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9Introduction
<e world economy is struggling since 2008 to emerge from a crisis that has no precedent since the 1930s. 
<e Luiss International Group on Economic Policy (LIGEP) has given, in 2010, its own assessment of the 
crisis. We warned that besides the policies needed to contrast the cyclical downturn, a serious e>ort was 
also needed to understand, and to address, the structural weaknesses that may impede future growth. <e 
present volume is a =rst attempt at this understanding, by focusing on the ways to durably improve the 
capacity of the economy, and in particular of the European Union economy, to grow in a sustainable way. 
While there is much more in sustainable growth than just output and income, this report focuses 
on productivity and technical progress, one of the most evident sources of divergence in performance 
between the EU and the United States. In this report we step back and take a longer and broader view of 
productivity behaviour. If productivity drives output, what drives productivity? Why do the developed 
nations di>er so much in their productivity performance? It is fairly easy to understand rapid productivity 
growth in many of the emerging economies as a process of catching up by importing capital and adopting 
technologies previously developed by OECD countries. It is harder to analyse the behaviour of countries, 
like the US, the EU-15, and Japan which have long operated close to the frontier of existing knowledge 
and technology. 
How then can we explain that since the mid-1990s Western Europe experienced a substantially lo-
wer productivity growth than the United States? For most EU countries the fall in productivity growth 
beyond US levels is usually traced to lower human capital accumulation, and a wealth of reasons going 
from rigidity in the labour and product markets to cultural attitude and faulty regulations. <e crisis is 
further deepening the gap: the United States are since 2010 on a path of recovery (however unsteady and 
fragile it may be), while the EU has been stuck in a sovereign debt and banking crisis that substantially 
decreases public and private investment, and hence hampers the future potential for growth.
A casual look at the data reveals nevertheless that there is nothing ineluctable behind this divergence. 
For the entire post-war period, up to 1995, productivity in Western Europe grew faster than in the US; 
therefore, the report sets as its =rst objective the understanding of the reasons behind the turnaround of 
the mid 1990s and of the strengths and weaknesses of each “model”. Most explanations start from the 
leading role of the United States in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution. 
But the report takes the stance that what is actually more important are di>erences in the e>ectiveness 
with which computers, the internet, and the web have been embedded in the production processes of the 
industries using these innovations, particularly retail and wholesale trade and other marketed services.
<e report reaches two conclusions that stand somewhat apart from the current literature. <e =rst 
is that the success of the US in maintaining high productivity growth derives from a complex set of 
interacting factors, which go well beyond simple market deregulation. In particular, we document how 
the role of policy has been paramount. Ironically, for a country that has been suspicious of government 
involvement in the private economy, it is the United States that appears to demonstrate the closest links 
between government policy and technological leadership. Examples may go back to the nineteenth centu-
ry, when land grants to railroads companies promoted the building of infrastructures. In the modern era, 
research support from the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation are credited 
with post-war American leadership in pharmaceuticals and biomedical research, as well as basic research 
in sciences. Defence-funded research and government-funded grants have presided over the early emer-
gence of American leadership in semiconductors, computers, software, biotech, and the Internet itself. 
Government antitrust policy is credited to the emergence of a software industry largely independent of 
computer hardware manufacturers. Last, but not least, the report stresses the role of educational policies, 
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where several sources of systemic US advantage stand out, most notably the mixed system of government- 
and private-funded research universities, the important role of US government agencies providing rese-
arch funding based on a criterion of peer review, and the strong position in a worldwide perspective of 
US business schools and US-owned investment banking, accounting, and management-consulting =rms. 
On this latter point, often invoked in the debate, so often indeed that it has become a cliché, the matter 
is far from clear. <e =nance models taught in these schools bear some responsibility in the =nancial crisis 
on the one hand, and on the other, it is diBcult to consider that the shadow banking system has been so 
successful. <e productivity in the US =nancial system seems rather to have been strongly over valuated.
Another factor which may explain the European lag in productivity is the peculiar constitution of Eu-
rope which has impeded the use of policy instruments like industrial and exchange rate policies and limi-
ted the use of traditional macroeconomic policy’s instruments. <at the design of European institutions 
has fatal Caws is becoming more and more apparent in the context of the sovereign debt crisis. <e conse-
quence of the =scal compact on productivity growth, for example, can’t be but negative as it is increasing 
the balance sheet recession of the private sector and reducing the capacity of the public sector to invest. 
While emphasizing the role of policy in a broad sense in providing an innovation-friendly envi-
ronment, the report also warns against the temptation to generalize, pointing out how the appropriate 
policies vary according to the sector, the country, or even the time period. For what concerns innovation 
and productivity growth, as most other domains in economics, one-size-does-not-=t-all. <is is what 
makes skilful institution building and policy implementation necessary conditions for sustained growth.
<e second main conclusion of the report is that it is necessary to avoid a one-sided critique of Europe 
and praise of the United States. <ere is a lot we do not know about the causes of productivity growth, 
and what we think we know depends on metrics on which we have faint con=dence. Multifactor produc-
tivity is rather a measure of our ignorance and it is a>ected by a myriad of variables, so many that we have 
an identi=cation problem. 
Besides, a number of factors point to a future slowdown of productivity growth in both areas, in-
cluding the demographic e>ect of an ageing population, the e>ects of globalization in draining away 
previously high-paying jobs in manufacturing and other sectors, and the e>ects of the post-2007 world 
=nancial crisis that is leaving consumers, banks, and governments burdened with excess debt. Europe 
also shares with the US the most serious threat of all, coming from the nature of innovation itself. While 
the process of invention and innovation is clearly not dying out, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that 
future innovation will have the e>ect of the previous Great Inventions. In other words, we do not know 
where and when would emerge the third industrial revolution.
Some factors, on the other hand, point to a future disadvantage of the United States: the e>ect of ri-
sing inequality is making the average growth rate of income in the US for the entire economy exceeds that 
of the “bottom 99%” by a substantial margin. <ere is thus an increasing gap between growth per capita 
and whatever measure of well-being we could design. <is is a clear indication that the US growth regime 
is not sustainable. Another headwind holding back the US more than Europe is its poorly performing 
secondary education system and rampant cost inCation in higher education that is in part the cause of a 
steady decline in the US ranking in international league tables of college completion. Also the US is far 
behind Europe in implementing policies to cope with global warming, and promoting green growth, that 
may be, in the future, important sources of technological advances and productivity increases.
the report is structured as follows
<e =rst chapter elicits the basic concepts and describes the relationship between output per capita and 
productivity since 1960, and then, in more detail, for the period since 1995. It inquires about the likely 
causes of the shifting growth rates of output and productivity in the US and in Western Europe over these 
di>erent periods. 
By de=nition there are only two ways for output per capita to rise, either through higher productivity 
or as a result of higher hours of work per member of the population. A striking aspect in the comparison 
between the two regions was a simultaneous transition after 1995. Europe’s growth of productivity moved 
from faster than the US to slower, while at the same time Europe’s growth of hours per capita moved from 
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slower than the US to faster. <ese opposing changes exactly cancelled out, so that European and US 
growth of output per capita was identical in the long period from 1977 to 2011, including the post-2007 
period of the great =nancial crisis. Hence remarkably, the US productivity growth revival had absolutely 
no e>ect on the level ratio for output per capita, which remained anchored at 70 percent with no sign of 
any European slippage after 1995. 
<e second chapter builds on the literature on the sources of growth. Growth accounting is a longstan-
ding method for decomposing output growth into its underlying sources, including changes in the quan-
tity and quality of labour, quantity and quality of capital, and a residual usually called “multi-factor 
productivity”(MFP). <is general introduction to the sources of growth is followed by a summary of 
conclusions from the more signi=cant recent studies for both the US and the EU-15. 
<e chapter identi=es a long list of reasons for di>erences in the behaviour of productivity growth in 
the United States and the EU-15, and to a lesser extent di>erences within the EU-15. Some of the reasons 
for slow productivity growth in Europe are not revealed at all by growth accounting or even by industry-
level analysis as in the speci=c discussion on market services productivity gap. Instead, a substantial part 
of the European productivity growth problem may be hidden inside the slow rate of Multi Factor Produc-
tivity (MFP) growth that, because of its residual nature is inCuenced by many factors and should not be 
taken as telling us something about technological change. Over the past 50 years European productivity 
has been held back by a long list of government interventions that lower the amount that each worker 
can produce. Examples include shop-closing rules that prevent shops from attaining their full eBciency 
by forcing them to remain empty for portions of the week; labor market regulations that prevent =rms 
from =ring employees who are no longer needed; and land-use regulations that protect small shops in the 
central city while preventing the construction of American-style “big boxes” like Wal-Mart and Target 
either in the middle of cities or on the periphery.
Hence the discussion of habits, culture and institutions focuses on the productivity-inhibiting aspects 
of attitudes, incentives and regulations. <e chapter concludes with evidence that there was a change after 
1995 in Europe toward fewer regulations, faster employment growth, but slower productivity growth, 
as inexperienced low-skill workers entered the labour force after previously being excluded by virtue of 
cultural attitudes, high taxes, or regulations. <ere was a change after 1995 in the US too. In retrospect 
the productivity revival was relatively short lived – say 1996-2003 – but the US labour market has radi-
cally changed. Usually labour market Cexibility is praised because it is supposed to help equilibrating the 
supply and demand for labour, thus keeping unemployment low. But since the stock market bubble of 
the early 2000s the increasing power given to management led in the US to savage cost cutting: a much 
more aggressive attitude in reducing employment in 2001-02 (and even more so later in 2008-09) than 
prior to 2000. A higher propensity to reduce labor hours in response to reductions in pro=ts and stock 
prices was reCected in an unusual drop in labor hours relative to output, with the counterpart that output 
per hour increased more than would have been expected. <is helps us to understand why the increase 
in the unemployment rate relative to the decline in output was about double in the US than what it was 
in Europe. 
Chapter 3 addresses the speci=c issue of innovation and innovation policies. R&D trends and the 
sectoral structure of the economy seem to play an important role in explaining the divergence of the past 
15-20 years. While the EU has an R&D intensity gap relative to the US in speci=c sectors, it also has a 
sectoral composition bias towards less R&D intensive sectors.
<e highest intensity gap in absolute terms can be observed in the ICT sector and other non-transport 
equipment sector. <e second highest relative gap emerges in commercial services where the intensity in 
the EU is one third of the corresponding =gure for the US Sectors with a large gap in R&D tend to have 
a large gap in productivity growth as well. 
<e literature on innovation distinguishes between the initial invention and its subsequent deve-
lopment and di>usion. A longstanding puzzle in the retardation of British economic growth after the 
1870s is the fact that many inventions initially made by British inventors were brought to commercial 
success in the US, Japan, and elsewhere.
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While predicting technological developments in advance is exceedingly diBcult, there is ample lite-
rature which points to particular national characteristics that help to explain, at least in retrospect, why 
particular inventions and industries came to be dominated by particular countries
Even in the dismal days of American pessimism during the years of the 1972-95, productivity 
slowdown, it was widely recognized that America’s private and state-supported research universities were 
its most successful export industry, at least as measured by its lead over other countries and its appeal for 
students from the rest of the world. <e interplay among these research universities, government research 
grants, and private industry was instrumental in achieving American leadership in the ICT industry, and 
it was no coincidence that Silicon Valley happened to be located next to Stanford University or that ano-
ther concentration of ICT companies in the hardware, software, and biotech industries was located in the 
Boston area near M.I.T. and Harvard. <e most important aspect of public policy appears to have been 
the relatively unfocussed support of research and training by the US government
<e literature on technological leadership omits a source of American advantage that is surely not 
insigni=cant. While language has little to do with domination in computer hardware (where indeed 
many of the components are imported), it is important for the American software industry that English 
long ago became the world’s leading second language in addition to being spoken as a =rst language by 
a critical mass of the world’s educated population. Another oft-neglected factor that should be discussed 
more often is the longstanding openness of the United States to immigration and the role of immigrants 
from India, East Asia, and elsewhere in providing the skilled labor that has been essential to the rise of 
Silicon Valley.
Chapter 4 investigates the role of the public sector in fostering productivity growth. <at sector 
mainly a>ects growth and productivity through three channels. <e =rst, and most straightforward, is 
public investment, and the building of infrastructure that enhance the productivity of the private sector. 
<e chapter emphasizes how less than perfect substitutability of production factors, externalities and sunk 
costs, constitute reasons for direct involvement of the government in the accumulation of capital in the 
economy. In terms of physical capital the comparative advantage goes to European countries that in general have 
more modern and eBcient infrastructures than the US. Externalities and market failures lead to a discrepancy 
between private and social returns. Every time that the social and private return of the provision of a given good 
diverges, there is under or over provision of that good. A number of investment projects (notably in infrastructures) 
have a large social return, while being not (or partially) pro=table for individual private entrepreneurs. In that case 
market provision is insuBcient, and there is room for public intervention.
Another aspect, also related to externalities and market failures, is transnational investment. <is is 
particularly important in deeply integrated economies, like the European Union, where area-wide infra-
structure development may become a bottleneck. In the European Commission’s intention, for example, 
the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) should become one of the cornerstones of the Europe 
2020 Strategy.
A second factor which may distort the comparison of productivity growth at the disadvantage of Eu-
rope is the way government production is measured. It is usually measured according to costs, i.e. on the 
assumption that productivity is stable. As, in general, government production is higher in Europe than in 
the US, this convention may lead to underestimate productivity growth in the former region. It also surely 
leads to underestimate the GDP of countries which have a “big government”. Privatization, say of the 
pension system, would result in higher pro=ts for European’s =nancial services industry and lower bene=ts 
for European’s retirees. <e higher pro=ts would likely be reCected in an increase in GDP. 
A recent report by the OECD (2008b) argues that in the next three decades the investment in infra-
structures will need to grow considerably to keep the pace of economic growth. <is is all the more true 
that most of the world growth will come from emerging countries where the stock of public capital is 
considerably lower, and hence its productivity higher. OECD (2008b) provides rough estimates of the 
investment need that, even with a very restrictive de=nition of physical infrastructures, range between 
2.5% and 3.5% of GDP
<e policy prescriptions of the report are then rather straightforward for what concerns the =nancing 
of infrastructure building (or maintenance). Public-Private-Partnership, increased user charges, increased 
involvement of other =nancing sources like pension funds. And the criticisms are also straightforward, 
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as the diBculty with infrastructures is their feature of public goods, that makes private and social returns 
diverge; it is unclear why would PPP emerge for non-rentable public works, unless substantial subsidies 
were given to =rms, thus renewing the problem of costs for the budget constrained public actors
It seems then unavoidable that an increase of the public capital stock passes by an increase in public 
spending, reversing the trend observed in the past two decades especially in advanced economies. But how 
can this be made compatible with the, also unavoidable, public budget constraints? Two ways deserve to 
be explored, increased taxation and/or allowance for a golden rule of public =nance which would permit 
investment to be =nanced out of public borrowing.
Where instead the US has an indisputable lead is the second channel identi=ed by the report, human 
capital accumulation. In the provision of education and research the role of policy and of institutions 
appears to be crucial, as witnessed by the di>erent paths of the US and of Europe recalled before. Educa-
tion and technical training are well-known examples of public goods whose social return justi=es public 
intervention even in presence of negative economic returns. <e report further notices how the notion 
of human capital accumulation somehow blurs the traditional national accounting distinction between 
current and capital expenditure by the government. Why should the wages of teachers and professors be 
considered as being di>erent from investment in bridges and railroads, when it comes to assessing the 
future capacity of the economy to produce income and well-being?
Last but not least, the role of the public sector in enhancing productivity growth is apparent in the 
institutions that foster (or hamper) innovation. A typical example is the US tradition of government se-
curities regulation that forced public disclosure of information and of access of equity research analysts to 
internal company information, fostering a large and active market for public o>erings, and this together 
with the relatively recent emergence of the venture capital industry provided ample =nance for start-up 
companies. Another example is the (in) eBciency of the judiciary system that in some countries imposes 
upon =rms high costs of doing business and, even more importantly, creates an environment of uncer-
tainty that reduces the incentives to risk taking and innovation.
Chapter 5 deals with Italy, pointing out what are the sources of its diBculties in the past two decades, 
and noticing that often these sources date further back in time. Italian overall performance is weaker than 
the EU average. Until the mid-1990s the increasing productivity growth in Italy was sustained by a decli-
ne of labour utilization and an increase of capital intensity due to high wages. <e labour market reforms 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s raised employment, but this led to stagnation in productivity growth, 
as less skilled workers entered the labour market.
Italy constitutes an interesting case study, because most of its features =t in the framework laid in 
chapters 1 and 2. Since the 90s a number of institutional features explain the low levels of investment per 
worker, R&D expenditure, and productivity. <e chronic instability of public =nances led to increased 
uncertainty for =rms, and to recurrent corrective measures that curtailed public investment. Wrong in-
centives were also given by subsidies and wage support schemes that resulted in excessive risk taking by 
private and public enterprises. Furthermore, taxes on incomes and pro=ts have constantly risen to reach 
nowadays European peak levels, in exchange for services of dismal quality.
Italy’s policy, in e>ect, aimed at maintaining real incomes, employment and production exactly where 
they were by increasing public expenditure which placed a tremendous burden on the public sector and 
publicly owned companies, impeding Cexible adjustment. <e public =nance problem was worsened by 
the introduction of generous pension and health bene=ts, enacted in the late 1970s and early 1980s in 
order to mitigate social conCict. <ese bene=ts were partly =nanced through higher sales and labour taxa-
tion which contributed even more to increasing the already excessive labour costs and accelerated labour 
shedding.
A main inhibiting factor in Italian policy was the perpetuation of a “three legs subsidy system” made 
up of incentives, extraordinary wage support schemes (cassa integrazione straordinaria and mobilità) and 
extraordinary administration proceedings (amministrazione straordinaria) provided to public and private 
companies. Within this framework, protection of domestic companies has also been ensured by means 
of closed public procurement (around 14% on annual GDP) and a contracting system for engineering 
and infrastructure works that has systematically favoured local companies often violating European rules, 
delayed new technology adoption, and fuelled rampant corruption by politicians and administrators.
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<ey contributed to maintain industry specialization in less technological sectors – despite the presen-
ce of some highly competitive industries – with prevalence of labour intensive industries, low innovation 
and relatively low knowledge intensity
In this context, the adverse e>ect of high taxation on private investment decisions is likely to have 
been compounded by the acute uncertainty generated by changes in tax rates and tax rules.
<e reports provides industry level evidence showing that both in trade and in business services, ho-
tels and restaurants, personal and public services productivity is on average lower than in the European 
counterparts.
<e lagging productivity growth in Italy can be explained primarily by scale of operations (the predo-
minance of small and medium enterprises), land and product market regulation, labour barriers including 
tax wedges and wage regulations and infrastructure gap.
<e reports points at institutions also to explain the dismal performance of the labour market. Wo-
men’s participation rate is kept low by insuBcient provision of welfare services such as child care and fa-
mily bene=ts, while distorted incentives in the pension system and insuBcient investment in active labour 
market policies keep young and senior citizens away from the labour market.
Contrary to common wisdom, the Italian labour market is not particularly rigid on average. Nevertheless, 
it is strongly dualistic, with a majority of highly protected workers that carry high gross labour costs (both di-
rectly in terms of high =scal and contributive wedge and indirectly in terms of social rights and =ring costs). At 
the other extreme we =nd temporary workers with lower =ring costs, =scal wedge and social security charges. 
<is dualistic structure distorts the incentives of =rms, which tend to hire non-protected workers because of 
the economic and regulatory bene=ts of temporary contracts. <is in turn reduces incentives for human capital 
investments, and temporary employment creation tends to be in low-skill areas.
<e chapter concludes by considering human capital and the educational system, also responsible for 
low productivity growth. <e Italian labour market seems to be unable to absorb tertiary degree holders 
in similar proportions to other EU countries while its university system is in turn characterized by low 
tertiary attainment. <e report also points out that the Italian system is unable to attract foreign students 
as well as foreign faculty/researchers, and that wage premia of graduates in Italy are lower than in Europe, 
although there are signi=cant gender di>erences. <e important skill mismatch contributes to the low 
productivity of the system as a whole.
In spite of this, Italian research remains of good quality, even if the channels of transmission to the 
=rm sector are ineBcient, leading to poor di>usion of innovation. Cooperation between universities and 
business is discouraged by several factors such as high costs, risk-aversion, a weak innovation culture and 
lack of institutional capacity to support inventions.
Italy performs especially poorly in “human resources” (which measures the availability of a high-skil-
led and educated workforce) and in “=rms investments”: private R&D expenditure only reaches 0.67% 
of GDP against the EU average of 1.23% and public expenditure for R&D in Italy stands at 0.54% of 
GDP against 0.76% in EU27.
Last, but not least, industrial policy is also incapable to foster productivity growth. In particular, and 
especially in a period of recession and =scal consolidation such as the present, facilitating access to credit 
should be part of industrial policy. In Italy the productive system is dominated by SMEs and non-banking 
means are relatively scarce since equity =nancing continues to play a modest role in the Italian context 
compared to other EU countries. <erefore, direct support to =rms and, more importantly, constant 
attention to a proper functioning of the credit system, become paramount. <e scarce public resources 
should also be allocated to the sectors in which the potential for productivity growth is larger (business 
services, ICT, etc.), and in which Italy can more easily =ll the gap with other European countries.
<e crisis appears to have acted as a catalyst for structural reforms. <e OECD Going for Growth 
2012 analysis points out that, compared to the pre-crisis period, the Italian responsiveness to the recom-
mendations addressed to OECD countries has greatly increased. A lot has been done especially since 
2011. It is likely that these reforms, notably the reduction of regulatory barriers to competition, streng-
thening incentives for innovation and labour market reforms, will address the delay of productivity per-
formance in Italy, both in the whole economy and in the services sector. 
Finally, an appendix is devoted to the study of some exit strategies in the labour market. 
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policy recommendations
<e focus of the report is on productivity and potential growth, and as such it is more concerned with 
the long than with the short run. In short we are trying to =gure out what are the policy measures which 
may lead to an increase in potential productivity growth. It is worth emphasizing that an increase of a 
few tenths of points would have considerable e>ects on growth per capita in the medium and long runs. 
Unfortunately there is no magic recipe to reach such a goal, at least for what concern advanced economies. 
But doubts do not imply paralysie. Whatever the limitation of our knowledge, it is not empty. 
<e challenge is therefore to design and implement policies aimed at improving the long run potential 
growth rate of the economy, in a context of depressed short/medium growth.
Although the US economy is far from being a model (as the report points out at length), its produc-
tivity growth in the past decades has been globally superior to the EU average. <e report emphasizes, 
with no pretence of being original, a mix of institutions, of human capital accumulation, and of industrial 
policies that explain this superior performance.
<e comparison between EU countries and the US, nevertheless, allowed us to highlight at least three 
features that are less commonly discussed in the literature.
<e =rst feature is linked to the dynamics of hours worked. Chapter one runs counter most of the 
literature trying to explain the crossing of trend productivity growth in the US and in the EU, in the mid 
1990s. Instead of (or in addition to) the di>erent di>usion of the internet revolution, whose importance 
is probably overstated, the report highlights a social transition that happened later in Europe (especially 
in Mediterranean countries) than in the United States.
Prior to the mid 1990s the European social model was characterized by low employment and partici-
pation rates (in particular among women), and a reduction of working hours that accompanied the incre-
ase of productivity. Reforms in the 1990s changed this model, trying to adapt to changing environmental 
conditions, and to associate increased productivity with increased employment. A number of changes 
have been implemented: the reform of pension systems (notably with higher retirement age), induced 
by longer life expectancy; policies supporting female and youth employment, through incentives to part-
time work and the creation of Cexible contracts; the e>ect of immigration Cows on labor supply; All these 
factors have changed the position of labor supply and demand curves. <e objective of full employment, 
that inspired national reforms but also EU policies had a negative e>ect on productivity dynamics. <e 
entry on the labor market of less quali=ed workers, and more intensive use of capital goods, have nega-
tively a>ected wages and competitiveness of the European productive system. But it had a fairly positive 
impact on well-being as employment is one of the main objective factors determining it. 
<is perspective opens the way to a number of prescriptions for policy makers:
() Investment is of course a key factor. Reducing capital intensity would have a negative impact on 
productivity; therefore the challenge is to increase employment at constant capital intensity. Capital 
accumulation must accompany employment growth. <e previous LIGEP report highlighted how 
investment in Europe has been insuBcient in the current crisis. <e present report suggests that this 
is likely to cause even more serious problems in the future capacity of the economy to grow. <e 
report further emphasizes that the tight constraints that member States face with regards to their 
public =nances calls for a serious European infrastructure building e>ort, much larger in size and in 
scope than the one the recent European summits have agreed upon.
() As for private investment, the report suggests that both public and private credit Cows need to be 
improved, especially in countries that rely on credit more than on capital markets, like Italy. <e 
credit crunch is widely discussed as one of the major factors that prevent the recovery of the Euro-
pean economy. <e report argues that it is also an obstacle to productivity growth in the long run. 
A better access to =nance is thus a crucial instrument for allowing European =rms, especially small 
and medium sized enterprises to invest. But this supposes to resolve the rampant European banking 
crisis which caracterises the Euro area today. 
() Several European countries have devised measures to reduce labour costs and to avoid disinvestment 
in =rm speci=c human capital by encouraging and subsidizing part time employment. <ese policies 
have given to Europe a decisive advantage vis à vis the US in smoothing the evolution of unemploy-
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ment. <ey should be pursued and generalized to southern countries where the rate of unemploy-
ment has reached unacceptable levels. To the extent that these policies are alike internal devaluation, 
they should be coordinated at the European level. 
() What the recent period taught us is that the outcome of employment policies depends also of the 
balance of power between =rms and workers. If more Cexibility is desirable to adapt to changing 
circumstances, it should not come at the expense of economic security. <e European policy makers 
should devise labour market reforms keeping an eye on the bargaining power of the workers. 
() <e changing European social model also calls for a broader rethinking of the labor-life cycle. So 
far the only response our economies have been capable to give to higher life expectancy has been in-
creasing the number of years spent at work. It may be worth to consider incentives to schooling and 
late entry in the labor market as complementary policies. Indeed, the more educated the labor force, 
the fewer of them will be doing arduous low-skilled work. Professionals like to work longer because 
their work is rewarding and ful=lling. So the larger the percentage of the population is educated, the 
higher retirement ages can be. 
<e second feature of the report that emerges as peculiar is linked to MFP growth. <e break-up by sec-
tor shows that Market Services account for a large part of the transatlantic gap in productivity, and more 
importantly were the main factor behind the crossing of productivity trend lines in the 1990s. <e report 
highlights that this is explained by poor MFP dynamics rather than intensity or productivity of single 
factors. However, once Europe is disaggregated by country groups, the dismal performance of this sector 
results to be a prominent feature of Southern Countries while Northern Countries have achieved remark-
able improvements, in particular where important reforms have been realized.
Among market services, the retail industry is the most important example: low productivity in that 
sector is on one side due to di>erent urban development and transportation models (that favour small 
scale businesses rather than large shopping malls as in the US); on the other, it is due to oligopolistic 
practices, excess of red tape and regulation, corporatism, and scarce incentives to innovation (e.g. e-
commerce). <ese limits, Cagrant in the retail sector, are in fact common to most of the services sector. 
<is calls for a series of policy prescriptions: 
() <e =rst and most obvious is of course to streamline regulation and to enhance competition through 
contrast to oligopolistic practices, reduction of red tape, and most importantly =ghting corporatist 
practices.
() <e second is to adapt the infrastructure system to enhance the logistics, and thus the productivity, 
of the di>use retail trade network of EU countries. It has to be emphasized that “Infrastructure” is a 
term with a broad de=nition – it encompasses everything in the external environment that makes a 
person or a business =rm more productive. 
() <e third is to transform the ‘weakness’ of the small scale retail network in ‘strength’, through the 
development of quality and value added and incentives to craftsmanship, while at the same time 
transferring as much as possible to large distribution the commerce of low added value goods.
<ese prescriptions, speci=c to retail trade, can be generalized to other service sectors, like for example 
tourism, where the insuBciencies of Infrastructures and of better organization (for example of the trans-
port network) at the European scale is Cagrant. <is of course relates to prescription 1 above, giving hints 
as of how a European infrastructure network should be built.
A word of caution is in order. We have identi=ed four sectors -- wholesale trade, retail trade, =nancial 
services, and business services – where European productivity lags behind its US counterpart. <is lag is 
mostly explained by the di>ering trends in MFP, a variable which is in some ways a measure of our igno-
rance. It is likely that our ignorance is deeper that what we think. In e>ect, much of the increase in GDP 
today occurs not as a result of, say, an increase in the number of cars purchased, but of their quality and 
our metrics is poor for measuring quality1. For material productions we may use some conventions which 
allow us to account for quality improvement, as we do when we use hedonic prices for computers. But 
1  Cf. Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz: Mismeasuring our Life, the New Press, 2010.
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the diBculty is compounded when we deal with services. Whereas for manufactures it is easy to de=ne 
the unit purchased, this is much harder for many services2. <is diBculty has long been recognized and 
it implies that for the service sector, especially for complex services, the quality question will be much 
harder to resolve. And precisely, we have identi=ed the sectors where European productivity is lagging as 
wholesale trade, retail trade, =nancial services, and business services. A modicum of historical sensitivity 
would tell us that we were wrong in our measurement of output and productivity for the =nancial sector 
in the US. Business services are complex services, and we have to go deep into the details of the compari-
son before coming with a robust conclusion. Even in the retail sector, it is not so easy to de=ne the unit 
purchased. Our conclusions are thus to be taken with caution, hoping that in the future better metrics 
will allow us to be more precise.
<e third theme that emerges from the report also pertains to MFP and technical progress. <e re-
port emphasizes the two pillars that sustain the US leadership in innovation and growth: on one side an 
eBcient system of private =nancing of invention and innovation (mostly through private equities and 
venture capital) and on the other an important role for government policies. Europe has largely been on 
the opposite path, with absent (or harmful) government policies, and ineBcient =nancing.
() <e =rst policy prescription is therefore to enhance or more often develop the capacity of the system 
to =nance innovation whose returns are uncertain and/or distant in time; in more extreme cases, in-
centives should be designed to induce =rms to face short term losses in return from investment that 
is rentable only in the long run. Environmental technologies are a typical example. It is doubtful that 
such an objective could be reached without an explicit industrial policy. 
() Tertiary education is instrumental to raise productivity. Because of globalization, Europe’s industry 
specialization is changing: employment is shifting from primary and basic manufacturing sectors 
to knowledge-intensive activities which require high-skilled workforce. As a result, investment in 
tertiary education becomes essential as it contributes to increase a country’s ability to innovate. <e 
European system is lagging behind the US one, because the search for formal equality comes often at 
the expenses of quality. In devising reforms of the university system, Europe should aim at substantial 
equality that is meritocracy. Some features of the US system may be imitated and some others have to 
be rejected. In particular, meritocracy should not be limited among the higher income deciles of the 
population (whose weight is increasing among the students of the top universities). At the contrary, 
student from poor families have to be helped on order to concour on equal footing with the others. 
() <e report also emphasizes the need of a bidirectional exchange between the education system and 
the productive sector (private and public alike), that in Europe is limited by regulation and by cor-
poratism.
2 Cf. !e Atkinson Review: Final Report, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2005
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Chapter 1 
Productivity: Basic Concepts, Historical Context,  
and Current Puzzles
1.1 
introduction
While both the US and Europe su+ered acutely from the 2007-09 world ,nancial crisis and began their 
recoveries at roughly the same time in mid-2009, their path of recovery has diverged in 2011 and 2012. 
Fiscal austerity measures imposed in several European countries have tilted them back into recession, whi-
le the US has delayed its ,scal reckoning and, partly as a result of continuing ,scal stimulus and very easy 
monetary policy, has experienced a slow but steady recovery. To the extent that this divergence, between a 
recovery in the US and renewed recession in parts of Europe, extends beyond 2012 for several more years, 
it will widen the longstanding gap between per capita output in the US and in Europe. Notice that this 
divergence has nothing to do with the fundamentals determinants of potential growth but much to do 
with the way Europe is dealing with the sovereign debt crisis, imposing almost everywhere restrictive ,scal 
policies and structural reforms in the hope that present recession will boost future growth. 
-e fundamental driver of output growth (when growth is allowed for) is the growth of labour pro-
ductivity1. For the entire post-war period up to 1995, productivity in Western Europe, hereafter the “EU-
15” (the pre-2004 members of the EU) grew faster than in the US In what Europeans sometimes call the 
golden years between 1945 and 1973, rapid European productivity growth mainly re.ected catching up 
to American technology that the US was able to adopt between 1914 and 1945, while Europe was su+e-
ring from wartime destruction and interwar economic chaos. Between 1973 and 1995, Europe continued 
to catch up in its level of productivity until 1995 where it reached 92 to 95 per cent of the US level. In this 
period the main driving force was not particularly rapid European growth but rather the widely discussed 
and somewhat puzzling US productivity growth slowdown. In the 80s, productivity growth in the US 
was on average 0, 80 per cent. But it is worth remembering that at that time, Europe was admiring US 
performances because of its higher “employment content” of growth. 
After 1995 Europe’s productivity growth fell behind that of the US in two stages, ,rst during the 
relatively prosperous years 1995 -20072 and in a second phase during the post-2007 years of the ,nancial 
crisis. -e current divergence of paths, with renewed recession in parts of Western Europe and continued 
recovery in the US, threatens to further worsen Europe’s relative productivity performance. 
In this report we step back and take a longer and broader view of productivity behaviour. If produc-
tivity drives output, what drives productivity? Why do the developed nations di+er so much in their pro-
ductivity performance? It is fairly easy to understand rapid productivity growth in many of the emerging 
economies as a process of catching up by importing capital and adopting technologies previously develo-
1  In times of depression, as the 30s teach us, productivity stagnates as a consequence of the de,ciency in global demand. -e 
actual evolution of productivity thus depends also of demand factors. -e relationship to which we refer assumes that no 
distorting factors are coming from the demand side. Cf. Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Anthony B. Atkinson, Olivier J. Blanchard, 
John S. Flemming, Edmond Malinvaud, Edmund S. Phelps and Robert M. Solow: Pour l’emploi et la cohésion sociale, 
Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1994. 
2 Europe’s strategy was in e+ect to decrease the cost of labour through payroll tax reductions and wage moderation in order 
to allow the hiring of less skilled workers. 
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ped by OECD countries. It is harder to analyse the behaviour of countries, like the US, the EU-15, and 
Japan which have long operated close to the frontier of existing knowledge and technology. -is report 
examines productivity growth in the so-called “rich nations,” both di+erences among groups of countries 
and also changes in behaviour over time. Most of the emphasis is on contrasts between the US and the 
EU-15, with occasional references to the Japanese experience.
-is section of the report begins by clarifying the relationship between output per capita and produc-
tivity, which are almost the same concept, but not quite. We recognize that the measures of the economy’s 
total real output used to de,ne both the standard of living and productivity are imperfect, and that there 
are many aspects of the standard of living that are neglected in the output statistics. Di+erences in the 
time paths of the basic concepts are examined for the post-war period going back to 1960, and then in 
more detail for the shorter period since 1995. -e chapter summarizes the consensus in the literature as 
to what caused the shifting growth rates of output and productivity over these di+erent eras.
-e outstanding puzzle in recent years, at least for 1995-2007 prior to the ,nancial crisis, is why Eu-
rope’s productivity growth slowed down while that of the US speeded up. -is chapter summarizes some 
of the broader causes in the recent literature. Among the possible causes of the transatlantic disparity 
is the leading role of the US in the internet revolution, partly in the innovation of hardware and more 
importantly software. More important are di+erences in the e+ectiveness with which computers, the in-
ternet, and the web have been implemented in the industries using these innovations, particularly retail 
and wholesale trade and other marketed services. Some of the causes include di+erences in regulations 
between the US and the EU-15 and within the EU-15 itself, involving such issues as land-use planning, 
product-market regulations, and labour-market regulations. -e report avoids a one-sided critique of 
Europe and praise of the United States.
-e ,nal section identi,es six “headwinds” that may slow future economic growth and that have 
impacts di+ering in the US and EU-15. -e e+ect of rising inequality distorts the data, making the 
average growth rate of income in the US for the entire economy exceed that of the “bottom 99%” by a 
substantial margin. Another headwind holding back the US more than Europe is its poorly performing 
secondary education system and rampant cost in.ation in higher education that is in part the cause of 
a steady decline in the US ranking in international league tables of college completion. Also the US is 
far behind Europe in implementing policies to cope with global warming, and any movement in the US 
toward a carbon tax will hinder future growth. Europe shares in common with the US other headwinds, 
including the demographic e+ect of an ageing population that will reduce future growth in hours of work 
per capita, the e+ects of globalization in draining away previously high-paying jobs in manufacturing and 
other sectors, and the e+ects of the post-2007 world ,nancial crisis in the form of consumers, banks, and 
governments burdened with excess debt.
-e most serious threat of all, however, comes from the nature of innovation. Steady future GSP 
growth at the past rate of 1.5 or 2 per cent per year is not guaranteed.3 -at rate of growth in the past 
140 years has been achieved by a cluster of innovations, mainly in the late 19th century, which brought 
the world electricity, the internal combustion engine, running water, and indoor plumbing, and all of 
the supplementary innovations that were made possible after that – household appliances, manufactu-
ring machinery, motor vehicles, airplanes, superhighways, supermarkets, suburbs, and air conditioning. 
While many of these inventions took a century or more to be fully developed, they can be characterized 
as “one-time-only” inventions, i.e., changes that would not be repeated endlessly into the future. Speed 
accelerated from that of a horse to that of a Boeing 707 in 1958, but has not increased further since then. 
Central heating and air conditioning have made it possible to maintain room temperatures evenly (at 70 
degrees F or 21 °C) in summer and winter, but we can’t make the climate any more comfortable than 
that. -ere was virtually no economic growth between the Roman Empire and Britain in 1750, and then 
the world got used to a steady burst of innovations since then. But, while innovation is clearly not dying 
out, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that future innovation will have the e+ect of the previous Great 
Inventions in brightening the evening, speeding transport, eliminating household drudgery, and bringing 
comfortable indoor temperatures. 
3  -e growth rate of output per capita in the US between 1929 and 2007 was 2.2 percent per year.
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1.2 
definitions: output per capita  
and productivity are almost the same thing, but not quite
-e concept of labour productivity, often called simply “productivity,” is almost the same as output per 
capita, but not quite. -e latter, by de,nition, divides output by the population, whereas productivity 
divides the same measure of output by the total number of hours worked in a year by all the employees. 
-us if each employee works 40 hours per week for 50 weeks per year, then he or she contributes 2,000 
hours per year. If there are 10 million such employees in a country, total hours are equal to 20 billion. If 
real GDP is $1,000 billion, then productivity is $50 per hour. 
By de,nition there are only two ways for output per capita to rise, either through higher productivity 
or as a result of higher hours of work per member of the population. -roughout history people have 
shown their preference to work fewer rather than more hours, and so to make possible a reduction in 
hours for more vacations and days o+, on average productivity rises somewhat more rapidly than output. 
-is was particularly true in Western Europe between 1960 and 1995, when hours per person declined 
substantially, holding back growth in GDP relative to the growth in productivity.4 -is relationship also 
extends to comparisons across countries. When the EU-15 are compared as a unit with the United States, 
they enjoyed faster productivity growth than the US between 1970 and 1995, and in fact their producti-
vity almost caught up to the US level over that interval, but their output per person languished at about 
70 percent of the US level. -is di+erence was due by de,nition to a decline in EU-15 hours per person 
by about 30 percent relative to the United States.
After 1995 the relationship changed. Hours in Europe rose relative to the US but productivity growth 
slipped back5, primarily because Europe did not share in the post-1995 US productivity growth revival 
that is usually interpreted as a bene,t of the internet and the invention of the world-wide web in the late 
1990s. Why Europe reaped fewer bene,ts from web-related innovation is one of the main productivity 
puzzles that we explore here, building on a rich literature to which both Europeans and Americans have 
made important contributions.
-e behaviour of hours per person can move in either direction, and thus we have witnessed eras in 
which productivity grew more rapidly than output per capita for decades and when the reverse was true. 
A leading example of fast growth in output per capita and slow growth in productivity occurred in the US 
between 1965 and 1990, which was the interval when the role of women was revolutionized. Social atti-
tudes changed from the assumption that women would stay home with their children to the new culture 
that women would work and have full-life careers, with only relatively short intervals of labour-force exit 
to bear children and take care of them while young. Output per capita could rise faster than productivity, 
simply because hours of work per capita increased as women entered market work.
-e entry of females into the labour force proceeded more slowly in the EU-15 and in 1985 the 
participation rate of Spanish women was only half that of Swedish women. As a result, the increased 
participation of women that dominated the behaviour of hours per person in the US was instead domi-
nated in Europe during 1970-95 by a move to a shorter work week, earlier retirement, longer vacations, 
and a higher unemployment rate. After 1995, as we shall see, this contrast was reversed, and the EU-15 
experienced an almost exactly o+setting increase in their growth of hours and employment relative to the 
US combined with a decrease in their relative growth in productivity. Subsequently we will discuss the 
extent to which there was after 1995 in Europe a trade-o+ between faster employment growth and lower 
productivity growth. If so, then Europe’s productivity problems after 1995 did not just involve a slow 
adaptation of the bene,ts of computers and the internet, but rather the outcome of a social transition that 
had occurred earlier in the US than in Europe, particularly in the Mediterranean countries.
4 An hour not worked because of longer vacations, a shorter work week, higher unemployment, and lower labor-force 
participation does not automatically create an equally valuable hour of leisure. Hours of work generate large amounts of 
tax revenue that hours of leisure do not, and some hours (particularly those of the unemployed) are less valuable than the 
after-tax value of work. See Gordon (2011a).
5  Of course, part of the divergence in productivity trends may be explained by this relative change in hours worked. 
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1.3 
alternating intervals of advantage and disadvantage: the contrasting  
history of growth in the us and the eu-15 since 1960
-e di+ering history of growth in per capita output versus productivity in the EU-15 and the US can be 
clari,ed if we look at a series of graphs, all of which plot the data from 1960 to 2011. Figure 1.1 exhibits 
growth in productivity in the EU-15 and in the US, showing much faster growth in the EU-15 in the 
1960s, a growth slowdown for both the EU-15 and the US between 1960 and 1980. After 1980 EU-15 
growth continued to outpace that of the US, which experienced a low growth plateau from the late 1970s 
to 1995, but the margin between rapid EU-15 growth and slower US growth continued to narrow. -e 
margin by which EU-15 growth exceeded that of the US fell from three percentage points in the late 
1960s, to two percentage points in the late 1970s, to less than one percentage point between 1985 and 
1995.6 After 1995 the relationship .ipped around; Europe’s productivity growth continued to decelerate 
while that in the US rejuvenated between 1995 and 2002. However, this US revival did not last, and by 
2007-11 the growth path had returned to roughly the same relatively low pace as during 1986-96. US 
productivity growth was notably better than in the EU-15 not just during the pre-crisis years of 1997-
2007, but also during the post-2007 years of the ,nancial crisis, recession, and recovery.
Figure 1.1 – Annual growth in H-P trend of output per hour in the EU-15 and the United States, 1961-2011
Figure 1.2 shows for the same period the smoothed growth rates of output per capita in the EU-15 
as contrasted with the US; the volatile year-to-year changes in growth rates are smoothed by the same 
technique as in Figure 1.1. -is graphical depiction of output growth is surprisingly di+erent than the 
previous graph displaying productivity growth. Growth of output per capita in the EU-15 slowed down 
to the American rate by 1977 and did not exceed it thereafter. In fact the EU-15 slowdown from 4 to 
2 percent growth during 1971 to 1977 echoes the same slowdown in the US that happened a few years 
earlier between 1964 and 1970. After 1977 Figure 1.2 evokes the song “Me and My Shadow,” because 
EU-15 growth of smoothed output per capita almost exactly mimics the US growth rate of one or two 
6 Growth in both productivity and output per-capita are quite volatile from year-to-year. -e data graphed in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 are 
trends extracted from the annual data using the Hodrick-Prescott method with a smoothness parameter of 100.
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years earlier. -ere were short-lived revivals in 1983-89 and 1994-2000 on both sides of the Atlantic, fol-
lowed by a relentless slide down to negative growth of output per capita after 2008. Because growth in 
EU-15 and US output per capita was so similar between 1977 and 2011, the level of EU-15 output per 
capita failed to make any progress in catching up to the US level.
Figure 1.2 – Annual Growth in H-P Trend of Output per Capita in the EU-15 and the US, 1961-2011
By de,nition, output per capita equals productivity times hours per capita. -at same de,nition means 
that, since output per capita growth in Figure 1.2 was virtually identical after 1977, di+erences between 
the EU-15 and the US in productivity growth shown in Figure 1.1 must have been o+set by the opposite 
pattern of growth rates of hours per capita. -us it is no surprise that the EU-15 productivity growth ad-
vantage of 1977-95 of Figure 1.1 is o+set by a shortfall of growth in hours per capita over the same period 
in Figure 1.3. In fact EU-15 smoothed hours per capita had a negative growth rate of more than minus 
one percent for more than two decades between 1961 and 1982. 
For the decade after 1995 the two lines in Figure 1.3 form the shape of an “X” in which the US growth 
rate collapses while the EU-15 growth rate soars upward, at least temporarily. -roughout 2000-2011, 
the smoothed growth rate of US hours per capita is negative. -is explains at least in the arithmetic sense 
why the US was able to achieve a much better productivity performance in the past 15 years without gain-
ing any further advantage in the margin by which its output per capita exceeds that in Europe.
-us the growth rates examined so far are for smoothed changes in productivity, output per capita, 
and hours per capita. We can also look at the ratio of the actual level of these variables in the EU-15 rela-
tive to their values in the US7 As shown in Figure 1.4 by 1995 European productivity had reached 91.7 
percent of that of the United States and then by 2011 slipped back to 83.0 percent. -ree European 
countries exceeded the US level for a few years during the 1990s: France was at 103.6 percent in 1995, 
7 Working-age population and hours can be compared directly across countries. However, output in one country can be compared to 
another only by adopting a uniform set of prices for each good or service. -e available data provide two alternative international price 
weighting schemes; these are the “G-K” (Geary-Khamis) weights calculated in 1990 dollars and the “E-K-S” (Eltetö, Köves, and Szulc) 
weights calculated in 2008 dollars. All data on productivity, output per capita, and hours per capita come from the Groningen economy 
wide database, now housed at the Conference Board. See http://www.conference-board.org/economicdatabase/.
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while Belgium achieved a ratio of 108.1 percent and the Netherlands a ratio of 105.0 percent. All three 
of these nations had fallen back under 100 percent of the US level by 2011. 
Figure 1.3 – Annual Growth in H-P Trend per Capita in the EU15-US, 1961-2011
Figure 1.4 – Ratio of EU-15 to US, Output per Capita and Output per Hour, 1960-2011
-e grey line in Figure 1.4 displays the EU-15 ratio to the US of output per capita, using the same de,ni-
tion of output as the black productivity line. Just as the smoothed growth rates of Figure 1.2 displayed 
 
 
25
an amazing similarity after 1977, so the ratio in Figure 1.4 is extremely stable after 1977, varying only 
between 69 and 72 percent. Short-lived upward movements in the ratio such as in 1981-83 re.ect US 
recessions, while intervals when the ratio slipped below 70 percent are the counterpart of prosperous peri-
ods in the US such as 1985-90 and 1997-2000. -e small bulge in the ratio in 2008-09 suggests that the 
recession associated with the world ,nancial crisis was more severe in the US than in the EU-15.
-e diverging behavior of the two lines in Figure 1.4 is consistent with a decline before 1995 in the 
ratio of hours per capita in the EU-15 relative to the US and a reversal after 1995. -e solid line in Figure 
1.5 displays the epochal drop in that ratio from 126 percent in 1960 to 76 percent in 1997, followed by 
a recovery to 86 percent in 2011. What caused these movements? Once again, de,nitions help to clarify 
these changes. Hours per capita by de,nition equals employment per capita times hours per employee. 
Employment per capita declines either when there is a rise in the unemployment rate, as occurred in 
Europe after the mid-1980s, or if labor-force participation declines. Hours per employee can decline as a 
result of more weeks of vacation, fewer work days per week, or fewer number of work hours per day. Since 
Figure 1.5 plots ratios of these variables to the US, a downward movement could also re.ect an increase 
for the US, including its rise in female labor-force participation between 1965 and 1990. 
Figure 1.5 – Ratio of EU-15 to the US, Hours per Capita, Hours per Employee, Employees per Capita, 1960-2011
All of these factors help to account for the divergent behavior of hours per capita in the EU-15 relative to 
the US -e solid black line in Figure 1.5 displays the steady decline in the ratio of EU-15 to US hours per 
capita from 1960 to about 1997, followed by a modest recovery in two phases, 1997-2003 and then again 
in the recession period 2008-11. -e two components of the hours per capita ratio are also plotted in 
Figure 1.5. -e solid grey line is employment per capita, and the dashed grey line is hours per employee. 
-e EU-15 to US ratio of employment per capita fell steadily from 1960 to 1995, with a few cyclical 
bumps along the way, but then it recovered substantially after 1997. -e ,nal phase of this recovery after 
2007 occurs in part because both employment and labor-force participation fell much more in the US 
than in Europe in the aftermath of the world ,nancial crisis. -e decline in the plotted ratio for hours 
per employee was quite steady from 1960 to 2000, but in the past decade the decline has stopped and the 
ratio has settled down to a plateau of about 88 percent.
-e time-series plots of the ,ve ratios in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 are summarized in Table 1.1, which 
displays both levels and growth rates for 1960, 1973, 1995, 2007, and 2011. Because the intervals are of 
di+erent lengths, we focus here on the annual growth rates shown in the bottom four lines of Table 1.1. 
 
26 1. productivity
-e ,rst column shows that the European level of output per capita grew much faster than the US level 
from 1960 to 1973, then inched up slightly further by 2007 and then declined slightly back to the 1995 
ratio by 2011. -e growth rates in the second column show the much greater speed of catching up of the 
productivity ratio through 1995, followed by a slow decline through 2007 and more rapid decline during 
2007-11. 
 
Table 1.1 – Levels and growth rates of Output and Labour Utilization: Ratio of EU-15 to US, 1960-2011
Output
per Capite Outputper Hour
Hours
per Capite
Hours 
per
Employees
Employee 
per Capite
Levels
1960 60.1 48.6 126.0 109.8 111.4
1973 68.2 69.0 102.3 101.4 100.8
1995 70.4 91.7 77.3 89.6 86.3
2007 71.5 86.3 82.2 88.0 93.4
2011 70.4 82.6 85.5 87.2 98.0
Annual Growth Rates
1960-1973 1.0 2.7 -1.6 -0.6 -0.8
1973-1995 0.1 1.3 -1.3 -0.6 -0.7
1995-2007 0.1 -0.5 0.5 -0.2 0.7
2007-2011 -0.4 -1.1 1.0 -0.2 1.2
Source: Conference Board Total Economy Database, accessed April 2012
-e third column shows the steady decrease in the ratio of hours per capita between 1960 and 1995, fol-
lowed by a signi,cant recovery. -e mirror-image behavior of the second and third columns after 1973 
has elicited interest in the idea of a trade-o+ between hours and productivity growth, which we explore 
further below. As shown in the fourth column hours per employee also declined relatively steadily from 
1960 to 1995, followed by a much smaller rate of decline after 1995. Employment per capita exhibits a 
similar decline through 1995 and a more dramatic turnaround after 1995. In fact, the ratio of EU-15 to 
US employment per capita has almost returned to the level of 1973, in part re.ecting the dismal US labor 
market of the last several years. 
1.4 
explanations for the overall patterns in the data: a concise history
-e data charts and table discussed in the previous section pose a number of questions. For each of the major in-
tervals (1960-73, 1973-95, 1995-2007, 2007-11) we observe faster or slower growth in the EU-15 and/or 
the US in productivity, output per capita, and hours per capita. Sometimes the two sides of the Atlantic 
display an identical performance, such as for 1977-2012 the growth rate of output per capita in Figure 1.2 
or the ratio of the level of per-capita output in Figure 1.4. Most of the time, however, the US and EU-15 
behave quite di+erently. -is section provides a broad overview of explanations, organized around several 
puzzles suggested by the charts. -is section ends with a summary of the major factors that appear to mat-
ter for productivity growth, and in subsequent sections we relate these factors to the more formal setting 
of growth accounting introduced in the last section. Does growth accounting provide deep explanations 
or is it merely an accounting device? 
-e puzzles that need explanation include the following:
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(1) Why was EU-15 productivity growth faster than the US during the pre-1995 period and why did it 
steadily slow down over every decade after 1960?
(2) Why did US productivity growth peak early in the 1960s, steadily slow down until it reached a pla-
teau during 1980-95, and then revive temporarily during 1995-2002?
(3) Why did EU-15 hours per capita decline so much relative to the US before 1995, and why did they 
grow more rapidly thereafter? To what extent does this re.ect changes in EU-15 labour markets as 
contrasted with changes in the opposite direction in US labour markets?
(4) Was it a coincidence that EU vs. US productivity growth di+erences were exactly o+set by move-
ments in the opposite direction of hours per capita? Is there any causal connection between move-
ments in hours per capita in one direction and movements in productivity in the opposite direction?
(5) How has the adjustment of output and labour markets changed these relationships since 2007? It ap-
pears from Figures 1.1 and 1.3 that the slowdown of Europe’s relative productivity growth (as compared 
to the US) and the relative revival of its hours per capita and employment per capita have increased 
during the crisis period. Does that re.ect new types of behaviour in the US, the EU-15, or both? 
Breaks in behaviour plotted in Figure 1.1 suggest that it is helpful to break up the post-1960 post-war era 
into four intervals divided at 1973, 1995, and 2007. Until 1973 Europe was catching up by exploiting 
the inventions of which the US had been able to take advantage years or decades earlier. -e dominance 
of the US when World War II ended was so overwhelming that it was bound to be temporary, as other 
nations took advantage of post-war peace to adopt the late 19th century inventions (electricity, internal 
combustion engine, running water, indoor plumbing) and their 20th century complements (electri,ca-
tion of manufacturing, air conditioning, air travel, supermarkets, superhighways, suburbs). An amazing 
fact is that in 1929 the US accounted for 80 per cent of the world’s motor vehicle production and 90 per 
cent of its vehicle registrations. In 1950 the productivity and output per capita of the EU-15 was less than 
half that of the US (Table 1.1 shows that it was still only 49 per cent as recently as 1960). In its adoption 
of electricity and automobiles, France in 1948 was roughly at the same stage as the US in 1915. Produc-
tivity naturally grew rapidly in Europe, high rates of saving and investment allowed the reconstruction of 
wartime damage and the adoption of modern conveniences. Europe had a well-educated population and 
strong institutions, and it was just a matter of time for investment to develop a modern stock of equip-
ment, structures, and infrastructure that incorporated a previous century of invention.
-e period between 1973 and 1995 witnessed a marked slowing of productivity growth in both the 
EU-15 and the US, but the EU-15 remained well ahead in its growth rate. -us its level of productivity 
continued to catch up. -e slowdown in Europe’s growth seemed easy to explain and there was relatively 
little written about it; the opportunities to catch up naturally eroded over time. Instead economists in 
Europe were much more interested in the sudden emergence of high unemployment there, with the un-
employment rate shooting up between 1972 and 1985 for the EU-15 from around 3 per cent to more 
than 10 per cent. Related problems included a loss of skills by the long-term unemployed and a mismatch 
between the labour force and an insuOcient amount of industrial capacity to employ that labour force. 
Responding quickly to the apparent permanence of Europe’s unemployment rate of 10 per cent, econo-
mists developed the idea of hysteresis or path dependence in which the equilibrium long-run unemploy-
ment rate (the “natural rate of unemployment”) moved up automatically in response to a long period of 
high actual unemployment (Cross, 1988).8
However, as high unemployment persisted and hours per capita continued to decline, the possibil-
ity was suggested of a trade-o+ between the growth of productivity and hours per capita9. -rough high 
taxes, powerful unions, and regulations that limited the .exibility of labour and product markets, Euro-
8 Several hypotheses were brought together in the “hysteresis” literature based on the supposition that the equilibrium long-
run rate of unemployment had crept up to equal the high rate of unemployment, due to loss of skills by the long-term 
unemployed and lack of suOcient capital investment to employ the available labor force. Papers written at the time called 
attention to the contrast between the high unemployment rate of labor and the relatively high capacity utilization rate, 
indicating much less unemployment of capital. For an early compendium of these papers, see Cross (1988).
9 What once was called the European school developed a theoretical framework to establish a typology of Unemployment. -e 
dominant diagnosis for Europe for the period going from mid 70s to mid 90s was Classical Unemployment (i.e. due to a two 
high level of the real wages). Cf. Malinvaud (1977), Fitoussi and Malinvaud (1979), Fitoussi (1982), Blanchard and Fitoussi (1997). 
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pean policies had made labour expensive, pushing Europe up and to the left (“Northwest”) on its labour 
demand curve. Because the cost of labour was higher, employers hired less of it, and the productivity of 
workers rose (both because the least productive workers were either ,red or not hired, and because the 
reduction of hours raised the ratio of capital to labour for the remaining workers). Even before the data 
turned around in 1995, showing that Europe’s productivity growth had declined below that in the US 
while hours growth exceeded that in the US, Gordon (1997) was one of the ,rst to explicitly suggest an 
employment-productivity trade-o+ based on data up to 1993.10 His analysis emphasized not only the Eu-
ropean but the American side of the trade-o+. Fewer regulations and lower taxes encouraged the employ-
ment in the US of inexperienced teenagers and women in relatively low-paying jobs in the service sector, 
including parking lot attendants, valet parking, restaurant bus boys, and grocery baggers. 
Prescott (1994) claimed that that the entire reason for Europe’s lower hours per capita was its high tax 
wedge between before-tax labour costs and after-tax worker pay. Critics of Prescott argued that at most 
the tax wedge could explain only half of the decline in hours (see Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2006). 
Other writers discussed links between low hours per capita, taxes, and institutions without emphasizing 
the trade-o+ with productivity (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Layard et al., 2005; Ljungqvist and Sar-
gent, 2006). -us in retrospect, European productivity growth was faster than that in the US between 
1960 and 1995 not just because of technological catching up (1960-1973), but as well because of a sepa-
rate and independent process by which taxes and institutions made labour expensive, causing hours per 
capita to fall and productivity to grow faster than in the US (1974-1995).
-e post-1973 slowdown in US productivity growth is more mysterious. Since the US had de,ned the 
technological frontier since the beginning of the 20th century, slower productivity growth implied that 
the frontier was expanding more slowly, with negative implications not just for the US but for the coun-
tries engaged in the catch-up process. -e literature on the causes of the US 1973-95 productivity growth 
slowdown sprouted even before the slowdown was evident (Nordhaus, 1972). A leading hypothesis was 
that the multi-fold increase in energy prices in 1973-75 and 1979-81 had reduced labour productivity, 
since it led to a decline in the use of energy as an input (Bruno and Sachs, 1985)11. -e labour-market 
in.ux of inexperienced teenagers and women was also an important explanation, as was diminished in-
vestment in infrastructure due in part to the completion around 1972 of the interstate highway system.12 
Doubtless there is some truth to all these explanations, but Nordhaus’ suggestion of the “depletion hy-
pothesis” seems most convincing in retrospect. As the interstate highway example suggests, by 1973 the 
US had ,nished exploiting the complementary 20th-century inventions to the original Great Inventions 
of the late 19th century. -ree of the last of these complementary inventions to boost productivity over 
the 1870-1970 century were air conditioning, the jet plane, and the interstate highway system. All had 
their maximum impact in the 1950s and 1960s, and indeed a more re,ned trend extracted from quarterly 
data shows that the fastest US productivity growth of the post-war years was achieved in 1961-62 (Gor-
don, 2011b). Particularly notable was the transition between the epochal 1820-1970 era when the speed 
of travel had increased from that of a horse to that of a jet plane; there have been no further increases in 
the speed of human travel since 1970.13 
As shown in Figure 1.1 productivity growth revived in the US from 1995 until 2002-03 but contin-
ued to slow down in Europe. -is raises three questions – why did US growth revive, why did Europe 
fail to mimic the US revival, and what additional developments in Europe may have contributed to the 
divergence? -e retrospective growth-accounting analyses of the ,rst question, the sources of the US pro-
ductivity growth revival, are unanimous that the main cause was the internet revolution. Robert Solow 
10  Romer (1987) had earlier suggested on the basis of historical US data that there had been an alternation of intervals of roughly two 
decades in which productivity growth alternated between low and high, while growth in employment had alternated in the opposite 
direction between high and low. 
11  Such an explanation was also hypothesized for Europe. 
12  -e original 1958 interstate highway map, with limited access multi-lane highways extending across the continent along six or seven 
routes from east to west, and at least ten routes from north to south, was a massive undertaking completed in the relatively short period 
between 1958 and 1972. Interstate highway construction continued after 1972, primarily consisting of ring roads around the periphery 
of metropolitan areas.
13  US air travel completed the transition from propeller planes to jets in the short period from 1958 to 1972. -e only further increase in 
speed was the ill-fated supersonic Concorde aircraft, long since grounded as economically impracticable, and space travel.
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earlier in 1987 had quipped that “we can see the computer revolution everywhere except in the productiv-
ity statistics.” -e analyses of Jorgenson et al., Oliner et al., and others pointed to an explosion of invest-
ment in ICT capital as the basic source of the post-1995 revival. Quite notable during the 1995-2000 
interval was the commercialization of the internet, the invention of the World Wide Web, and a marked 
acceleration of the rate of decline of computer prices and rate of growth of real investment in computers. 
-e share of investment in ICT equipment as a share of US GDP reached a peak in 2000 which has not 
been exceeded since. 
A puzzle in the US experience is that the stock market and ICT investment collapsed between 2000 
and 2002, yet the actual pace of quarter-to-quarter productivity growth remained rapid until early 2004. 
-is seemed to cast doubt on the explanation of the 1995-2000 revival based on ICT investment. Two 
sources of the continuation of productivity growth in the wake of lower ICT investment were suggested 
(Gordon, 2003, 2010). -e ,rst was that US labour markets had changed, with increasing power given 
to management which was much more aggressive in reducing employment in 2001-02 (and even more so 
later in 2008-09) than prior to 2000. A higher propensity to reduce labor hours in response to reductions 
in pro,ts and stock prices was re.ected in an unusual drop in labor hours relative to output, with the 
counterpart that output per hour increased more than would have been expected. -e second explanation 
was an argument based on timing. Computer investment was included in GDP as soon as the computers 
were produced, but it took months and even years for the software to be written and the training to take 
place to implement the productivity bene,ts of computers. Whatever the explanation, the productivity 
revival began to fade away in early 2004, and the annual rate of productivity growth between mid-2004 
and mid-2008 was only 0.8 percent per year, slower than in what have been called the “dismal decades” 
between 1973 and 1995.
Analyses in the early 2000s of the post-1995 US productivity revival often adopted a triumphalist 
attitude, abounding with enthusiasm about the “new economy” and the unlimited horizons opened up 
by the internet. As shown in Figure 1.4 above, the failure of the EU-15 to match this productivity perfor-
mance caused the ratio of the level of EU-15 to US productivity to slip back from 92 percent in 1995 to 
87 percent in 2007 (and then further to 83 percent in 2011, for a di+erent set of reasons discussed below). 
Yet, remarkably, as also shown in Figure 1.4, the US productivity growth revival had absolutely no e+ect 
on the level ratio for output per capita, which remained anchored at 70 percent with no sign of any Euro-
pean slippage after 1995. -is re.ected not only the revival of European hours per capita shown in Figure 
1.3 and discussed below, but also the remarkable transition in the smoothed growth of US hours from 
positive before 2000 to consistently negative after 2000. -e trend of US hours growth fell from +0.7 
percent per year in 1996 to -0.6 percent in 2005-07 and then to a devastating -1.5 percent in 2009-11.
Why did the growth of US hours slow down so much? Growth in hours per capita is by de,nition 
the product of hours per employee, employees divided by the labor force, and the labor-force participa-
tion rate. -e problem was not so much the employment rate (which by de,nition is 1.0 minus the 
unemployment rate); the unemployment rate in the peak year of 2007 was 4.6 percent, not that di+erent 
than the super-peak year of 2000 when the unemployment rate for the year averaged 4.0 percent. Rather, 
hours growth sagged both because hours per employee began to decline more rapidly than before as an 
increasing number of ,rms reduced the number of full-time jobs o+ering medical insurance and other 
fringe bene,ts in favor of part-time jobs o+ering fewer or no bene,ts. Equally important was the decline 
in labor-force participation, a full percentage point lower in 2007 than in 2000, representing a decline in 
the labor force of about 2.4 million people. Labor-force participation grew steadily from 1965 to 1990, 
re.ecting in large part the entry of females into the labor force (which happened earlier and to a larger ex-
tent in the US than in the average for the EU-15), and to a lesser extent the entry of the baby-boom teen-
agers during the years 1963-1978. -us a part of the shift towards negative smoothed growth in hours 
per capita is explained by the ageing of the baby-boomers and the plateau reached in female labor-force 
participation around 1990. Part of the 2000-07 decline in participation is a simple “mix e+ect”; as the 
population ages the percent in the groups aged 60+ rises, and the average is pulled down by the relatively 
30 1. productivity
low participation of older people in the 60+ groups. -e second major aspect of the 2000-07 decline was 
a tendency toward more schooling among young people aged 16-25.14 
-e next question is why Europe failed to mimic the US productivity growth revival after 1995. -e 
most comprehensive and recent study of this question has been carried out by Timmer et al. (2010). 
While the US literature points to the rise in ICT investment during 1995-2000 as the primary driver of 
the productivity revival, Timmer does not place primary emphasis on a lack of production of ICT within 
Europe. Rather the problem is in the use of ICT equipment. -ey pinpoint poor productivity growth in 
the market services, e.g., retail, wholesale, and business services, as the heart of the European problem. 
-eir focus on these portions of the market services sector is motivated not just by slow EU-15 produc-
tivity growth in these industries but also the contrasting rapidity of US productivity growth in the same 
industries. Other elements of their diagnosis include a diOculty Europe faced in “switching from growth 
based on imitation to growth based on innovation” (Timmer et al., 2010, p. 5). -ese authors suggest that 
“outdated and in.exible industrial structures” prevented Europe from making the transition from low-
tech to high-tech manufacturing. We return subsequently to a more complete diagnosis of these European 
problems, based on the research of the Timmer team and by others.
Just as the causes of rapid productivity growth in Europe before 1995 can be divided into two sets 
of causes – technological catch-up and hours-reducing labor-market institutions, so the post-1995 per-
formance can similarly be illuminated by joining the innovation-based arguments related to the produc-
tion and use of ICT with a further exploration of the productivity-hours trade-o+. -e most important 
evidence in favor of such a trade-o+ is the simple data presentation of Figures 1.1 and 1.3. -e smoothed 
growth rates of EU-15 and US productivity and hours per capita display movements in the opposite 
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on both sides of the Atlantic for the entire period between 1977 and 2011 (Figure 2 above). In our more 
detailed treatment of European productivity issues below, we discuss the nature of the empirical support 
for the trade-o+ idea, and its interaction with the innovation-related factors. 
As the last topic in this section we turn to the smoothed growth rates displayed in Figures 1.1-1.3 for pro-
ductivity, output per capita, and hours per capita between 2007 and 2011. Super,cially the graphs seem to 
say “more of the same.” In Figure 1.1 EU-15 productivity growth slows further and remains below that of the 
US In Figure 1.3 smoothed growth in EU-15 hours per capita turns negative but remains well above that of 
the US In Figure 1.2 smoothed growth in output per capita remains almost identical and slows on both sides 
of the Atlantic from almost 2.5 percent in the late 1990s to a dismal rate in 2009-11 that is slightly negative. 
But to say “more of the same” is to ignore the di+erent forces that came into play in the post-2007 
,nancial crisis. Both the EU-15 and the US su+ered roughly the same decline in output relative to 
trend. Estimates of the ratio of actual real GDP relative to its long-run trend declined by about the same 
amount. But the response of productivity and hours per capita was quite di+erent. In the US behavior 
shifted not just in 2008-09 but earlier in 2001-03 toward a much greater reduction in hours relative to 
output than had been typical before 2000. Business ,rm managers, who in the United States earn very 
high compensation based in substantial measure on their ,rm’s stock market performance, cut costs dras-
tically in 2008-09 in a desperate attempt to avoid bankruptcy, which would imply that the common stock 
with which they were rewarded would become worthless. Not only were workers tossed overboard, but 
total domestic investment fell at an annual rate of 32 percent during the winter and spring of 2009. As a 
counterpart of savage cost-cutting, labor productivity actually experienced a short-lived explosion in late 
2009-10. -e new behavior of the economy both in 2001-03 and in 2008-09 implied that productivity 
no longer .uctuated procyclically, and in fact had not done so since the sharp recession of 1981-82. 
14 On the overall behavior of participation see Van Zandweghe (2012). For an analysis of declining participation during 
2000-06, see Aaronson et al. (2006). -is mention of increased attendance at school may appear to contradict the empha-
sis in section 1.3 and Table 2 on the plateau of educational achievement in the US as a source of pessimism about future 
growth prospects. -e resolution of this puzzle is that more Americans than ever, roughly 70 percent of young people, 
begin a program in higher education, but only slightly more than half of them earn degrees. Two-year community and 
junior colleges are little better than remedial e+orts to impart knowledge and skills that students did not acquire in high 
school. -ere is remarkably little transferring from two-year community colleges to four-year colleges. -ere is no wage 
premium for earning an associate’s degree as given by two-year colleges; the college wage premium comes entirely from 
,nishing a four-year college and obtaining a bachelor’s degree.
31
In Europe generalizations are diOcult because reactions were quite di+erent among the component 
countries of the EU-15. In the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria government-sponsored institutions 
favored “kurzarbeit,” or shorter working hours, in which workers were not ,red but rather retained on 
the sta+ at reduced pay and working hours. Government subsidies analogous to unemployment compen-
sation cushioned the income loss for workers, while ,rms were able to keep the skills and organization-
speci,c knowledge of their workers intact for the recovery. -ese programs help us to understand why 
the increase in the unemployment rate relative to the decline in output was about double in the US than 
what it was in Europe. But by retaining employees in the face of depressed production and sales, Europe 
su+ered from a further drop in productivity growth. And in some countries workers were not protected at 
all; the unemployment rate in Ireland, Spain, and Greece increased far more than in the US
While the charts display data for 2007-11, this report de-emphasizes productivity patterns in those 
crisis years as representing cyclical responses rather than long-term structural trends. In subsequent sec-
tions we emphasize ,ndings based largely on data referring to the pre-2007 intervals in order to sort out 
the main sources of productivity growth di+erences on both sides of the Atlantic. 
To summarize this section, we have isolated a set of determinants of productivity growth, and of ex-
planations of di+erences in growth in the EU-15 and the US, which contains numerous elements:
(1) Innovation and the exploitation of inventions. -e US was responsible for a majority of the path-
breaking inventions that occurred between 1870 and 1945, and Americans were free to introduce 
inventions such as electricity and the internal combustion engine during the years when Europeans 
were distracted by the pre-1914 arms race, the two World wars, and inter war economic chaos and 
disaster. Innovation also enters as an explanation of the US post-1995 productivity growth revival, 
because much of the innovation in ICT hardware and software, both before and after the invention 
of the internet, took place in the US
(2) Catching up. -e technological frontier established by the US after 1900 involved relatively open 
technologies that could be easily copied. After 1945 when Europe was free to invest its national saving 
into structures, producer durables, and consumer durables instead of guns and munitions, it was able 
to achieve a rapid albeit incomplete catching up. 
(3) Saving and investment. To rebuild their cities and equip them with modern vehicles and conveni-
ences, Europeans had to save and they did. European saving rates were much higher than in the US 
throughout the postwar period.
(4) -e preceding list ignores interactions between productivity and hour wise growth. Productivity is 
not determined just by the pace of innovation and catch-up. Institutions and regulations di+er across 
countries, and they can introduce distortions into the process of growth. -ese distortions include 
taxes, unions, minimum wages, product market regulation, and employment protection legislation.
(5) -e most familiar distortion is a tax on labor. To ,nance its welfare state, the EU-15 levied higher 
taxes on labor income than did the US -e creation of the welfare state deserves praise for reducing 
poverty, making lifetime outcomes more certain, making health care a right of citizenship, and many 
other bene,ts. Indeed the comparisons of per-capita output in the previous graphs are based on pre-
tax income, not after-tax income, which involves the implicit assumption that each dollar of welfare 
expenditure ,nanced by taxes delivers the same welfare or satisfaction to a consumer as a dollar of 
untaxed cash. Elementary economics suggests that higher taxes on labor reduce labor supply, i.e., 
help to explain the precipitous decline in EU-15 hours displayed in Figure 1.5 and indeed for Prescott 
(1994) higher taxes were the only explanation of reduced European work hours.
(6) Work hours and productivity are inseparable, linked by the labor demand curve. Anything that 
makes labor more expensive reduces the demand for labor. Workers who lose their jobs or work 
shorter hours are selected as those who are least productive and eOcient. -e remaining workers 
are more productive, and so the measures that make labor more expensive have the e+ect of arti,-
cially raising average labor productivity relative to its level in a no-regulation environment. Timmer 
(2010, p. 19) emphasizes that the shrinking demand for labor in Europe was accompanied by a rapid 
increase in the capital-labor ratio, as the rise in the cost of labor created an incentive to substitute 
capital for labor.
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(7) Until 1995 hours per capita declined in the EU-15 relative to the US, and productivity growth was higher. 
After 1995 the reverse was true – hours per capita increased relative to the US and productivity growth 
recovered. While suggestive of a trade-o+, the reasons for the revival of EU-15 hour wise growth are 
not well understood. In our discussion of recent research in subsequent sections, we focus on the long-
overdue rise in female participation in southern Europe and the arrival of inexperienced immigrants. 
(8) -e entire mechanism of making labor more or less expensive occurs independently of innovation 
and catch-up. But it does have the side-e+ect of skewing the industrial structure of the economy. 
As we will see in the more detailed analysis below, in Europe taxes, unions, minimum wages, and 
regulations all combined to stunt the growth of the services sector relative to the US European 
women stayed at home doing their own laundry and cooking, while because of low wages and 
bene,ts that made services relatively cheap, Americans took their laundry to the Laundromat or 
cleaning shop, while shifting much of the work of cooking and food production to inexpensive 
fast-food and take-out restaurants.1516 -e result was slow productivity growth in the US during 
1973-95 because so many low-skilled jobs were created; part of the reason for the turnaround after 
1995 is that Europe’s high cost structure for labor began to erode, and lower-skilled jobs began to 
become available.
-is summary of the major factors that help explain the di+ering growth experience of the EU-15 and of 
the US suggests a number of factors that are missing from traditional growth accounting that for decades 
has guided the usual explanation by economists of the sources of growth. -is traditional approach is 
explained in the next section, with an example for the past and future of the US economy. Subsequently 
we will show that the wide-ranging approach of this section and the formal sources of growth literature 
are complementary and not mutually exclusive.17
1.5 
the headwinds that will slow productivity  
growthon both sides of the atlantic
-is chapter has emphasized the steady slowdown in the rate of European productivity growth compared 
to that of the US From 1960 to 1995 Europe’s labor productivity caught up to the US but since then 
has fallen back. However, Europe is not alone in facing problems. It is becoming increasingly evident 
that the post-1995 productivity growth revival was a one-time event that lasted less than a decade, with 
a signi,cant slowdown after 2004. Part of this is due to diminishing returns – just as the complementary 
inventions to the great late 19th century industrial revolution (often called the “Second Industrial Revo-
lution”) had their major e+ect in the century ending in 1970, so the “-ird Industrial Revolution” of the 
computer, personal computer, and the internet are now encountering diminishing returns.
-e productivity impact of computers involves the replacement of human e+ort by electronic equip-
ment, a substitution of capital for labor. But much of the basic contributions of the computer to this 
substitution happened a long time ago. -e ,rst industrial robot was introduced by General Motors in 
1961. Telephone operators went away in the 1960s and the ranks of clerks began to diminish as the initial 
computer-produced telephone bills were developed by sorting punch-cards. Credit cards were introduced 
in the 1950s. By the 1970s, even before the personal computer, tedious retyping had been made obsolete 
15  Freeman and Schettkat (2005) have shown that European women do not enjoy more leisure than American women. -ey 
participate less in paid market work and spend more time working on food, laundry, and cleaning the house. -e net dif-
ference in leisure is cancelled out, so the extra home production of European women prevents them from enjoying more 
leisure.
16  -e problem is that home production is not counted in GDP so that the shift from home to market production increases 
GDP even if total production would remain the same. In a way, in this period, production in the US was overvaluated 
vis-à-vis Europe. 
17  -e approach in this section which combines technological catch-up and the role of European institutions of making labor 
more expensive and thus suppressing demand-driven growth of low-wage market services, is supported by Timmer (2010, 
p. 18): “-e European growth slowdown might be related to long-term trends in the structure of the economy, such as the 
increasing demand for low-productive services and a gradual exhaustion of the potential for growth based on a catching 
up in traditional technologies.”
33
by memory typewriters. -e 1970s and early 1980s brought airline reservation systems, the ,rst bar-code 
scanners, the ,rst automatic cash machines, and in 1982 the introduction of the IBM personal comput-
ers. Even the earliest PCs could run word-processing software with word wrap and the elimination of 
repetitive typing. Secretaries began to disappear in legal ,rms and even in economics departments pro-
fessors began to type their own papers. -e 1990s brought the internet and web, and further e+ort was 
eliminated as the world’s libraries replaced card catalogues with electronic terminals, auto parts depart-
ments no longer had to spent an hour a day replacing pages in the paper parts catalogues, and web search 
tools made research easier, not only in academic research but in e-commerce that allowed consumers to 
search for models and prices on the web. 
-e nature of electronic innovation changed after 2001. Most of the inventions discussed above 
involved the direct replacement of human labor by machine labor, going back to those early telephone 
bills and bank statements in the 1960s. But since 2001 the most prominent inventions have replaced one 
form of entertainment or communication by another, from the Walkman to the iPod, the cell phone to 
the SmartPhone, the laptop to the ultra book and the iPad. Along the way, the dominance of American 
companies has increased as Apple’s iphone has replaced Nokia’s previous dominance in ordinary mobile 
phones, and as its iPod replaced the Walkman and other types of music devices pioneered by Sony. 
-e history of technology provides many examples of the folly of forecasting, of naïve pronounce-
ments that everything useful has already been invented. We suggest that diminishing returns to the elec-
tronic revolution is still a controversial proposition, and many pleasant surprises may lie just beyond the 
horizon. But less controversial is the fact that the US and Europe face strong headwinds in achieving 
productivity growth as fast as the last 50 years. All these headwinds are faced on both sides of the Atlantic 
albeit with di+erent rankings and urgency.
(1) -e ,rst headwind is demographic. Recall that income per capita grows faster than labor productiv-
ity when hours per capita are increasing and vice versa. -e US received what is called a demographic 
dividend between 1965 and 1990 through the social changes that drove the rise in female labor-force 
participation and the entry of the baby-boom teenagers. -e demographic dividend has now become 
a de,cit pulling down hours per capita as the baby-boom generation retires between 2012 and 2030. 
Birth rates have been lower in many European countries than in the US for a long time, but the rise 
in female participation, particularly in southern Europe, delayed the demographic de,cit. But in-
creasingly female participation will reach a plateau and cause the ageing of the population to reduce 
hours per capita. 
(2) -e second headwind is education, which poses challenges for both Europe and the US In the US 
educational attainment reached a plateau in 1991 (Goldin-Katz, 2008). Since then the US has slipped 
from ,rst to about 14th in rank among the OECD countries in its percentage of college completion. 
-is headwind combines a number of problems that have di+erent solutions. One of them is the cost 
disease in higher education, the rapid increase in college tuition relative to the prices of other goods 
and people’s incomes. -e cost in.ation in higher education is leading to mounting student debt, 
which is increasingly distorting career choices and deterring low-income people from going to col-
lege. At the secondary level the PISA test is administered by the OECD for 37 nations. -e United 
States in the most recent survey ranked 21st in reading, 31st in math, and 34th in science. -e US suf-
fers from an ongoing achievement gap between whites and Asians versus Hispanics and Blacks, and 
the Hispanic percentage of schoolchildren keeps increasing, dragging down the national average. -e 
two US problems are interrelated, because the problem of stagnant college depletion involves those 
who drop out of college without degrees, due both to high costs and poor preparation as re.ected in 
the low PISA scores. Quite a few European countries have surpassed the US in college completion 
and most have better PISA scores. -us education is not as daunting a headwind in Europe, although 
in some countries like the UK government tuition subsidies are being cut as a result of austerity poli-
cies, leaving open the possibility that in some countries college completion rates may stop increasing 
or even could begin to fall. 
(3) -e third headwind is also more important for the US than for Europe, and this is the inexorable 
rise of income inequality. -e growth in median income has been substantially slower than the 
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averages displayed on the charts above, implying that the measured stagnation in Europe’s output 
per capita relative to the US has been understated, at least for the bottom 99 percent of the income 
distribution. -e US numbers are startling. From 1993 to 2008, the average growth in real household 
income was 1.3 percent per year. But for the bottom 99% it was only 0.75 per year. So there’s a full 
half percentage point gap between the bottom 99 and the averages that we’ve been looking at. -e 
top 1% captured fully 52% of the income gains during that 15-year period. While there has been some 
increase of inequality in European countries like Sweden and the UK, the di+erences between the 
bottom 99% and the top 1% are much smaller. 
(4) -e fourth headwind faces Europe and the US with equal force. Globalization has brought a .ood 
of imports from Asia, and it has also led to an outsourcing of many functions such as radiologists 
in India reading X-rays and replacing radiologists in the United States. -ere are nuances in under-
standing the widespread e+ects of globalization. For instance, Apple’s i-phone is assembled in Asia 
with Asian components, but more than half of the value-added remains in Silicon Valley in the form 
of development costs and pure pro,t. Further, globalization has di+erent impacts across Europe. 
Germany has bene,ted by its middle stand that produces specialized machinery for the entire world, 
while the traditional low-tech products of Italian manufacturing like clothing, shoes, and furniture 
are desperately battling to stay alive in the face of competition from China and elsewhere. 
(5) -e ,fth headwind is the interlinked issue of global warming, the environment, and energy policy. 
Part of any e+ort to cope with global warming and energy independence represents a payback for 
past growth. In 1901, they didn’t care about the environment, and the symbol of prosperity was a 
factory with chimneys emitting dense black smoke. Most American economists are in favor of a 
carbon tax that gradually increases in order to raise American gasoline prices up more toward Eu-
ropean levels. -at subtracts from growth in output by reducing the amount that households have 
left over to spend on everything else. -e US is far behind the EU-15 in energy policy from gasoline 
taxes to the development of solar and wind energy. But some Americans are sceptical of the high-tax 
solution, given the essential role that high-carbon coal plays in the production of electricity, the criti-
cal infrastructure needed to power continuing economic growth in India and China. Some of the 
improved energy eOcient in the US may come without massive increases in gasoline taxes, given the 
enthusiasm of the auto industry for the draconian fuel-economy rules introduced recently and their 
implication for pushing the development of auto engine technology. 
(6) -e ,nal headwind is the triple de,cits, which brings us past 2007 to consider the impacts of the 
global ,nancial crisis. Households face a debt overhang in countries that have experienced a hous-
ing boom and subsequent collapse in housing prices, and this has happened both in the US and 
in Europe. Banks and ,nancial institutions allowed leverage to get out of hand in the years before 
2007 and are now struggling to rebuild capital ratios, crimping the supply of credit for business 
and consumers and thus contributing to the slow economic recovery. Finally, governments to dif-
ferent degrees have experience soaring debt-to-GDP ratios, combining policies preceding 2007, the 
collapse of government revenue as a side-e+ect of the crisis, and in some countries like the US the 
consequence of aggressive ,scal stimulus packages.
-e ongoing Euro crisis di+erentiates the Euro area from the US Many American economists predicted 
before 1999 that the euro was infeasible because it lacked two essential prerequisites of a common cur-
rency area, labor mobility and a centralized ,scal authority. -e US is free from pressure by bond markets 
to implement ,scal austerity but may nevertheless face the same fate if political gridlock after the 2012 
Presidential election prevents the compromises needed to implement long-run ,scal solutions to the omi-
nous future of an ever-rising debt-to-GDP ratio.
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Chapter 2 
!e Sources of Productivity Growth
2.1 
introduction
In this chapter we begin by an introduction to the literature on the sources of growth, which is a long-
standing method of decomposing output growth into its underlying sources, including changes in the 
quantity and quality of labor, quantity and quality of capital, and a residual usually called “multi-factor 
productivity.” Some studies of the sources of growth go further and attribute a separate role to changes in 
infrastructure spending, energy use and that of intermediate materials. -is general introduction to the 
sources of growth is followed by a summary of conclusions from the best recent studies for both the US 
and the EU-15. What were the main sources of the slowdown of EU-15 productivity growth after 1995 
and the revival of US productivity growth after that year? What forecast can be made of the future behav-
ior of the sources of growth, and hence of the future growth of productivity and output?
After a summary of .ndings about the divergent development of productivity across the Atlantic in 
market services (particularly retail trade, wholesale trade, .nance, and business services), the chapter turns 
to the sources of innovation and a set of institutional di/erences between the EU-15 and US in the role 
of government in stimulating innovation, including the synergies between elite US private universities 
and the .nance sector, eager through venture capital to .nance creative start-up companies. Attention is 
called to the di/ering methods of government support of higher education, with more emphasis on peer-
reviewed research grants in the US as compared to block tuition subsidies for undergraduates in Europe. 
A consistent theme of the chapter is that the traditional “sources of growth” decompositions fail to 
explain any of the puzzles discussed in this chapter. -is technique divides up the sources of growth in 
labor productivity between “capital-deepening” (increases in the ratio of labor to capital), changes in the 
quality of capital and labor, and a residual called multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth. All the interest-
ing questions and di/erences are buried inside the residual, and the growth arithmetic hides the puzzles 
inside the mysterious MFP residual.
-e chapter identi.es a long list of reasons for di/erences in the behavior of productivity growth in 
the US and the EU-15, and to a lesser extent di/erences within the EU-15. It dismisses the tendency of 
economists to identify MFP growth as telling us something about technological change, because there are 
so many additional factors besides technology in0uencing MFP growth.
-e de.nition of productivity as output per hour in itself suggests a classi.cation of sources of produc-
tivity growth. For productivity to rise, workers have to produce more. Historically this has not occurred, 
except in some slave societies, by bosses bringing out whips to 0og the workers into greater e/ort. Instead, 
the sources of higher productivity growth can be classi.ed as follows, with examples.
(1) A worker can be equipped with a machine. -is aspect of growth is called “capital deepening” and 
occurs when there is an increase of the quantity of capital relative to the number of worker-hours. 
(2) However, workers use di/erent types of capital now than they did a century ago. -e history of 
farms, for instance, portrays a progression from men walking behind plows, to men guiding horses 
which pulled plows, to tractors pulling plows, to ever-better tractors today guiding themselves with 
GPS. -is example suggests that changes in the quantity of capital, e.g., the number of horses or 
tractors, are inseparable from the quality of that capital. For instance, tractors have improved stea-
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dily since their invention with more powerful motors, better ways of attaching tools like plows to 
the tractor, better wheels to progress through muddy .elds, and more recently electronics like GPS 
and computer-driven seeding devices that allow the tractors to guide themselves and drop seeds with 
minimal human intervention. Computer equipment included with tractors, motor vehicles and ai-
rcraft, along with many other uses of electronic equipment, provide and endless array of examples of 
the constant improvement in the quality of capital, through the long progression from the primitive 
mainframes and punchcards of the 1960s to today’s powerful laptops and ipads.
(3) Workers can become smarter by acquiring additional education. In 1900 few people had acquired 
any education beyond the age of 12. During the 20th century high school graduation became com-
mon in many developed countries by 1960 and in some countries 40 to 50 percent of young people 
now attain college degrees. Higher levels of education raise productivity in obvious ways, such as 
enabling workers to understand and use all the features of highly-computerized industrial machinery. 
More importantly, more educated workers not only create goods more e:ciently but also routinely 
invent services that generate revenue, from e:ciently-run high-volume restaurants, to neighborhood 
computer-repair stores and copying shops, to new computer software and applications. 
(4) Energy is used to produce output, from fuel in trucks and airplanes to coal in electricity generating 
plants. A notable advance during the 20th century was a shift from fuels like coal and wood that 
had to be physically transported by humans and horses or trucks, to new sources of fuel like nuclear 
power or natural gas that 0ows automatically through permanent pipelines to the ultimate customer. 
(5) “Infrastructure” is a term with a broad de.nition – it encompasses everything in the external en-
vironment that makes a person or a business .rm more productive. -is can be provided by the 
government in the form of roads, or by private .rms building toll-roads or telephone networks. It 
includes highways, airports, runways, electricity, telephone service, water availability and sewage 
facilities to remove the water. One of the most important contributions to higher productivity and 
output in the past 150 years has been the development of municipal waterworks that deliver running 
water to households and businesses, and also remove the waste through sewer lines. 
(6) -e environment could be thought of as a type of infrastructure, although usually it is considered as 
a separate category. -e municipal waterworks of the late 19th century were a .rst step in cleaning 
the water and wiping out waterborne diseases. Air pollution continued to be a problem throughout 
most of the 20th century and still plagues urban China and other rapidly growing regions dependent 
on coal for electric power. Substantial progress made in cleaning up the environment has directly 
contributed to worker productivity by improvements in health. 
(7) Saved for last is perhaps the most important of all sources of growth in productivity, and this is 
technology. A long debate in the economics profession about the relative importance of capital accu-
mulation and technology was settled more than 50 years ago by a simple remark once made by Evsey 
Domar. “If there had never been any technological change, then capital accumulation would have 
amounted to piling one wooden plow on top of another wooden plow.” -us technological change 
and improvements in the quality of both labor and capital go hand in hand. -e GPS installed in 
the tractor makes it more productive, and this in turn entices people to buy more tractors, as one 
example of the e/ect of technology in raising the quality of tractors. Subsequent sections will delve 
further into the sources of technological change.
(8) An American would perhaps stop the list here. But nothing in this list so far helps us to understand 
the reasons for the ebb and 0ow of European vs. US productivity growth. And without any analysis 
of the di/erences, we cannot proceed to a discussion of desirable policy changes on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Over the past 50 years European productivity has been held back by a long list of go-
vernment interventions that lower the amount that each worker can produce. Examples include 
shop-closing rules that prevent shops from attaining their full e:ciency by forcing them to remain 
empty for portions of the week; labor market regulations that prevent .rms from .ring employees 
who are no longer needed; and land-use regulations that protect small shops in the central city while 
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preventing the construction of American-style “big boxes” like Wal-Mart and Target either in the 
middle of cities or on the periphery.12 
2.2 
the role of multi factor productivity
Economists have long decomposed the sources of growth into these various categories, with primary 
emphasis on the quantity and quality of capital, in recent years distinguishing between information and 
communication technology (ICT) capital and other capital, and on the role of education in improving the 
quality of labor. -e portion of growth in labor productivity (output per hour) that cannot be explained 
by these factors is treated as an unexplained residual, usually called “total factor productivity” or “multi-
factor productivity” (MFP). It is measured by subtracting from output the contribution of the quantity 
and quality of capital and the quantity and quality of labor hours. -is is equivalent to taking the growth 
rate of labor productivity and subtracting the so-called capital-deepening e/ect, that is, the growth rate 
of the ratio of capital to labor, including both their quantity and quality growth, and multiplying by the 
estimated contribution of capital to output. -e resulting residual or MFP growth is often thought of as 
representing technological change, but less widely recognized is that it also includes other factors on the 
list above that are not measured explicitly, including energy, the environment, infrastructure, and the ef-
fects of tightening and loosening of regulations. 
A further quali.cation to the interpretation of MFP growth involves growth in the quality of capital. 
As measured by the best-known work on capital quality by Dale W. Jorgenson and associates (most re-
cently 2008), this only looks at the tip of the iceberg of changes in capital quality. It observes that short-
lived capital goods like computers have much faster depreciation rates than long-lived capital goods like 
structures. To earn enough pro.ts to pay for their rapid depreciation, short-lived computers must have 
a higher marginal product than long-lived structures, implying that they earn higher pro.ts per dollar 
of investment and a higher share in the income of all capital goods. -e Jorgenson method then weights 
capital input not by dollars of original investment in a good, but rather with a weighting scheme that 
places more weight on short-lived goods. -is estimate of growth in capital “services” always is higher 
than the growth in the capital stock which measures each capital good by its historic cost of investment.
But this is only the tip of the iceberg, because the contribution of capital quality goes far beyond re-
weighting. Within a narrow category like aircraft or autos or kitchen appliances, the value of many quality 
changes was never recorded in the price indexes for these capital goods. Jet commercial aircrafts like the 
Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 were faster, larger, and had much lower seat-mile costs than their piston 
predecessors like the Douglas DC-6. But price indexes for aircraft linked together the prices of old and new 
aircraft assuming no change in quality. A major reason that quality change was missed in the price indexes 
is that new goods were typically introduced into the o:cial indexes years after the initial introductory pe-
riod when their prices experienced rapid reductions. For instance, the automobile was not introduced into 
the US o:cial Consumer Price Index until 1935. Room air conditioners were .rst sold in 1951 but did not 
appear in the CPI until 1967. Video cassette recorders fell in price from $1200 in 1978 to $200 in 1987 
but were introduced to the CPI only in that year. Whenever the rise of capital goods prices is overstated, 
as in the US o:cial price indexes for most of the postwar era, then growth in both capital quality and in 
output itself is understated. But the impact in understating capital input growth is greater than on output 
growth, so that MFP growth is likely to be slower in reality than in o:cial measures.
However, recall that MFP growth is not the same thing as technological change. Contributions to 
MFP growth include items that are typically omitted in studies of sources of growth, and as listed above 
these include energy, the environment, infrastructure, and regulations. Further, much of the contribution 
1  In the US Wal-Mart and Target, which began as stores located exclusively in the suburbs, are now rapidly building very 
large stores in low-income areas of large cities like Chicago where previously the population su/ered from “food deserts” 
in which fresh food could only be obtained from small individually-owned shops at exorbitant prices. 
2 One could also argue that these regulations are the outcome of several trade-o/: between productivity and family life for 
the shops closed on Sunday for example; between employment and economic security; between productivity and the social 
capital of cities, etc.
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of technological change is “hiding” inside the contribution of capital quality, because without technologi-
cal change we would never had witnessed a massive shift from investment in long-lived structures to elec-
tronic equipment that typically has a short life not because it wears out but because it becomes obsolete.
Table 2.1 provides one example for the US showing how economic research decomposes the sources 
of economic growth. -e .rst two columns display growth rates for the 20 years ending in the .nal quar-
ter of 2007 (2007:Q4), which was the peak of the US economic expansion that lasted between late 2001 
and late 2007. -e left column refers to the total economy and displays growth rates of the key variables 
plotted in Figures 1.1-1.5 discussed above. Growth in output per hour (1.79 percent) was almost the same 
as in output per capita (1.74 percent), because there was virtually no change in the three components of 
growth in hours per capita. 
Box 2.1: -e Sources of Growth and Technological Change
-e relationships among output, labor, capital, and productivity can be explained succinctly by assigning 
symbols to each component. -is helps us to understand how the unobservable concept of multi-factor 
productivity growth is estimated by economists and government statistics o:ces from data on output and 
inputs. Using small letters for growth rates, we can use symbols to relate the growth rates of output (y), capi-
tal (k), labor hours (h), labor productivity (y-h), and multi- factor productivity (m). 
In order to know how much the measurable labor and capital inputs contribute to output growth, we need an 
estimate of the responsiveness of output to each input. Robert Solow’s (1956) Nobel-winning research pro-
vided a crucial and simple insight. If labor markets are competitive, then labor’s real wage equals its marginal 
product. -is implies directly that the elasticity of output growth to labor input growth (the marginal prod-
uct of labor divided by the average product of labor) equals the share of labor in national income (the real 
wage divided by the average product of labor). -e same is true for capital. -us the contribution of labor to 
output growth is the growth in labor input times the income share of labor, and the contribution of capital is 
the growth in capital input times the income share of capital. A standard symbol for the contribution of capi-
tal to output growth is b and the contribution of labor is (1-b). -is treatment of the contributions re0ects 
the assumption of constant returns to scale, i.e., that doubling both inputs will double the amount of output.
Multi-factor productivity growth is de.ned as 
m = y – bk – (1-b)h = y-h – b(k-h).
-e .rst expression states that MFP growth is output growth minus the contribution of capital growth mi-
nus the contribution of labour force growth. -e second expression provides a useful simpli.cation, that to 
determine MFP growth all we need to do is to subtract from labor productivity growth the income share of 
capital (b) times the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio (k-h). 
Notice that our list of contributions to growth in this section contains eight components, but there are only 
three contributions to growth in the equation (b, k, and h). Changes in the quality of capital and labor can 
be handled in the equation by treating the k and h terms as the growth of quality-corrected capital and labor. 
However, since no direct measures of the role of energy, the environment, infrastructure, technology, and 
regulation are included in the equation, the “residual” term m, or growth in MFP, combines the in0uence 
of all these factors. -us MFP growth de.nitely does not provide a measure of technological change, and 
instead it is better labeled as simply the “residual” or the more cynical term that dates from the 1950s, “the 
measure of our ignorance.”
How was MFP related to labor productivity growth over this two-decade period? Because the data on factor 
inputs is most readily available for the non-farm private business (NFPB) sector, about 75 percent of total 
GDP, the decomposition of sources of growth in labor productivity is shown in the bottom part of the second 
column. Growth in labor productivity in that sector of 2.23 percent per year was faster than the 1.79 percent 
registered by the total economy, because the part of the economy that is excluded from the NFPB sector (the 
government, households, and institutions) typically has little or no measured productivity growth. 
-e 2.23 percent growth in NFPB labor productivity can be divided between contributions of 0.96 per 
year for the capital deepening e/ect (growth in capital quantity and quality relative to growth in labor hours), 
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plus a contribution of 0.32 percent per year for improvements in labor quality (i.e., higher educational at-
tainment), and the residual of 0.96 percent (2.23-0.96-0.32) represents MFP growth – this residual com-
bines the impacts of changes in energy use, the e/ects of environmental pollution, growth of infrastructure, 
technological change, and regulations. -is decomposition proceeds further and provides the breakdown of 
the overall capital-deepening e/ect between ICT and non-ICT capital, and it also decomposes MFP growth 
between that achieved by ICT-producing industries (including software) and the rest of the NFPB sector.3 
Table 2.1 Growth rates of components of real GDP and related variables, actual for 1988-2007 and projected for 
2007-2027
Actual
:Q-:Q
Projected
:Q-:Q
Total
Economy
NFPB
Sector
Total
Economy
NFPB
Sector
Output (Y) 2.93 2.40
Components
Output per Hour 
(Y/H)
1.79 2.23 1.70 2.05
Hours per Employee 
(H/F)
-0.13 -0.10
Employment Rate 
(FIN)
0.05 0.00
Labor-force Part. 
Rate (L/N)
0.02 -0.20
Working-age Popu-
lation (N)
1.19 1.00
Related Variables
Aggregate Hours 
(H)
1.14 0.70
Household 
Employment (F)
1.26 0.80
Labor Force (0 1.21 0.80
Output per Capita 
(YIN)
1.74 1.40
Decomposition of NFPB Labor Prodactivity Growth
Output per Hour 2.23 2.05
Capital Deepening 0.96 0.85
ICT 0.71 0.60
non-ICT 0.25 0.25
Labor Quality 0.32 0.15
Multi-factor Pro-
ductivity
0.96 1.05
ICT 0.50 0.45
non-ICT 0.45 0.60
Source: Gordon (2010a Table 10).
3  -e sources-of-growth decomposition in the second column of Table 2.2 comes from Gordon (2010) and represents an updated version 
of Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007).
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-e forecast for the two decades 2007-2027 is laid out in the two right columns of Table 2.1. -is fore-
cast re0ected what was known back in 2007 and has not been updated to re0ect the response of any of 
the variables to the crisis years since 2007. -e forecast was relatively optimistic, calling for productivity 
growth only slightly smaller than in the previous two decades. -is forecast is interesting and instruc-
tive by showing which factors among the sources of growth can cause a change in the forecast of overall 
growth. While technological change and MFP growth in general cannot be forecasted, some components 
of future growth are known with relative accuracy. For instance, we know that in the US there will be a 
retirement of the baby-boomers (the large cohort born during the years of high birth rates from 1947 to 
1964). -is implies a decline in hours of work per capita that can be forecasted fairly precisely, subject to 
a change in the retirement age.4 Another component of the forecast is that educational attainment has reached 
a plateau in the US since 1991 (Goldin and Katz, 1998). -e forecast of future changes in labor quality, which 
has traditionally been estimated on the basis of changes of educational attainment, thus can be made fairly easily. 
In the forecast on the right side of Table 2.1, growth in output per capita was forecasted to slow down 
substantially from 1.74 to 1.40 percent per year, due in large part to the retirement of the baby-boom 
cohort and the plateau of educational attainment. When it was made in 2008, this forecast of growth of 
output per capita was considered pessimistic and indeed was substantially slower than over previous 20-
year intervals in US history back to 1929. Yet as shown by the growth rates in Figure 1.2, US growth has 
fallen far behind the forecast. During the period 2007:Q4 to 2012:Q1, US output per capita declined 
2.6 percent, in contrast to the 6.1 percent increase that is implied by the forecast in Table 2.2, implying 
a shortfall of 8.6 (2.2 + 5.6). In the two years ending in 2012:Q1 the realized growth rate of output per 
capita was only 1.0 percent, and a continuation of growth at that slow pace would imply a 20-year growth 
rate between 2007 and 2027 of only 0.7 percent.5 In short, unless the pace of the US recovery quickens, the 
realized 2007-27 growth rate will be only half of that forecast a few years ago and fully 1.1 percentage points per 
year slower than was achieved during 1987-2007. 
-us so far we have compared growth rates and levels of productivity, income per capita, and hours per capita 
in the US and the EU-15. We have also examined the standard classi.cation of sources of growth as they refer to 
the US economy both in the realized data of 1987-2007 and also how they may change over the period 2007-27. 
Subsequently we will summarize .ndings about the sources of di/erences in EU-15 and US growth that emerge 
from recent studies.
Table 2.1 above introduced the distinction between the de.nitional decomposition of productivity and the 
sources of growth approach. -e de.nitional decomposition splits up growth of output per capita into productivity 
and hours per capita, and then beyond that into hours per employee and employment per capita. Just because a rela-
tionship is a de.nition does not imply that it is uninteresting or unrevealing. -e contrast between Figures 1.1 and 
1.3, or between Figures 1.4 and .15, in previous section reveal that since 1977 there has been an implausibly close 
negative correlation between the EU/US ratio of productivity levels and the same ratio of levels of hours per capita. Be-
fore 1995 productivity growth in Europe was faster but hours growth was slower, and after 1995 the reverse was true.
How much additional insight is provided by comparisons of the EU-15 and US based on the sources of growth 
methodology? Fortunately, Timmer et al. (2010) in a recent book provided a wide range of comparisons based on a 
comprehensive new data set that provides de.nitely consistent measures of the major components that are included 
in a sources-of-growth analysis.6 -ey organize their analysis of the sources of growth di/erences between the EU-
15 and the US in a format exactly the same as the US decomposition that we have already examined in Table 2.1. 
In Table 2.2, taken from their book, the four columns provide annual growth rates for the EU-15 before and after 
1995, and then for the US before and after 1995.
4 A larger number of retirements reduces work hours without a/ecting the working-age population, which includes 
everyone from age 16 until the year of their death. 
5  -ese calculations are made with natural logs and exponents. Real output per capita is measured as real GDP (US National 
Accounts, Table 1.1.6) divided by the Working-age Population (from the FRED database).
6 -e Timmer (2010) book is the .rst systematically to base its empirical analysis on the EU KLEMS database, introduced 
in 2007-08. -is provides identically de.ned levels and growth rates of output and inputs not just for the aggregate eco-
nomy in many countries but also for individual industries within those countries. A prime example of the methodological 
homogenization imposed in the EU KLEMS data is that price indexes for computers and other electronic equipment are 
taken from the US hedonic price de0ators, even if the country in question does not adjust the prices of its computers for 
rapid changes in quality and performance.
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Table 2.2 Decomposition of sources of growth, EU-15 US, average annual growth rates, 1980-1995 compared to 
1995-2005
EU- United States
Decomposition of Sources of 
Growth for the Market Economy
- - - -
1. Output 2.1 2.2 3.2 3.6
2. Labor hours worked -0.5 0.7 1.3 0.7
3. Labor productivity (1)-(2) 2.5 1.5 1.9 2.9
Contributions from:
4. Labor quality 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
5. Capital services per hour (6) + (7)
   Of which:
1.2 1.0 1.0 1.3
6. ICT capital per Hour 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0
7. Non-ICT capital per your 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3
8. Residual = MFP (3) - (4) - (5) 1.0 0.3 0.7 1.3
Addendum: Contributirni of the 
knowledge economy to labor
productivitiy (4) + (6) + (8)
1.7 1.1 1.6 2.6
Source: Timmer et al. (2010 Table 2.1).
-e overall objective of the table is to explain why (on line 3) US labor productivity growth was 0.6 points 
slower than the EU-15 during 1980-95 and 1.4 points faster during 1995-2005. -e end result of the 
calculations is that MFP growth (the unexplained residual) was 0.3 percent slower than the EU-15 during 
1980-95 and 1.0 points faster after 1995. -is means that the explanatory factors provided in the table, 
the contribution of labor quality and of capital deepening, contribute only 0.3 percentage points of US 
shortfall in 1980-95 and only 0.4 percentage points of the US advantage in labor productivity growth af-
ter 1995. -e remaining turnaround from a MFP growth shortfall of 0.3 points to a surplus of 1.0 points 
is left entirely unexplained. -e only contribution of this growth accounting exercise, besides revealing 
the MFP growth turnaround as an unexplained puzzle, is to point to the slowdown of EU-15 non-ICT 
capital growth as a source of its productivity growth slowdown. 
Let us de.ne the term “turnaround” to refer to the change between the EU-15 advantages in produc-
tivity growth prior to 1995 to the US advantage after 1995. For labor productivity on line 3 of Table 2.2, 
the EU-15 advantage before 1995 was 0.6 percentage points and the US advantage after 1995 was 1.4 
percentage points. -is turnaround sums to 2.0 points (that is, 0.6 plus 1.4). -e turnaround for labor 
quality on line 4 was 0.2 points, for capital deepening was 0.5 points, and thus for MFP had to be 1.3 
points, thus accounting for the labor productivity growth turnaround (2.0 = 0.2 + 0.5 + 1.3). When the 
authors add together the contribution of knowledge-related factors that include labor quality, ICT capital 
deepening, and MFP growth, they obtain a turnaround of 1.6 points, accounting for most of the produc-
tivity growth turnaround of 2.0 points. 
So far the growth accounting exercise in Table 2.2 leaves us baKed. Most of the turnaround is attrib-
uted to MFP growth and an even greater component is attributed to the contribution of knowledge which 
includes MFP growth. But since MFP is just the residual or “the measure of our ignorance,” there is no 
real explanation in Table 2.3. More useful analysis occurs when the authors use their massive EU KLEMS 
data base to provide a breakdown by industry. Of the 2.0 percent turnaround in labor productivity, they 
assign 0.2 to ICT production, 0.5 to the rest of manufacturing, 0.0 to other goods, and a whopping 1.2 
percent to market services.7 -e ICT-producing sector in the US, somewhat surprisingly, turns out not to be 
important, in the sense that it explains only 10 percent (0.2/2.0) of the turnaround, despite the role of US compa-
nies such as Intel, Dell, Oracle, Cisco, Apple, and Microsoft in driving the internet revolution. While the US has a 
7 See Timmer et al. (2010, Table 2.2, p. 32).
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somewhat larger share of its economy devoted to ICT production, its productivity growth in ICT industries does 
not di/er appreciably from the EU-15. 
Before we turn to the crucial role of market services, Timmer et al. (2010, p. 33) identify an important 
role for the changing structure of the European economy. Production has gradually shifted from manu-
facturing, where productivity growth tends to be relatively fast, to market services, where productivity 
growth tends to be relatively slow. -e authors calculate that if productivity growth after 1995 in each 
industrial sector retained its actual value, while the employment shares are held constant at 1980 percent-
ages, EU-15 overall labor productivity growth would have been 0.5 percent faster after 1995 than actu-
ally occurred. -is source of a productivity slowdown is familiar from the US literature going back four 
decades. Services are handicapped by “Baumol’s Disease,” the di:culty of increasing productivity when 
a service is provided by direct contact between the service provider and the customer. Bartenders hand 
drinks to customers and waiters bring food; so far robots have not replaced these basic labor-intensive 
occupations. Baumol’s own example of a string quartet requiring four players has long been obsolete, 
because modern electronic media raise the productivity of the string quartet as measured by the number 
of listeners divided by the number of players.
2.3 
europe’s productivity problem in market services
Detailed studies of di/erences across industries in EU-15 versus US productivity growth began at least a dec-
ade ago, long before the development of the EU KLEMS data base used by Timmer et al. (2010). Early in 
the last decade four industries were identi.ed as having much faster post-1995 growth in labor productivity 
and MFP in the US than in Europe, and none of these involved the production of ICT equipment. -e four 
sectors are wholesale trade, retail trade, .nancial services, and business services. -e analysis of the Timmer 
team con.rms that this is not explained by the behavior of capital-labor ratios but rather re0ects di/erences 
in the unexplained residual of MFP growth. -us a central area of research in the past decade has been on 
the sources of rapid productivity growth in these four service industries in the US compared to Europe, with 
leading contributions in a compendium of papers on the US service sector (Triplett and Bosworth, 2004) 
and a relatively early paper documenting trade and .nance as the heart of Europe’s post-1995 productivity 
problem (van Ark et al., 2003). -e latter study showed that of the di/erential in productivity growth be-
tween Europe and the US in the late 1990s, fully 55 percent was contributed by the retail sector, 25 percent 
by the wholesale sector, and banking/.nance contributed the remaining 20 percent. Surprisingly there was 
no net contribution to explaining the di/erential from the rest of the economy. -e updated decomposition 
by Timmer et al. (2010) is less extreme, but also these authors emphasize that market services are the key to 
faster productivity growth in Europe. Given that market services are likely to continue to grow as a share of 
the economy in both regions, they are potentially a major source of economic growth. Services industries, 
such as distribution and business services, may see rapid labour productivity growth, as evidenced by the 
US experience. But until the mid 2000s Europe did not exploit this opportunity, leading to a growing gap 
in the productivity level between Europe and USA. In 2005, Europe’s market services sector was 20% less 
productive than that in USA. In addition to slow productivity growth in market services, labour productivity 
growth in goods production, a traditional European strength, also slowed considerably after 1995 and, to 
some extent, to slower capital deepening. 
Table 2.3 shows the sectoral growth in labour productivity. ICT production and personal services have 
experienced a better productivity dynamics in US in both periods although the gap widens in the second 
one. However, ICT production is the only sector where productivity growth in the EU increased also in 
the second period. -e highest contribution to the productivity growth turn-point in ‘95 comes from 
Distribution and Business and Financial services.
Box 2.2 deepens the possible causes of EU to US productivity gap in the retail sector. A prominent 
source of the productivity growth in the US is its “big-box” retail format. -is point deserves awareness 
since it represents a typical example of an eventual trade-o/ between productivity and well-being. Indeed, 
the European burdens to the development of such a format are strictly related to the continental life 
styles and social norms embodied in the speci.c urban models. -us, a shift towards the urban model 
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is coherent with a fully developed “big box” format which could have a negative impact on the EU well 
being (weaker social networks, city center deserti.cation, longer journeys, etc.). However, the problem of 
increasing retail productivity is still at hand, although the corresponding policies should take into account 
the peculiarities of the EU urban models, as the provision of the appropriate real and intangible infra-
structures (as logistic platforms and small .rm networks) and regulatory issues are able to shift smaller and 
city center retailers towards high value product retail.
Table 2.3 Sectoral labour productivity, EU and USA
Growth in labour productivity (annual growth)
EU USA
- - - -
ICT production 4.9 6.5 5.9 10
Manufacturing 3.2 2 2.1 2.9
Other goods 3.5 1.6 1.8 -0.4
Distribution 2.5 1.7 2.7 4
Business 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.6
Personal 0.5 0.4 1.1 1.2
Market cconomy 2.5 1.5 1.9 2.9
Sources Timmer et al. (2010a).
-e US di/erential of higher productivity growth also applies to wholesale trade, .nancial services, and 
business services. -e sources of the US productivity advantage in wholesaling have some of the same 
causes as in retailing. Much of US trade takes place in the suburbs than in the central city. -is means 
that wholesale merchants can make their deliveries with larger trucks, less congestion, fewer problems of 
narrow streets, and can deliver to large suburban shopping malls and big boxes in well-designed loading 
docks designed for large trucks. Wholesale productivity has also adopted computer bar-coding and scan-
ner devices, which in turn is possible because the wholesale trade industry in the US involves large .rms 
selling to large customers.
-e .nance sector’s meteoric rise in the US in the 1990s was both a source of measured productivity 
growth and of controversy, particularly after the US .nancial services industry caused the global .nancial 
meltdown of 2007-09. A greatly increased share of GDP taking the form of .nance sector value-added oc-
curred simultaneously with a marked increase in the relative compensation of top o:cers in .nancial .rms, 
a primary cause of rising income inequality in the US Sceptics wondered whether the alleged productivity 
advantage of the .nancial .rms re0ected mainly increases in compensation rather than increases in pro-
ductivity. -e answer requires close study of the methods used by the US national accounting agency (the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis) to de0ate .nancial sector value added. No clear answer has yet emerged as to 
whether the increased executive pay was mis-measured as higher productivity growth. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that there was frenetic activity in the US .nancial sector during 1990-2007 that created many new .nancial 
products that in turn contributed directly or indirectly to the post-2007 .nancial crisis.
An important remark is in order. Much of the increase in GDP today occurs not as a result of, say, 
an increase in the number of cars purchased, but of their quality and our metrics is poor for measuring 
quality.8 For material productions we may use some conventions which allow us to account for quality 
improvement, as we do when we use hedonic prices for computers. But the di:culty is compounded 
when we deal with services. Whereas for manufactures it is easy to de.ne the unit purchased, this is much 
harder for many services.9 -is di:culty has long been recognized and it implies that for the service sec-
tor, especially for complex services, the quality question will be much harder to resolve. And precisely, we 
8 Cf. Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz: Mismeasuring our Life, the New Press, 2010.
9 Cf. $e Atkinson Review: Final Report, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2005
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have identi.ed the sectors where European productivity is lagging as wholesale trade, retail trade, .nancial 
services, and business services. A modicum of historical sensitivity would tell us that we were wrong in our 
measurement of output and productivity for the .nancial sector in the US. Business services are complex 
services, and we have to go deep into the details of the comparison before coming with a robust conclu-
sion. Even in the retail sector, it is not so easy to de.ne the unit purchased. 
Our conclusions are thus to be taken with caution, hoping that in the future better metrics will allow 
us to be more precise. 
Box 2.2: US and EU productivity in the Trade sector
-e productivity advantage in US retailing did not occur evenly across the board in retailing, rather was 
concentrated in “large stores o/ering a wide array of goods accompanied by low prices and relatively high use 
of self-service systems” (Sieling et al. 2001, p. 10). A complementary .nding by Foster et al. (2002) based 
on a study of a large set of individual retail establishments shows that all of retail productivity growth (not 
just the revival but the entire amount of measured productivity growth over the decade of the 1990s) can be 
attributed to newly entered more productive establishments which displaced comparatively less productive 
existing establishments. -e average establishment that continued to be in business exhibited zero productiv-
ity growth despite the massive investment of the retail industry in ICT equipment that presumably went into 
both replenishment of old and opening of new establishments. In Foster’s results, productivity growth re0ects 
the greater e:ciency of newly opened stores, and Sieling’s comment implies that most of these highly e:cient 
new stores were large discount operations, the proverbial “big boxes” like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Best Buy, 
Circuit City (now defunct), and new large supermarkets. 
Sieling’s and Foster’s .ndings seem to con0ict with that of Oliner-Sichel (2000, 2002) that at least for the 
period through 1999, all of the productivity revival in retailing was achieved by purchasing new computers, 
software, and communications equipment. All retailers, whether new establishments of the 1990s, older estab-
lishments of the 1980s or prior decades, had adopted ICT technology. Bar-code readers have become universal 
in new and old stores. It is likely that the productivity revival in retailing associated with newly built “big box” 
stores involves something beyond the use of computers, including large size of the big boxes, economies of 
scale, e:cient design to allow large-volume unloading from delivery trucks, stacking of merchandise on tall 
racks with fork-lift trucks, and large-scale purchases taken by customers to vehicles in adjacent parking lots. 
-is set of factors related to size and scale reinforce Timmer et al. (2010, p. 36) .nding that MFP growth 
rather than “factor intensity” (i.e., capital deepening) is responsible for most of the US to EU gap in pro-
ductivity growth. Just as the US retailing sector has achieved e:ciency gains for reasons not directly related 
to computers, including the “big box” format, we can suggest in parallel that Europe has fallen back because 
European .rms have lesser liberty to develop the “big box” retail formats. Impediments include land use 
regulations that prevent the carving out of new “green.eld” sites for big box stores in suburban and exur-
ban locations, shop-closing regulations that restrict the revenue potential of new investments, congestion in 
central-city locations that are near the nodes of Europe’s extensive urban public transit systems, and restrictive 
labor rules that limit 0exibility in organizing the workplace and make it expensive to hire and .re workers 
with the near-total freedom to which US .rms are accustomed.
A regulatory issue is the role of resale price maintenance policies that in the US assure new competitors that 
they will be able to obtain volume discounts for their large operations, so that they can sell at lower retail 
prices both because of lower wholesale prices and for more e:cient operations that imply smaller retail 
markups and thus lower retail prices. In contrast, in some European countries producers refuse to discount 
to sell to or provide volume discounts to new, high-volume, and low-cost retailing formats in order to protect 
smaller high-cost merchants. In some European countries, regulations directly prohibit the entry of large-
scale stores and/or limit store opening days and hours, thus preventing large stores from fully amortizing their 
investments. 
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Box 2.3: -e Dynamics of Productivity within Europe
In a general perspective of Europe falling behind the US in productivity, it is hard to tell a “single European 
history” as over time there are large di/erences in productivity performance within the EU (Figure 2.1). -at 
is why in this paragraph we compare the productivity growth between some “families” of European countries1. 
Over the last twenty years Anglo-Saxon are the best performers mainly due to the signi.cant boost from more 
productive foreign direct investment in Ireland; Nordic countries follow with a very good performance. Even 
though continental countries did well, as Nordic countries, they experienced large productivity losses in the 
recent crisis. Despite a rapid catch-up up to early 2000s due to very low starting levels, the labour productiv-
ity growth of Southern countries lags behind that of the other groups.
Figure 2.1 – Labour productivity (GDP per hour worked, 1990=100).
Source: -e Conference Board and OECD.
EU Klems database2 contains industry-level measures of output, inputs and productivity for 25 European 
countries, Japan and the US from 1970 to 2007. Figure 2.2 shows the performance of the four families of 
European countries. 
-e Anglo-Saxon countries show outstanding performance: 14 out of 25 industries bear out an increase in 
labour productivity growth rate in 1995-08. In most of the other industries productivity growth was .rst-rate 
in the period 1980-95 and then in 1995-07, the productivity growth rate was satisfactory. -is group display 
between the two periods a shift of the sectorial peaks of the productivity growth rates: while in the .rst period 
the highest rates concern more traditional sectors (mining, agriculture, chemical), recent peaks mainly concern 
less traditional ones (Paper Print and Publishing, Business Services, Finance, Post and Telecommunications).
A similar shift also occurred in the Nordic countries where the productivity growth rates re0ects their in-
dustry specialization, with an outstanding increase of productivity in electrical equipment and post and tel-
ecommunications services during 1995-07 (while in the .rst period Mining, Metal and Agriculture were also 
prominent). In the services sector we observe an increase in wholesale and retail trade and in .nancial services 
(notably high in Sweden, see Box 5.1 in the last Chapter). 
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Continental countries show an improvement in labour productivity growth in 1995-07 with respect to the 
previous period, with manufacturing sectors performing better than services (except for .nancial intermedia-
tion), but lacking a clear common sesctor-speci.c pattern. Lastly, in this sectorial insight, the dismal perfor-
mance of Southern countries displays a sectorial composition following the european one, in the correspon-
dent leser extent. Noteworthy is that the only sector that seems to have bene.t of relatively higher increases, 
in the pre crisis period, is Finance (and the opposite is true for Business Services).
Figure 2.2 – Labour productivity growth in the four families of EU countries (annual average, %)
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Box 2.3: -e Dynamics of Productivity within Europe
Note
1. -e four families of EU counties are grouped as follows. Northern countries: Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden; Anglo-Saxon: Ireland and United Kingdom; Continental: France, Germany, Benelux and Austria; 
Southern: Spain, Portugal and Greece. Italy is considered aside and analyzed in Chapter 5.
2. www.euklems.net. For an overview of the methodology and construction of the EU KLEMS 
database, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). 
2.4 
the role of culture and institutions  
in the european problem of slow productivity growth
Some of the reasons for slow productivity growth in Europe are not revealed at all by growth account-
ing or even by industry as in our discussion of market services above. Instead, a substantial part of the 
European productivity growth problem may be hidden inside the slow rate of MFP growth after 1995 
as shown in Table 2.3 above. -e discussion of culture and institutions in this section goes beyond issues 
related to innovation treated in the preceding section. Here we focus on productivity-inhibiting aspects 
of attitudes and regulations. -is section concludes with evidence that there was a change after 1995 in 
Europe toward fewer regulations, faster employment growth, but slower productivity growth, as inexperi-
enced workers entered the labor force after previously being excluded by virtue of cultural attitudes, high 
taxes, or regulations like shop-closing hours.
Phelps (2003) takes a broad view of economic institutions that promote economic “dynamism” and 
those that suppress it.10 His analysis of “dynamism” starts from Schumpeter’s concept of “creative de-
struction”. He adds to Schumpeter’s emphasis on entrepreneurship an equal if not greater emphasis on 
“.nanciership,” that is, the ability of .nancial markets to steer .nance to worthy innovations. -e greater 
10  See also Phelps and Sinn (2010, pp. 15-16).
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success of the US in encouraging innovation is attributed in part to its greater emphasis on venture capital 
and initial public equity o/erings than in Europe.
In Phelps’ view, the relatively poor economic performance of continental Europe results both from the 
underdevelopment of capitalist institutions like venture capital and equity .nance, and the overdevelop-
ment of corporatist institutions which suppress innovation and competition. -ese corporatist institu-
tions impose “penalties, impediments, prohibitions, and mandates generally intended to damp down 
creative destruction.” Among these impediments are licenses and permissions to set up a new plant or 
.rm, the need to consult with workers on changes in the mix of products or plants, and employment pro-
tection legislation. Because these institutions are designed to suppress the changes inherent in “unbridled 
capitalism,” they also lead to the underdevelopment of the stock market, resulting in lower ratios of stock 
market valuation to GDP in continental Europe than in the US and other less corporatist economies like 
Britain, Canada, and Australia.  
Phelps provides a complementary analysis of cultural di/erences between Europe and the US Europe-
ans view money-grubbing Americans with their out-sized rewards for CEOs and successful entrepreneurs 
with disdain. American children begin to work earlier than European children, earning baby-sitting mon-
ey in their early teens, working in fast-food outlets while in high school, and are forced to work during 
college in contrast to European youth who “free ride” on government-paid college tuition and stipends. 
Phelps concludes that Europe has developed a culture of “dependency” that “breeds an unduly large share 
of young people who have little sense of independence and are unwilling to strike out on their own.” He 
might have added that high levels of long-term youth unemployment discourage independence and en-
courage young adults to live with their parents in their 20s and, in Italy, into their 30s.
Europeans do not take these criticisms lying down. Yes, they admit that high youth unemployment, 
low labor force participation, and a generation of young adults living with their parents represent an 
economic and social failure. But they are quick to criticize aspects of American economic and political 
institutions that, while making it easy for Wal-Mart and Home Depot to .nd the land to build thousands 
of “big box” stores, have o/setting disadvantages. Europeans .nd abhorrent the hundreds of billions, or 
even trillions, that Americans have spent on extra highways and extra energy to support the dispersion of 
the population into huge metropolitan areas spreading over hundreds or even thousands of square miles, 
in many cases with few transport options other than the automobile. Productivity data do not give Europe 
su:cient credit for the convenience bene.ts of frequent bus, subway, and train (including TGV) public 
transit. Excessive American dispersion is viewed as a response to misguided public policies, especially sub-
sidies to interstate highways in vast amounts relative to public transport, local zoning measures in some 
suburbs that prohibit residential land allocations below a .xed size, e.g., two acres, and the infamous and 
politically untouchable deduction of mortgage interest payments from income tax. 
Europeans enjoy shopping at small individually owned shops on lively central city main streets and 
pedestrian arcades, and recoil with distaste from the ubiquitous and cheerless American strip malls and 
big-box retailers although Carrefour, Ikea, and others provide American-like options in some European 
cities to counter the e/ects of American land use regulations that create overly dispersed metropolitan ar-
eas. Europeans counter with their own brand of land use rules that preserve greenbelts and inhibit growth 
of suburban and exurban retailing. 
A striking aspect of the graphs above was a simultaneous transition after 1995. Europe’s growth of 
productivity moved from faster than the US to slower, while at the same time Europe’s growth of hours 
per capita moved from slower than the US to faster. -ese opposing changes exactly cancelled out, so 
that European and US growth of output per capita was identical in the long period from 1977 to 2011, 
including the post-2007 period of the great .nancial crisis.
What caused this inverse relationship between growth in productivity and in hours per capita? -e 
basic economic mechanism behind the tradeo/ has been introduced above. Let us discuss just one source 
of the tradeo/, labor taxes (presumably used to .nance social welfare programs). Higher taxes make labor 
more expensive to employ while reducing after-tax pay to workers. Firms respond by hiring fewer work-
ers and workers react by choosing to work less hours per capita decline, but output per hour increases 
because those who lose their jobs or choose to work less are typically less e:cient and productive than the 
remaining employees.
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-is tradeo/ has been studied by Dew-Becker and Gordon (2012), using data and hypotheses sug-
gested by Bassanini and Duval (2006) and other authors cited above, particularly Prescott (1994), Alesina 
et al. (2006), and others. -eir paper does not compare the US and the EU-15 as a whole, but divides up 
the EU-15 into four groups of countries – Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, Continental, and Mediterranean – and 
explores explanations of the very di/erent behavior of hours and productivity growth in the four coun-
try groups. In regressions for both employment per capita and productivity spanning 1980-2003, they 
highlight the similarity of the European experience before 1995 and the divergence across country groups 
after 1995. 
Two quite di/erent sets of factors might have caused the post-1995 turnaround in employment 
growth, which in turn was associated with a decline in productivity growth. Tax rates fell moderately, 
unions became weaker, and regulations in both labor markets and product markets were loosened. In ad-
dition several European countries reduced drastically payroll taxes for the low paid11. All of these changes 
contributed to the turnaround in employment growth but at the cost of slower productivity growth; the 
e/ects of these changes on output per capita are ambiguous. But one of the main causes of the revival of 
EU-15 employment growth is something quite di/erent, and this is the marked increase of female em-
ployment and labor-force participation in the Mediterranean countries (especially Italy and Spain), where 
70 percent of the employment increase after 1995 consisted of females. Starting from extremely low rates 
of female participation in 1985, half the rate in Spain as in Sweden, the Mediterranean countries caught 
up rapidly both during 1985-95 and after 1995. -e increase of employment in the southern countries 
was also to a lesser extent an increase of immigrants, who were presumably unskilled and dragged down 
national averages of productivity levels. -ese two sets of causes, changing institutions and changing 
behavior, may be interrelated. Lower taxes on labor or changing social norms, which cause an in0ux of 
inexperienced women into the labor force, can interact in raising hours per capita while decreasing output 
per hour. 
11  Cf. Fitoussi (1997)
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Chapter 3 
Innovations
3.1 
introduction
+e sources of growth analysis has singled out MFP as the main component of the transatlantic gap on 
productivity dynamic. Although the growth of such variable has often been used synonymously with 
technical change, its dynamics and di,erences between countries re-ect far more than just technology, 
and include a wide variety of institutions, regulations, and cultural factors. In this section we look at In-
novation as the result of the interplay between technological change and all these other factors. Indeed, 
countries structural di,erences involve the setting up of speci.c innovative models. Such models di,er 
for the intensity and the e,ectiveness of innovation activities but also for “the trajectory” that innovations 
take in each economy. 
In the following sections, we .rst look at the data concerning the dynamics of R&D expenditure wi-
thout answering the question of whether the European R&D de.cit is a symptom rather than a cause of 
weakness in EU’s capacity to innovate. However, formal organized R&D is only one source of progress; 
also Entrepreneurship and Creativity play an important role,1 and the relative importance of corporate 
R&D varies across products and industries 
We explore the di,erences between the two R&D systems according to institutions and productive 
sectors such as: competition and market entry conditions; the willingness of .nancial markets to fund 
new sectors and new .rms; the di,erences in labour market and in product markets; the investment in 
higher education; the di,erent public-private interface. Before concluding, we consider one of the main 
.eld where innovation issues are expected to be relevant, that of Energy and Environmental Policies
3.2 
r&d investments and gdp
+e R&D investment in innovation is the most commonly used mode to measure the innovation acti-
vities of .rms. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP in EU, US 
and Japan. Japan has the highest intensity in R&D investment in all the period considered. Indeed, after 
the catch-up of the US level that occurred at the beginning of the ’80s, Japan has always experienced a 
steady growth in the index of R&D all along the period except during their crisis years, in the .rst half of 
‘90s, while in US the corresponding index has varied cyclically around a constant intensity level. Europe 
experiences a permanent gap relatively to the R & D expenditure in US, although the intensity level has 
kept more stable, with a lower sensitivity to cyclical conditions. In line with the analysis of MFP dynamics 
in previous section, EU did not demonstrate any recovery after ’95 contrary to Japan and the US. Actual 
levels of EU investments in R&D are also well below the average of OECD countries. 
1  Electricity and the internal combustion engine, as well as the phonograph and telephone, were not invented in the late 
19th century inside the R&D departments of large corporations, but by individual entrepreneurs. Bill Gates and Mark 
Zuckerberg provide more recent examples. Furthermore, European Innobarometer survey shows .rms investing in creati-
ve innovative activities are likely to be fast growing.
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Figure 3.1– Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (as percentage of GDP.)
Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD 2008
Table 3.1 shows the sources and the performers of R&D. Both EU Government .nanced and performed 
R&D have a higher relative share, but a lower level, than in US. +us, the gap in innovation activities 
seems to rely much more on a de.cit of the private sector. On the contrary, the R&D performed by Eu-
ropean Higher Education Institutions is higher than in US also in levels (OECD 2008). However, the 
next section will discuss many limits in the European higher education system that harm the e,ectiveness 
of R&D investments and that are mainly related to the connection of such institutions with the private 
sector.
Government expenditure on R&D, have experienced a sharp decline both in US and EU (Figure 3.2). 
+e brief revival of public R&D in the US corresponds to an increase in Defense R&D expenditures after 
the September 11 attacks (OECD 2008). Besides, in spite of its higher level of Defence expenditures in 
R&D, the same data con.rm that the US innovation system is much more sustained by the government 
than the EU one, even when the comparison is restricted to its civil component.
Table 3.1 – Gross domestic expenditure on R&D by Financiers and Performers.
 of R&D 
expenditures financed by:
 of R&D expenditures performed by:
Industry Government Industry Higher Educ. Governmen
US 66.4 27.7 71.9 13.3 10.7
EU 27 55 63.1 22.3 13.4
Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD 2008.
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+e EU/US gap in R&D intensity is a result of both a di,erence of the intensity in each sector of the two 
countries, and a di,erence in the sectoral composition since each sector is characterized by a di,erent ave-
rage intensity. While the EU has an R&D intensity gap in speci.c sectors with regards to that of the US, 
it also has a sectoral composition bias towards less R&D intensive sectors. Box 3.1 develops this argument 
by using the European Innovation Scorebord analysis. Beside, the more traditional aggregation in Table 
3.2 sheds light on the sectoral features of the R&D intensity gap.
+e highest intensity gap in absolute terms can be observed in the “ICT and other non-transport 
equipment” sector. +is gap shows that the EU has more than a 10 percentage points di,erence with US 
in the R&D to value added ratio in the sector of ICT. +e second highest relative gap emerges in com-
mercial services where the intensity in the EU is one third of the corresponding .gure for the US. Only 
in utilities and pharmaceuticals, the US has a lower ratio compared to EU. +us, taking such evidences 
together with the discussions in chapter 1, we can conclude that the sectors where the gap in R&D 
between the two economies is larger tend to have also a larger gap in productivity growth as well, and 
thus di,erences in R&D intensity between EU and US play a fundamental role in the productivity gap. 
In particular, in commercial services the gap is wider in “Renting, Real Estate, IT services and R&D”, but 
it is particularly high for Wholesale and Retail Trade2. +us, the institutional and regulatory tary barriers that 
harm the productivity growth in the trade sector that we considered in previous section are accompanied by a fairly 
weak propensity to invest in R&D.
Figure 3.2 – Government Gross domestic expenditure on R&D by .nanciers and performers in 2007.
Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD 2008.
2 See Van Ark (2008), L. Paganetto (2007).
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Table 3.2 – Sources of the EU-US gap in business sector R&D intensity
 of sector value added
EU- US US-EU gap US-EU gap as 
a  of EU level
Transport equipment 16.3 16.0 -0.3 -2
ICT and other non-transport 
equipment
10.5 21.0 10.6 101
Chemicals and
pharmaceuticals
10.0 9.0 -1.0 -10
Metals and minerals 1.3 1.4 0.1 9
Food, textiles, wood and paper 0.8 1.2 0.4 57
Utilities 0.6 0.1 -0.5 -88
Commercial services 0.4 1.3 0.9 215
Construction 0.1 0.1 0.0 -45
All industries 1.9 2.6 0.7 37
Source: (OECD 2009).
Box 3.1 –  An R&D intensity sectoral disaggregation
+e European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) classi.es the various sectors into four sub-sector groups by R&D in-
tensities (measured as the ratio of R&D investments over net sales). Figure 3.3 shows the R&D intensity of each 
group in the EU and US. +e .gure re-ects similar R&D intensity in the EU and the US. +e high intensity 
sectors (pharmaceuticals & biotechnology, health care equipment & services, ICT–software and hardware related) 
have an intensity ranging between 12-13%, while medium high sectors (electronics & electrical equipment, auto-
mobiles, aerospace & defence, chemicals possess an intensity ranging between 3-4%. +e medium-low intensity 
sector (1,3-1,5%) which includes food producers, travel, media, oil equipment, electricity re-ect an intensity rang-
ing between 1,3-1,5 %. Finally, the low intensity sector which includes oil and gas producers, construction, food 
retailers, transportation, mining, multi-utilities has an intensity ranging between 0,3-0,5%.
Figure 3.3 – R&D intensity in the four groups (R&D spending as a percentage of value added, average 2000-03) 
Source: EIS 2009.
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Box 3.1 –  An R&D intensity sectoral disaggregation
However, these di,erent sectors contributed di,erently to the aggregate R&D intensity because the weight 
of the high R&D intensity group amongst the US companies is greater than that of the EU ones. As a matter 
of fact, the investment in R&D in the high intensity sector represents 63% of the total amount of R&D 
investment in the US and only 35% in the EU.
3.3 
innovation, incentives, and institutions in the us and europe
America clearly surged after 1995 to the forefront in most of the ICT industries. Our overview of the 
stimuli and barriers to technological change and innovation covers not just the core of ICT (computer 
hardware and software and communications), but also pharmaceuticals, and biotech. Why did the US 
have a comparative or absolute advantage in innovative capacity in the late 1990s, more than a century 
after its initial leadership in the invention of electricity and its early lead in the exploitation of the internal 
combustion engine?
+e mid-1990s discontinuity in productivity in the United States was not predicted in advance, althou-
gh its signi.cance was spotted almost immediately by Business Week and some other astute observers. A de-
cade earlier it had been “Japan as Number One”, and brie-y the market value of Japanese equities exceeded 
that of American equities. Rosenberg (1986, p. 25) perceptively generalized the diEculty of forecasting the 
consequences of inventions in advance: “A disinterested observer who happened to be passing by at Kitty 
Hawk on that fateful day in 1903 might surely be excused if he did not walk away with visions of 747s or C-
5As in his head.” +e great success of Japanese .rms in dominating many leading technologies in the 1980s 
did not appear to give them any head start in dominating the new technologies of the 1990s. Rosenberg 
points to the failure of carriage makers to play any role in the development of the automobile, or even the 
failure of steam locomotive makers to participate in the development of the diesel locomotive. 
+e literature on technology distinguishes between the initial invention and its subsequent deve-
lopment and di,usion. A longstanding puzzle in the retardation of British economic growth after the 
1870s is the fact that many inventions initially made by British inventors were brought to commercial 
success in the US, Japan, and elsewhere. +e British were not alone in losing out. +e US invention of vi-
deotape was followed by an exploitation of the consumer VCR market that was almost entirely achieved by 
Japanese companies. +e Finnish company Nokia took over leadership in mobile phones from Motorola. 
Within any economy there are winners and losers as upstart companies (Intel, Microsoft) seize the advan-
tage in developing technology while leaving older competitors (IBM, Wang, Digital Equipment, Xerox) 
behind. While predicting technological developments in advance is exceedingly diEcult, there is ample 
literature which points to particular national characteristics that help to explain, at least in retrospect, why 
particular inventions and industries came to be dominated by particular countries.3 Perhaps the one gene-
ralization that spans most industries is the role of the product cycle. No matter what the causes of initial 
national leadership, technology eventually di,uses from the leading nations to other nations that may 
have lower labor costs. An extensive literature on the sources of US superiority (e.g., Wright, 1990) iden-
ti.es national advantages both in the supply of resources and in national characteristics of demand. +e 
US achieved initial leadership in petrochemicals in part because of its abundant supply of cheap domestic 
petroleum, while its leadership in machine tools was the result of its early adoption of mass production 
methods, which in turn re-ected its relative scarcity of labor and its large internal market. In turn mass 
production, together with long distances, cheap land, and the low density of urban development help to 
explain why the US achieved such an enormous early lead in automobile production and ownership in the 
1920s. In turn, the mass market for automobiles fed back into a rapidly increasing demand for gasoline 
and stimulated further developments in petroleum and petrochemical manufacturing.
3  +e generalizations in the next several paragraphs select among the more important points made by Mowery and Nelson (1999a).
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However, it is less clear that America’s large domestic market provided a universal source of advantage 
throughout the history of technological development over the last two centuries. Between 1870 and 1914 
-ows of goods, capital, and immigrants were notably free, and trade could create international markets on 
the scale of the US domestic markets, as demonstrated by German dominance in chemicals. After 1960, 
Japan rose to prominence and even domination in one industry after another, with export markets pro-
viding the scale that was lacking, at least initially, at home. Several small countries, e.g., the Netherlands 
and Sweden, have remained close to the productivity frontier over the past century despite their small 
relative size.
Close integration of industrial R&D and university research is credited to the German domination 
of the chemical products industry between the 1870s and early 1920s, as well as German and Swiss le-
adership in the development of pharmaceuticals in the early part of the 20th century. More generally, a 
rise in educational attainment is one of the sources of rising output per hour. While the .rst cited role 
of the education system in technological development is the rise of the German chemical industry after 
1870, a set of relatively uncoordinated policies at the state and local level resulted in the US achieving the 
.rst universal secondary education between 1910 and 1940 (Goldin, 1998; Goldin-Katz, 2008) and the 
highest rate of participation in college education after World War II. 
Even in the dismal days of American pessimism during the years of the 1972-95, productivity 
slowdown, it was widely recognized that America’s private and state-supported research universities were 
its most successful export industry, at least as measured by its lead over other countries and its appeal for 
students from the rest of the world. +e interplay among these research universities, government research 
grants, and private industry was instrumental in achieving American leadership in the ICT industry, and 
it was no coincidence that Silicon Valley happened to be located next to Stanford University or that ano-
ther concentration of ICT companies in the hardware, software, and biotech industries was located in the 
Boston area near M.I.T. and Harvard.
A US educational advantage of possible importance is its early development of the graduate school of 
business and its continuing dominance in this type of education. +e mere existence of business schools 
did not provide any solution to the productivity slowdown of the 1970s and 1980s, and indeed the on-
going superiority of Japanese .rms in automobiles and consumer electronics elicited the cynical joke in 
those years that “the secret advantage of the Japanese manufacturers is that they have no world-class busi-
ness schools.” While US business schools were indeed weak in teaching such specialities as manufacturing 
production and quality control, they excelled in .nance and general management strategy. +ese skills 
came into their own in the 1990s and interacted with the rise of the venture capital industry and internet 
start-up companies; in the United States more than elsewhere there was a ready supply of thousands of 
well-educated MBAs, both knowledgeable about .nance and receptive to a culture of innovation and risk-
taking. Further, US business schools have provided a wealth of talent to further develop US worldwide 
dominance in investment banking, accounting, and management-consulting .rms.
Ironically for a country that has been suspicious of government involvement in the private economy, it 
is the United States that appears to demonstrate the closest links between government policy and techno-
logical leadership. +e central role of government subsidies in achieving economic growth in the United 
States goes back to the last half of the nineteenth century, when free farmland under the Homestead Act 
encouraged immigration and the settlement of the frontier, while land grants to railroads promoted the 
building of infrastructure. In the modern era, research support from the National Institutes of Health 
and National Science Foundation are credited with postwar American leadership in pharmaceuticals and 
biomedical research, as well as basic research in the sciences. Defence-funded research and government-
funded grants is credited with the early emergence of American leadership in semiconductors, computers, 
software, biotech, and the Internet itself. Government antitrust policy is credited to the emergence of a 
software industry largely independent of computer hardware manufacturers. 
+ere are notable di,erences between the US method of supporting higher education and research 
and that found in European countries like France, Germany, and the UK First, the US mix of private 
universities and those .nanced at the state and local level promotes competition and allows the top tier of 
the private university sector the budgetary freedom to pay high salaries, fund opulent research labs, and 
achieve the highest levels of quality, in turn attracting many top faculty members and graduate students 
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from other countries. Second, much of US central government research support is allocated through a 
peer-review system that favors a meritocracy of young, active researchers and discourages elitism and con-
tinuing support for senior professors whose best ideas are in the past. In Europe, a much larger share of 
central government support to universities and research institutes goes to general budgetary support that 
tends to result in a more equal salary structure less prone to reward academic “stars” and also relies less on 
the periodic quality hurdle imposed by peer review. 
Explicit government policies to encourage the development of speci.c industries by trade protection 
and .nancial subsidies may have been successful in helping to accelerate the rise of Japan and Korea to 
industrial success, but they have been less successful in the United States and Europe and indeed may have 
back.red in Japan in the past decade. +e relevance of particular government policies, from protection 
to defence spending to antitrust, di,er suEciently across industries as to discourage generalizations. In 
the industries that have received the most credit for the post-1995 productivity revival (semiconductors, 
computer hardware, and computer software), the most important aspect of public policy appears to have 
been the relatively unfocussed support of research and training by the US government. +e literature on 
the American resurgence in semiconductor production as well as its continuing dominance in software 
also emphasizes the role of private enforcement of intellectual property rights and regulation of licensing 
agreements (see Bresnahan and Melerba, 1999, and Mowery, 1999). +e US pharmaceutical industry 
initially gained an advantage through massive government support during World War II, health-related 
research support during most of the postwar period, and a long tradition of strong US patent protection. 
US drug companies also were able to make high pro.ts, much of which was reinvested in R&D, as a result 
of high rents earned in the face of a fragmented health care system with no attempt by the government to 
place price or pro.t ceilings on drug companies (see Pisano 2002).Lastly it is also worth to recall the role 
of the Defense department in developing the internet in the 1980s and 1990s.
Another set of US policies could be interpreted as “enforcement of benign neglect.” +e US go-
vernment took no action to arrest the erosion of state sales tax revenues as internet e-commerce merchants 
sold items without charging any sales tax to customers. In e,ect, the freedom of e-commerce transac-
tions from the burden of sales taxes amounted to government subsidization of shipping charges, since 
for e-commerce these usually amounted to roughly the same surcharge on listed prices as sales taxes at 
traditional bricks and mortar outlets. +e US government also maintained a zero-tari, regime for trade 
in electronic components, fostering large trade -ows in both directions and a large US trade de.cit in IT 
manufacturing. 
In the 1980s American capital markets seemed to be a source of American industrial weakness, with 
their emphasis on short-run pro.t maximization, and there was much envy of the access of Japanese 
.rms to low-cost bank capital that played a role in the temporary period of Japanese domination of the 
semiconductor industry. But the American capital market turned out to be a blessing in disguise. A long 
tradition of government securities regulation that forced public disclosure of information and of access of 
equity research analysts to internal company information had fostered a large and active market for public 
o,erings, and this together with the relatively recent emergence of the venture capital industry provided 
ample .nance for start-up companies once the technological groundwork for the Internet was laid in the 
mid-1990s. While the stock market collapses of 2000-02 and 2007-09 temporarily damaged the venture 
capital industry, the .nancial infrastructure is still there seeking out the next round of innovation, inclu-
ding the recent stock o,erings of Linked In, Facebook, and other software companies that have achieved 
worldwide dominance in the development of social media software. 
+e literature on technological leadership omits a source of American advantage that is surely not in-
signi.cant. While language has little to do with domination in computer hardware (where indeed many 
of the components are imported), it is important for the American software industry that English long 
ago became the world’s leading second language in addition to being spoken as a .rst language by a criti-
cal mass of the world’s educated population. Another oft-neglected factor that should be discussed more 
often is the longstanding openness of the United States to immigration and the role of immigrants from 
India, East Asia, and elsewhere in providing the skilled labor that has been essential to the rise of Silicon 
Valley. Likewise, Indians returning from Silicon Valley have taken the lead in developing India’s capabi-
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lities in programming and call centres that have fuelled the current American debate about the potential 
harm or bene.t of “outsourcing.”
Several sources of systemic US advantage stand out, most notably the mixed system of government- 
and private-funded research universities, the large role of US government agencies providing research 
funding based on a criterion of peer review, and the strong position in a worldwide perspective of US 
business schools and US-owned investment banking, accounting, and management-consulting .rms. In 
comparison Germany, despite its recent relative economic success compared to southern Europe, seems 
particularly weak in its failure to reform its old-fashioned hierarchical university system, its bureaucratic 
rules that inhibit start-up .rms, its reliance on bank debt .nance, and its weakness in venture capital 
and equity .nance (Siebert and Stolpe, 2002). France su,ers from overcentralized government control, a 
system of universities and research institutions which places more emphasis on rewarding those with an 
elite educational pedigree rather than those currently working on the research frontier. 
Until its structural reforms and privatizations of the 1980s and 1990s, Britain shared a labor market 
dominated by strong unions with France and Germany. While the strong unions are gone, Britain con-
tinues to su,er from handicaps that date back a century or more, including a shortfall of technical skills 
among manual workers and a lack of graduate management training and business-oriented culture among 
highly educated workers. Where Britain does well, as in investment banking or as a destination of inward 
foreign investment, it relies on a relatively narrow set of advantages, including the traditional role of the 
City of London as a .nancial centre, and the same advantage that the English language provides, i.e., as 
a comfortable place for Asian .rms to build plants, to the United States, Canada, Ireland, Australia, and 
other parts of the former British Empire.
3.4 
innovations, energy and environmental policies
+e debate on energy and environmental policy is focused on the study of the various energy sources 
in use, the percentage composition of energy production from these sources, the problems related to the 
supply of these sources and environmental safety. +us, an evaluation of the opportunities and cost of 
energy production from petroleum, gas and nuclear sources vs. renewable energies -- so as to reach a better 
composition of energy production keeping in mind environmental problems and particularly the need for 
a necessary reduction in the CO2 emissions -- is needed. More speci.cally, energy eEciency, renewable 
energy usage and related innovation are aspects of the challenges being faced. However, technological 
advances and innovation in the energy sector can be seen as one of the most important driving forces to 
recover growth and tackle the risks of climate change in the near future.
At the Summit of L’Aquila in July 2009, the main issue dealt with was the prevention of a rise in the 
average world temperature above 2 degree Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels, as to avoid adverse 
events linked to global warming. To achieve this, it was decided that by 2050 the emissions should be 
halved. However, the exact policy to be implemented was left open-ended by the above meeting and 
the Copenhagen summit in December 2009. +e estimates by the ‘Intergovernmental Panel of Climate 
Change (IPCC), establish a correspondence between the level of concentration of greenhouse gases and 
the increase of the average temperature of the planet and predict a likely increase in temperature of 2.1 ° 
C if the concentration of greenhouse gases reaches 450 ppm. +e IEA supports the trends stated above. 
To combat this problem, if appropriate initiatives are taken, emissions should decline by 34% by 2030. 
However, according to some other estimates (Bosetti et al.), even if the goal of a drastic reduction in emis-
sions is adopted for 2050, the concentration of CO2 will grow reaching 470 ppm.
+e analysis by the World Energy Outlook of the ‘International Energy Association’, considers two 
scenarios: the .rst shows the evolution of emissions and energy market assuming that, by 2030, there 
is no change in the policies adopted. +e alternative scenario includes a series of trajectories consistent 
with the need to stabilize the greenhouse gases into the atmosphere to no more than 450 ppm, with the 
aim to avoid increases in average global temperature of 2 °C. +e analysis is conducted with a model that 
considers 24 geographic regions reclassifying them into OECD countries + ( including non-EU countries 
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including OECD members), higher emissions (OME) such as Brazil, China, Middle East, Russia and 
South Africa and all other (OC) countries with lower emissions.
All scenarios show a trend of oil prices growth as a result of the growing demand for energy, especially 
by developing countries, and the need to stimulate investments to ensure the corresponding supply. +e 
maximum price allowed is $ 100 per barrel in real terms, in 2020 in the reference scenario, while in the 
scenario of restrictive emissions the same price will be 90 dollars for the combined e,ect of its reduced 
relative demand, linked to all the interventions. Emission reduction technologies are those that focus on 
renewable. Investments related to the 450 ppm scenario, are substantial and are 0.5 % and 1 % of the glo-
bal GDP, respectively in 2020 and 2030. +e greater part of the expenditure, more than 60%, is related to 
technology for the production of low carbon content energy. +e need and focus on emission reduction 
will force innovation and adoption of new technologies even in the presence of costs of production higher 
than for the traditional sources. +is will also generate technological completion which is better for the 
respective country’s economic development. 
+e prospect of a technological change linked with end-use energy eEciency can help promote a clu-
ster of innovation potential to fundamentally alter the system-but energy. At the same time the substantial 
increase in world demand of energy, beginning with China, India and emerging countries, foreseen in the 
coming years, and the expected increase in relative prices starting with oil, will give a push to the use of 
energy resources such as wind, biomass and solar energy. +is, in turn, can lead to a paradigm shift, with 
the establishment of positions of competitive advantage based on the geographic availability of renewable 
energy resources, as solar and biomass. 
+e ETS (Emissions Trading System) idea of a single price of carbon for all countries and sectors is 
rational but not easily workable. To have a well-functioning cap and trade system long-term agreements 
must be de.ned and a system of clear rules must be shared by the greatest number of countries participat-
ing in the agreement. Additionally, all measures related to the transfer of energy technology, innovation, 
renewables, CCS and .nancial initiatives etc. must be carefully laid out. +is is because energy demand 
over the next 20-30 years will come from emerging countries and, in particular, the poorest of them; thus, 
the emissions can be controlled only by making available the necessary technologies.
Box 3.2 – Energy and Environmental Policies in EU
+e objectives of EU 2020 energy policy comprise of increasing the energy stability and security, monitoring 
of the energy prices and the adoption of appropriate policies that contain possible gains and create condi-
tions for their reduction, and the liberalization of the energy market directed at increasing the competition in 
the internal market for facilitating the creation of an integrated network for the distribution of energy. +e 
broader aims are reduction in emissions, increase in energy eEciency and an increase in the share of renew-
able energy in total energy production. +is is imperative for the EU because they import nearly 50% of oil 
and gas likely to increase to 70 % in the next decade, as per estimates. Further, a wide and diverse supplier 
base with Russia and North Africa as gas suppliers and the Middle East as suppliers of oil, calls for a policy 
that works towards the development of appropriate transport networks and technologies. +e binding fac-
tor of energy-environmental policies is the use of technology in achieving the objectives set, which is also 
supported by the International Energy Association (IEA). +is is true for production, distribution networks, 
diversi.cation of energy sources, and for energy eEciency objectives. +us, technology and innovation are 
indispensable for combating the risks posed by climate change.
+e European Commission’s (EC), e,ective agreement on combating the risks of a 2 degree increase in global 
temperature levels is: 
1) ambitious cuts by all developed countries, with a cut of greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40% compared 
to 1990 levels by 2020;
2) mitigation actions carried out by developing countries of cuts around 15-30% in comparison to the per-
formance trends ;
3) global cuts of 50% compared to 1990 emissions by 2050; 
4) appropriate action in terms of mitigation; 
5) inclusion of the aviation maritime sectors in the list of suggested sectors where emissions can be reduced. 
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Box 3.2 – Energy and Environmental Policies in EU
Although this agreement would be very fruitful for a cleaner environmental, these objectives are diEcult, if 
not utopistic, to reach. In fact, realistically, these countries could achieve the maximum reduction of green-
house gases of around 10-17% by 2020 and furthermore they are still not taking the right initiatives to do it. 
Although the EC will be providing .nancial assistance of around 22 to 50 billion Euros per year until 2020 
(European Council) to countries in the developing stage and for actions for adaptation of technological re-
search and development, some loopholes remain. +e tools to tackle this problem would be emissions trading 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, other instruments such as taxes on traded goods 
which emit lower CO2 etc. which could prove to be more e,ective are being ignored. +us, a possibility that 
excessive trust is being laid in the instruments for which .nancial support is being provided exists.
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Chapter 4 
Productivity and the Public Sector
4.1 
introduction
,e nexus between the public sector and overall productivity is best understood when its direct and indi-
rect e-ects are analyzed separately. ,e former refers to the productivity of the public sector with regard 
to the direct provision of goods and services, in accordance with its weigh in overall production. ,e lat-
ter concerns the e-ect of the provision of material and immaterial infrastructure by the public sector on 
overall productivity. ,e issues being dealt with in each case are di-erent. 
To analyze the productivity of the public sector, we have to overcome one of the .aws of our measure-
ment system which consists in measuring government production by expenditures rather than by output. 
Indeed, as discussed in Box 4.2, the limitation of National Accounting Systems when measuring public 
production by means of its costs (implicitly assuming that there is no productivity growth) has recently 
been tackled by many national and international institutions (footnote: see Beyond GDP and Atkinson 
report). However, actual improvements, although relevant, do not allow for a signi/cant international 
comparison of public sector productivity. 
Hence, in the next section we switch to the latter aspect, primarily, looking at the channels through 
which the public sector can a-ect overall productivity: public investments, human capital and institu-
tions. It must be noted that the two main aspects are strictly related and most of public goods such as 
justice, health, education, safety, and other welfare services are constrained by the extent of the social and 
human capital available for private production. E.g.: a well-functioning justice system as well as a stronger 
struggle against corruption spurs entrepreneurship and private investments: a healthy and highly edu-
cated population increases labor productivity; a lower social risk decreases the ine0ciency e-ect of precau-
tionary devices and better child-care systems increase the participation of women in the labour market.
As stressed in the “beyond-GDP” literature, the targets of the policy makers are not and should not be 
measured only by output growth. In fact, the concept of economic e0ciency used to measure overall productiv-
ity should not be used to measure public sector e-ectiveness. Instead, once the possible discrepancies between 
production and well-being are properly taken into account, a more ‘e0cient’ public sector (in terms of well-
being to cost ratio) could increase overall productivity as illustrated in the examples above.
Box 4.1 – ,e measurement of public sector productivity
,e measurement of public sector output and its productivity su-er from acute problems due to the di0culty 
in giving an appropriate value to public services. Indeed, the volume of public sector services is generally 
measured in terms of its costs, thus implicitly assuming no productivity growth. However, this involves a bias 
in the analysis of country’s overall performance in terms of output and productivity, especially for countries 
with a high share of public provided services. Recently, many OECD countries and International Organiza-
tions have engaged in developing more accurate output-based measures of such services.
Since the major problem faced in measuring the public sector production is to obtain an aggregate value in-
dex, the main complexities are to de/ne and measure the output of the di-erent goods and services provided 
by the government and to aggregate them. 
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Box 4.1 – ,e measurement of public sector productivity
Public sector output includes di-erent services over di-erent dimensions; quantitative and qualitative. In 
order to measure it we should be able to take into account quality improvements. Consider the case of edu-
cation. We can ask how many students are educated, and if we spend more resources to educate the same 
number of students, this would suggest that education productivity has decreased. If, however, additional 
resources go, say, into smaller class sizes, it may improve the quality of education. A good measure would 
re.ect this; there would be an increase in output even though there has been no change in the number of stu-
dents educated. We can measure the quality of education of students by performance on test scores, but that 
too is an intermediate variable. What we are really interested in is long run productivity. Test scores are only 
relevant to the extent that they correlate with future productivity or broader measures of wellbeing, but they 
are a better indicator than the number of students educated. Furthermore the output of a schooling system in 
a given district is a-ected by other societal changes (some related to the economic system) which may a-ect 
the quality of inputs: change in the average distance from home to school, increase in the degree of inequality 
between families, in the number and skills of immigrants and in many other factors in.uencing the quality 
of the provided service. Consider a country in which immigration increases. Because of cultural and language 
problems this may require, to maintain “quality” a more than proportionate increase of the number of profes-
sors and/or a reduction in class size. Should we then speak of a decrease in productivity knowing that if these 
special e-orts are not undertaken the overall quality of education would decrease? 
In the health sector, measures of output may be an even poorer indicator of output. It is not the number of 
heart surgeries that is of concern, but how successful they are. Fortunately we do have some indicators, even 
if they are imperfect measures of value added: life expectancy, child mortality, for example1. 
Each individual sector consists of many di-erent activities. While it is necessary to consider the di-erent 
activities related to each service, simple measures of activities o-set both quality changes and technological 
improvements. Furthermore, when technological changes reduce the number of activities needed to provide 
a given service an activity based measure would be misleading demonstrating a decrease in the volume of 
output.
Quality has a very special impact on the e-ectiveness of public services and it is better assessed by outcome 
indicators. However, they are exposed to several biases, since the performance of a service could strongly de-
pend on external factors. Healthcare system outcomes are strongly a-ected by lifestyles and social habits such 
as eating, smoking, and use of leisure time, as well as by environmental conditions like carbon concentration 
or water quality. In fact, a change in the outcome of a service could depend only on the variation of some of 
these external factors.
,e bias results could be particularly compromising in cross country comparisons since the extent of these 
factors can be very di-erent. Two sector examples can illustrate this better. Firstly, alcohol abuse rates cannot 
be used to evaluate e-ectiveness of preventing and healing services (related to the abuse) regardless of the 
speci/c social norms such as the ones related to religion, that strongly a-ect alcohol average consumption 
and the way it is consumed. Similarly, the analysis of the e-ectiveness of education systems cannot ignore the 
average parental background of pupils, a variable that has been proved to be crucial in education outcomes 
and that varies highly both between and within countries.
Further problems emerge when the service is not provided at individual level as in the case of education and 
health and is instead provided for at the collective level as environment protection, preservation and up keeping 
of public gardens, architectural and cultural heritage or defence. In such cases it is di0cult to exactly de/ne the 
amount of service enjoyed, and it becomes even trickier when the extent of the service relies on its unused capac-
ity as in most of the collective services such as public safety and defence that are preventive by nature.
Once a suitable set of public sector output has been de/ned we have to deal with the problem of aggregation. 
,is is also a sensitive issue since public service provision is by de/nition a non-market process and thus 
prices are not available or at least not corresponding to market prices. ,us, to weight the di-erent outputs 
according to their marginal value, coherently to what should correspond in the marketed output case, we 
cannot rely on the use of costs index since there’s no reason why marginal costs should equal marginal utility.  
,e option of considering the price of similar services traded on the market, even when available, could be 
misleading. Consider for example what happens if we nationalized a private insurance company. ,e services 
of the insurance industry when it is private are measured by the inputs of labor and other factors of produc-
tion plus the pro/ts. Because there are no pro/ts the output of the nationalized industry will be smaller than
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the output when it was in the private sector, but that has nothing to do with reality but is only re.ecting 
accounting conventions. In the wider case of measuring the value of public goods or taking into account of 
positive and negative externalities, we can use qualitative surveys for a relative valuation or subjective willing-
ness-to-pay. Such indirect methods, however, su-er from well-known technical limits and when the /nal goal 
is to analyze productivity dynamics, an eventual change in such a subjective evaluation of the marginal social 
bene/t of services would result unsuitably in a change in productivity.
In addition to all the above problems in measuring public sector output, the measurement of productivity 
also faces the additional problems related to inputs measurement and the timing of the services provision. If 
we are analyzing a speci/c service at a disaggregate level, it is not simple to impute all the inputs needed in 
the provision of this single service. Particularly, special care must be taken when an input is used to produce 
a di-erent output, or else when some services need a complementary e-ort by its user: e.g. education needs 
student diligence, healthcare needs patient cooperation and so on. 
,e steps needed to overcome all these problems have already been in discussion for long and National Ac-
counting experts are now partially recognizing the need for a standard of evaluation in each of the speci/c 
sector of public services. Although such measures are still not suitable for an international comparison, where 
implemented, they have already stressed the gap between public and private sector growth and productivity 
dynamics, and thus the resulting bias of inaccurate measures. In fact, in the period of the EU productivity 
slowdown analyzed in the /rst few chapters, output-corrected measures of the public sector led to a downfall 
in the growth rates of France and UK, which indicates bad performance of the public sector.
Such e-orts in reforming national account systems are important not only to better understand productivity 
dynamics but also to improve the analysis of public sector e-ectiveness. ,us, they are also helpful in the 
assessment of institutional models of public services provision such as the right ownership structure (public, 
private or mixed), the proper level of competition among the organization involved, and the performance 
incentives needed to improve quality and cost-e-ectiveness of each speci/c service.
Note
1 Cf JS, AS and JPF: ,e Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress Revisited, Working Paper n° 2009-33, OFCE, 
December 2009.
Next sections detail the channels through which government action a-ects, directly or indirectly, growth 
and productivity. Without pretending to be exhaustive, we want to highlight the main factors behind the 
need of public intervention as a complement to private physical and human capital accumulation: public 
investment, human capital and institutions.
,e need to focus on the eventual complementarities between public sector e-ectiveness and overall 
productivity becomes particularly important when, as in current times, governments face the simultane-
ous need to cut expenses and foster recovery. Hence, the suggestion of “an extended golden rule” and such 
general policy prescriptions and implications for EU governance as a way to /nance public investments 
in infrastructure and human capital proposed in the concluding sections are inferences drawn from the 
framework discussed above. 
4.2 
public investment
,e /rst channel through which governments may impact productivity and growth is of course public 
investment. Capital accumulation is a prominent source of long term growth, and with a very few ex-
ceptions (e.g. China in 2011-2012), the investment levels and capital stocks of today’s economies is not 
excessive, rather the contrary. ,erefore, as long as public investment does not crowd out private expendi-
ture, its e-ect on productivity and growth is positive.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to ask why there may be a need for public investment as opposed (or in 
addition) to private capital accumulation. We can think of at least three reasons:
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a) First, there is a standard externality and complementarity argument: every time that the social and 
private return of the provision of a given good diverges, there is under or over provision of that good. 
A number of investment projects (notably in infrastructures) have a large social return, while being 
not (or partially) pro/table for individual private entrepreneurs. In that case market provision is 
insu0cient, and there is room for public intervention. ,is problem should of course be minimized 
if there existed perfect complementarity between the di-erent types of capital, i.e, to put it some-
what paradoxically, if a highway could be substituted in the production process by a number x of 
privately owned trucks. But in fact inputs to production are complementary and not substitutable 
(investment in trucks is more productive if there is a well-developed highways network), therefore 
the existence of externalities calls for the existence of public investment in sectors/projects that would 
otherwise not be properly managed by the private sector.
b) A related justi/cation for public investment is the existence of sunk costs and /nancial constraints. 
In normal conditions private agents may face credit constraints that prevent them from investing in 
pro/table projects whose costs are borne upfront while pro/ts are delayed. ,is becomes particularly 
relevant for large size projects. Governments may face looser short term constraints, or equivalently, 
be able to extend the maturity of their debt beyond what is permitted to private agents. ,us, public 
intervention may allow pro/table investment that would otherwise not be carried on.
c) Another aspect, also related to externalities and large scale projects, is transnational investment. ,is 
is particularly important in deeply integrated economies, like the European Union, where area-wide 
infrastructure development may become a bottleneck. In the European Commission’s intention, for 
example, the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) should become one of the cornerstones of 
the Europe 2020 Strategy.
d) Finally, a fourth reason for public investment may be constituted by industrial policy choices. Coun-
tries may decide to invest in certain sectors that are strategic for development and export strategies, 
and one of the ways to do it is through targeted investment (eventually, at the expenses of other sec-
tors that are deemed less or not strategic at all). Strategic trade policies are discussed at length by new 
trade theories (e.g., Krugman, 1987)
Box 4.2 – ,e empirical evidences on the e-ect of public investments
,e empirical literature on the e-ects of public capital on output and growth, on the other hand, is extremely 
rich, and dates back at least to the seminal work of Aschauer (1989), who /nds a very large elasticity of total 
factor productivity with respect to public capital (around 0.4). Broadly speaking, this literature can be di-
vided into four main categories: /rst, papers based on the production function approach, which treat public 
capital as an input of the aggregate production function, and estimate its e-ects on output. Second, papers 
based on the cost function approach, that are admittedly less demanding than the previous ones regarding 
the restrictions (for example on the degree of substitutability among factors) they impose. ,ird, papers based 
on cross section growth regressions à la Barro (1991), which include public capital among other explanatory 
variables. ,e fourth is the group of contributions that use VAR (or VECM) models including public capital; 
the advantage of this latter approach is that, by explicitly taking into account the dynamic links among vari-
ables, it allows to disentangle possible reverse causation (i.e. from output to capital/investment).
Romp and de Haan (2007) survey of the literature on public capital and growth, explain in detail each of the 
methodologies enumerated above, and reach a number of general conclusions. First, the majority of works 
surveyed, especially the most recent ones, conclude for a positive e-ect of public capital (or investment) on 
growth or on output. ,ese e-ects are nevertheless considerably smaller than originally suggested by Aschau-
er. Second, a number of papers suggest that reverse causation, from output to capital, is also signi/cant and 
positive. Finally, and quite unsurprisingly, Romp and de Haan notice how the e-ects of public capital on 
growth di-er across countries, regions and sectors.
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While the /rst two methodologies we mentioned naturally limit the e-ect of public capital to the impact on 
the private sector production or cost functions, growth regressions and VAR models do not have this limita-
tion, and can capture macroeconomic e-ects of public expenditure beyond those linked to the production 
side of the economy. 
Perotti (2004) and Creel, Monperrus-Veroni and Saraceno (2009) build on Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
explicitly including public investment variables. Perotti concludes that investment seems to have even less 
e-ect than current spending on GDP. A possible explanation that Perotti o-ers for these somehow puzzling 
/ndings is that the level of public capital is so large in the countries considered, that public investment is not 
productive enough. ,e crowding out of private investment hence more than compensates the direct e-ect 
on aggregate demand. Creel et al.), on the other hand, /nd that once long term public /nance variables are 
properly accounted for (notably inserting public debt and a monetary policy reaction function in the model), 
public investment has signi/cant and permanent e-ects on output, contrary to current spending.
4.3 
human capital
,e second main channel through which public expenditure may impact economic growth is human 
capital. Its most known formalization is the Uzawa-Lucas model (Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988)), even if 
the investigation of this channel is as old as the study of accumulation and growth.
In the theoretical literature, human capital a-ects aggregate output, or its rate of growth, via higher 
productivity, or through the e-ect on the capacity to innovate and adopt new technologies. ,e stock of 
human capital cumulated by the economy may enter into a production function alongside with physical 
capital and output. In this case higher human capital (or investment in it) will a-ect the level of GDP, 
but not necessarily its growth rate. To have an impact on the growth rate of the economy, we need to 
build a model in which human capital somehow enters, together with other variables like R&D, into the 
function describing technical progress. If human capital a-ects the rate of growth of aggregate productiv-
ity (the Solow residual, or Total Factor Productivity, TFP), it will also a-ect, through that channel, the 
growth rate of the economy.
Models embedding one or both e-ects (on levels or on the growth rate) have proliferated. What is 
important for the present chapter is that in both cases externalities may open the way for di-erences in 
social and private returns to human capital investment, and hence to government intervention. ,is is for 
example the case in Lucas (1988), where aggregate human capital a-ects productivity for the individual 
/rm in conjunction with /rm speci/c human capital. ,e /rst source of government intervention is a 
typical spillover, by which /rms cannot fully appropriate the returns of their investment. ,e impossibil-
ity for a /rm to capture its employees, for example, leads to underinvestment into training, for fear that 
competitor /rms will then ‘steal’ the trained worker. Another typical case for government intervention 
is the existence of scale e-ect. No individual /rm could pro/tably invest in basic education or in funda-
mental research, whose social return is nevertheless undisputed. Education and fundamental research are 
also typical cases of intergenerational spillovers, as investment in these /elds, paid for by the current gen-
eration, bene/ts the future ones as well (for a model embedding this type of e-ects in a standard growth 
setting with multiple equilibria, see Azariadis and Drazen (1990). As a side note, remark that this is one 
of the main reasons for /nancing this type of expenditure through debt.
Finally, we will see in the next paragraph that human capital may constitute a fertile background for 
the building of appropriate, growth-friendly institutions. Of course, as the previous examples make clear, 
while the importance of human capital is widely acknowledged, its measurement, and the measurement 
of its impact are much more controversial. In particular, as shown in Box 4.2, the necessity to pass from 
the measure of inputs (years of schooling, funding of research, etc.) to output (“education”, productivity) 
is obvious. 
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Empirical analysis re.ects the theoretical emphasis on inputs rather than on output. ,e literature 
trying to measure the impact of human capital on productivity or on growth either introduces human 
capital in an otherwise standard growth equation, or tries to estimate structural equations of output and 
technical progress, using human capital along with physical capital and labour (a complete, even if aging, 
survey, can be found in de la Fuente and Ciccone (2002), that served as a basis for this section). In both 
cases, results seems to depend on the econometric strategy used, i.e. on whether the estimation, usually 
a panel, emphasizes more the cross section or the time series dimension, and in general on the quality 
of data. ,e /rst set of studies (for two classic examples see Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992)) usually found a positive impact of human capital on growth and productivity, while the latter 
(e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994; Islam (1995; Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996)) are much less conclu-
sive. De la Fuente and Domenech (2006) argue that this is because of the poor quality of human capital 
data (years of schooling, or investment in education), that emerge more clearly when using time series 
than when using cross sections. 
,is chapter does not have the ambition to be exhaustive on a complex issue like that of human capi-
tal. But there are three considerations that need to be made to conclude this short discussion. ,e /rst is 
that while it is common to talk about “investment” in public capital, there have been rare attempts to try 
and measure the stock of human capital that this .ow of investment would lead to. With the exception 
of some pioneering work in the 1970s for the United States Kendrick (1974; Graham and Webb (1979; 
Eisner (1980), the issue remained largely unexplored until when it was mentioned by the Stiglitz-Sen-
Fitoussi Commission (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009). A recent assessment for France Melonio (2011), 
estimates human capital to be as high as 140% of GDP, with all the obvious implications with respect to 
the importance of the stock of public debt.
,e second observation is that most of the literature on human capital focuses on the impact of 
education and research; but in fact, the quality and the quantity of human capital also depend on other 
factors, that are only partially correlated with standard measures of educational attainment or research 
expenditure. For example, social protection, e0cient institutions, or a good health care system, are all 
complementary factors. A given investment in human capital in the standard sense (for example in basic 
education) will be more productive if the individuals receiving the education are in good health, live in a 
safe environment, live and work longer, live in a household with access to books and magazines.
A third and related aspect, which appears in all its importance in the current crisis, is the impact of 
business cycles on the stock of human capital. Crises destroy capital; this has been clear since Karl Marx’s 
Capital. But human capital also pays an important toll to economic downturns (for a recent discussion of 
hysteresis and human capital loss, see Ball (2009)). Long unemployment spells, particularly frequent in 
European countries, degrade skills and the productivity of workers. ,e overall stock of human capital, 
therefore, is impacted by the capacity of governments to contrast macroeconomic .uctuations through 
/scal and monetary policy; and also on their capacity to attenuate, for example through active market 
policies, the loss of human capital due to unemployment and forced inactivity.
In conclusion, once we try to depart from a measure of public capital through its inputs, it becomes 
hard to think of a single economic process, or policy measure that does not have an impact on the stock of 
human capital. ,is of course makes the task of measuring human capital, and its contribution to produc-
tivity growth, overwhelming. ,is does not mean that it should not be attempted. In the meantime, we 
would at least need to abandon old customs that it is harder and harder to justify. It is for example clear, 
when discussing public investment, that there is a need to go beyond the standard dichotomy between 
current and capital public expenditure. 
4.4 
institutions
,e third axis along which public intervention is crucial in ensuring productivity growth is institution 
building. While the old one-size-!ts-all recipes dividing the institutions in “good” and “bad” has been 
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discredited at least for development policies,1 the importance of putting together the “right” set of institu-
tions remains undisputed. Rodrik (2005; 2007) de/nes a set of “/rst order neoclassical economic prin-
ciples” — protection of property rights, contract enforcement, market-based competition, appropriate 
incentives, sound money, debt sustainability — that, he argues at length, are compatible with a multitude 
of institutional arrangements. ,e list of /rst principles put forward by Rodrik may be challenged, even 
in its most common sense elements. Li (1996), for example, argues that the ambiguous property rights 
regime that characterizes most of the Chinese economy is an institutional adaptation to an imperfect 
market economy. Li argues that the immature market environment in China makes ambiguous property 
rights often more e0cient than unambiguously de/ned private property rights. Nevertheless, Rodrik’s 
approach has the merit of de/nitively disposing of the one-size-!ts-all approach. Following Rodrik’s logic, 
appropriate institution building boils down to the task, often extremely complex, of designing the right 
incentives for utility maximizing agents. ,e task is all the more complex that the economy is not a set 
of markets that can be studied in isolation, but can best be described as a complex environment charac-
terized by feedback loops. In the present context it is particularly interesting to mention the example of 
labour market institutions. In two widely quoted papers, Freeman (2002, (2005)2 argues that the concept 
of “best” labour market institutions evolves over time, and is highly dependent on the macroeconomic 
context. He further argues that while the distributional e-ects of di-erent labour market institutions 
may be very important, their impact on e0ciency is limited, and is dominated by the interaction with 
other institutions. ,e conclusion is that there is no reason to argue in favour of convergence to a single 
institutional model.
Another important issue, strictly related to the quality of institutions is that of corruption. ,e eco-
nomic literature has recognized di-erent causal links between corruption and economic growth and has 
helped to highlight details and controversial aspects of the economic impact of corruption.
However, some authors like Le- (1964) and Huttington (1968) have highlighted possible positive 
outcomes of corruption practices as well. In particular, in a context of pervasive and cumbersome regu-
lations, the use of bribes may increase the e0ciency of the systems. ,us, bribes are needed to “grease 
the wheels” of sluggish economies. In these models, since the presence of distortion related to a rigid 
administration leads to the second best equilibrium, further distortion due to corruption may be welfare 
improving. A similar argument has been formalized by Lui (1985), Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien 
(1986). In the context of rationing characterized by queuing, such models show bribers to have positive 
selection e-ects3.
Although such literature has contributed to an in-depth study of di-erent aspects of corruption, the 
limitations of this approach have been highlighted both in theoretical and empirical literature. ,ese 
critics are not restricted to the way of modelling corruption as a process of bargaining between an o0cial 
and private agents. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995) point to the fact that corruption belongs to the 
set of non-enforceable contracts. ,us, for the models of e0cient bribers to hold, the agents involved in 
the corruption process should be “honest” between themselves. Such limits are much stronger in case of 
non-centralized corruption where the e-ect of bribers is less predictable and often takes the form of an 
appeal to the threat of delay.
If compared with taxation, corruption has two distorting e-ects: the /rst is to favour high income and 
wealthy classes or alternatively speci/c groups, quite independently of any explicit e0ciency criteria; the 
second is related to the distortion due to the non-uniform distribution of corruption options. A similar 
situation results when public resources devoted to an increase in productivity are diverted for private 
consumption. ,us, in addition to the static distorting e-ects, corruption can have severe e-ects on eco-
1  Paradoxically, Europe seems to have remained under the grips of an updated version of the Washington Consensus, impos-
ing a limited role for macroeconomic policies, and viewing structural reforms as the only means to the end of economic 
growth (see Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2004).
2 See also Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Olivier Passet: Réduction du chômage: les réussites en Europe, Conseil d’Analyse Economique, 
n. 23, La Documentation Française, 2000; and Richard Freeman: Single peaked vs. diversi!ed capitalism: the relation between 
economic institutions and outcomes, NBER Working Paper, n. 7556, 2000.
3  It is rather hard to argue in this direction as the problem is bad administration. Corruption will decrease further the degree 
of con/dence leading to even worst administration and destroying social capital!
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nomic growth: a less transparent context increases uncertainty, discouraging investment. ,e prevention 
of investment is particularly strong for innovative investments that need permits and license. ,e strong 
negative impact of corruption on the investment rate has also been empirically proved by Mauro (1995).
Policy prescriptions against corruption might take into account the prominent role of the degree of 
con/dence in corruption, or in general of its reputation, i.e., on the share of people that are commonly 
expected to be corrupt. Important suggestions from the literature to tackle with such phenomenon, 
other than the enforcement of anti-corruption legislations and public resource allocation accountability, 
concern the management of bureaucrats: reducing monopoly, favour periodic rotation and the setting up 
of proper incentive payments. However, even in this case, no solution can be generalized to be good. In 
fact, most of the literature has highlighted that corruption has very di-erent features, impacts and causal 
relationships depending on the di-erent characteristics of a country and development stage.
4.5 
policy prescriptions
A recent report by the OECD (2008b) argues that in the next three decades the investment in infra-
structures will need to grow considerably to keep the pace of economic growth. ,is is all the more true 
that most of the world growth will come from emerging countries where the stock of public capital is 
considerably lower, and hence its productivity higher. OECD (2008b) provides rough estimates of the 
investment need that, even with a very restrictive de/nition of physical infrastructures, range between 
2.5% and 3.5% of GDP. A larger de/nition would yield substantially larger investment needs, and even 
more would be needed if we included in the investment de/nition some items of current expenditure like 
wages in the education and health care sectors.
,is increased need will con.ict with the tightening budget constraints for most governments, which 
result both from long term trends (ageing, increased per capita health expenditure) and from the e-ects 
of the crisis on public /nances, which will take years to be reabsorbed.
,e policy prescriptions of the report are then rather straightforward for what concerns the /nancing 
of infrastructure building (or maintenance). Public-Private-Partnership, increased user charges, increased 
involvement of other /nancing sources like pension funds. And the criticisms are also straightforward, 
as the di0culty with infrastructures is their feature of public goods, that makes private and social returns 
diverge; it is unclear why would PPP emerge for non-rentable public works, unless substantial subsidies 
were given to /rms, thus renewing the problem of costs for the budget constrained public actors. ,e 
example of French highways is a good case in point: ,e privatization of 2005-2006, mostly due to the 
need of the French government to raise revenues and reduce debt, happened at a price that de facto left 
the substantial cost of the initial network investment on the shoulders of French tax payers, while transfer-
ring the rentable toll bene/ts to large private groups. 
,e report also mentions improvements in the regulatory framework and in governance that, while 
certainly useful, are not likely to provide the boost to spending capable of bridging the infrastructure gap.
It seems then unavoidable that an increase of the public capital stock passes by an increase in public 
spending, reversing the trend observed in the past two decades especially in advanced economies. But how 
can this be made compatible with the, also unavoidable, public budget constraints? Two ways deserve to 
be explored.
,e /rst, universal, is an increased shift of the burden of taxation towards the very rich, that have 
bene/ted disproportionally of the strong growth period 1980-2005, and su-ered less during the crisis 
(OECD, 2008a; 2011)). ,e increased tax revenues coming from the very rich could be explicitly ear-
marked for the provision of public goods like infrastructures, but also health care and education. But this 
solution assumes both that the very rich are su0ciently numerous for the tax increase to produce enough 
/scal receipts and that the world is equitable enough not to embark in /scal competition. 
,e second, speci/c to Europe, would be to strengthen and deepen the cooperation in the provision 
of public goods, thus better allocating the cost, and enhancing e0ciency. ,is would mean renewed em-
phasis on traditional transport infrastructures, but also and more importantly, investment in green growth 
(energy grids, renewables, and the like) 
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Chapter 5 
Growth and Productivity in the Italian Economy
5.1 
introduction
Italy started experiencing a slowdown in growth in the 1980’s. -is was followed by a halt in the growth 
rate before the international crises and further translation into a deep recession during the crisis. -e poor 
performance has been compounded by a declining trend in labour and total factor productivity. However, 
it is important to note that this loss has key historical roots. 
When the oil price shocks of the 1970s pushed many companies over the brink and made domestic 
wage levels unsustainable, Italy’s policy aimed at maintaining real incomes, employment and produc-
tion exactly where they were by increasing public expenditure which placed a tremendous burden on the 
public sector and publicly owned companies, impeding .exible adjustment. -e public /nance problem 
was worsened by the introduction of generous pension and health bene/ts, enacted in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s in order to mitigate social con.ict. -ese bene/ts were partly /nanced through higher sales 
and labour taxation which contributed even more to increasing the already excessive labour costs and ac-
celerated labour shedding. Government debt exceeded GDP, bringing the country close to bankruptcy 
in the early 1990s while most public companies were all but destroyed. Two features which need careful 
consideration stand out in public policies for the economy and enterprise. 
-e /rst is the perpetuation of a “three legs subsidy system” made up of incentives, extraordinary wage 
support schemes (cassa integrazione straordinaria and mobilità) and extraordinary administration proceed-
ings (amministrazione straordinaria) provided to public and private companies. Within this framework, 
protection of domestic companies has also been ensured by means of closed public procurement (around 
14% on annual GDP) and a contracting system for engineering and infrastructure works that has sys-
tematically favoured local companies often violating European rules, delayed new technology adoption, 
and fuelled rampant corruption by politicians and administrators. Subsidies and protections were meant 
to make up for weak material and immaterial infrastructure – including high energy and transport costs, 
poor education and disastrous law enforcement – but above all they were designed to compensate for the 
malfunctioning of labour market that, despite the recurrent public intervention, evolved over time into 
a overload dualism. Bank of Italy1 shows that there is hardly any evidence of positive e0ect on economic 
activity or employment derived from this tremendous .ow of public money. Wage support schemes and 
extraordinary administration proceeding aimed to support restructuring but ended up preventing the 
necessary industrial change. -ey contributed to maintain industry specialization in less technological 
sectors – despite the presence of some highly competitive industries – with prevalence of labour intensive 
industries, low innovation and relatively low knowledge intensity.
-e second quasi-permanent feature of public policies has been the instability in government /nances, 
which require corrective measures to cover for excess public spending on a yearly basis, and often on an 
emergency basis. -e spending for infrastructure, research and education has been systematically curtailed 
to create room for public wages and pensions; taxes on incomes and pro/ts have risen to European peak 
levels, in exchange for services of dismal quality. In this context, the adverse e0ect of high taxation on 
private investment decisions is likely to have been compounded by the acute uncertainty generated by 
changes in tax rates and tax rules. 
Monetary policy has been forced periodically to accommodate government de/cits and in.ationary 
wage settlements, leading to exchange rate depreciations, in order to restore the dwindling pro/ts of private 
1  Bank of Italy (2010) 
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Figure 5.1 – Italian Competitive Performance
Italy
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Labour productivity per hour worked (EU27=100; 2010)
Labour productivity per person employed (EU27=100; 2010)
Labour productivity per person employed in manufacturing (1000 PPS; 2010)
Share of science and technology graduates (% of 20-29 years old population; 2008)
R&D performed by businesses (% of GDP; 2009)
Share of innovating enterprises as % of all enterprises (2008)
Share of high-tech exports in total exports  (2009)
Energy intensity in industry and the energy sector
(kg oil eq. / euro GVA; reference year 2000; 2009)
CO2 intensity in industry and the energy sector
(kg CO2 / euro GVA; reference year 2000; 2009)
Waste generated by enterprises (all NACE sectors;
tonnes per capita; 2008)
Exports of environmental goods as % of all exports of goods (2010)
State aid for industry and services as % of GDP (2009)
Electricity prices for medium size enterprises (euro per kWh;2007)
Infrastructure expenditures (euro per inhabitant; 2009)
Satisfaction with quality of infrastructure (rail, road, port and airport)
(1=underdeveloped / 7=extensive and efficicient by int'l standards; 2010-11)
% of broadband lines with speed above 10 MBps (2011)
Legal and regulatory framework (0= neg. / 10=pos.; 2011)
Burden of government regulation (1 = burdensome 7 = not burdensome; 2010-11)
E-government usage by enterprises (%; 2010)
Time required to start a business (days; 2010)
Enterprise survival rate after two years (2008)
Business churn (enterprise entries and exits as % of existing stock; 2008)
Share of high-growth enterprises as % of all enterprises (2007)
Early stage financing (% of GDP; 2009)
Rejected loan applications, and loan offers whose conditions were deemed
unacceptable, as % of all loan applications by SMEs (2009)
Duration of payments by public authorities (days; 2011)
Distance from the EU average (measured in standard deviations)
-3.9
-4.2
Note : In the graph, data are presented in such a way that data bars pointing to the right (left) always indicate performance which is better (weaker) than the EU 
average.
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companies and reabsorb excessive real wage increases. In turn, these depreciations have accommodated inef-
/ciency and have acted as a perverse incentive to maintain an obsolete industrial specialization. Owing to 
the inability to control domestic costs and the continuing expansion of public spending, tighter monetary 
policy and a less accommodating exchange rate policy within the European Monetary System (EMS) led 
once again to an unsustainable real appreciation of the exchange rate, followed in the early 1990s by the ejec-
tion of the lira from the EMS and an even larger exchange rate depreciation. Only then, under the threat of 
national bankruptcy, there was a policy of wage moderation swallowed by the unions, and measures /nally 
adopted to curb public spending. Once again, as in the 1970s, the fall in the exchange rate was followed by 
dismal productivity growth and a recovery of traditional sectors. -e sales of banks and other publicly owned 
companies substantially reduced State presence in the economy, but market-opening measures in privatized 
sectors were postponed for much of the decade. In 2002 Italy shed the lira and adopted the euro; but once 
again government policies derailed, with a large increase in public spending leading to higher de/cits and 
a rising public-debt-to-GDP ratio. -e real exchange rate appreciated, while productivity fell as a result of 
increasing employment among the low skilled. However, the easy way out of nominal exchange rate depre-
ciation was no longer available. Public and many private services remained of low quality and were closed to 
market rules. -e recent economic, /nancial and debt crises hit the Italian economy in a failing condition 
mainly because of ignored or incomplete structural reforms. 
-e actual under performance of Italy is well depicted in the European Commission Report (2011a), 
assessing the competitiveness performance of EU Member States with respect to a number of key frame-
work conditions. -e report shows that Italian overall performance is weaker than the EU average in most 
of the indicators (Figure 5.1). In this chapter we will provide an analysis of the productivity performance 
in Italy through an industry perspective followed by an analysis of the labour market problems and that 
of the education system. Finally, we discuss measures that can contribute to foster growth. 
5.2 
the productivity performance in italy
In this paragraph we compare the Italian productivity growth with the four “families” of European coun-
tries that we considered in Chapter 2 (Box 2.3 and Figure 2.1)
-is dismal performance of Italian labour productivity can be explained by the negative correlation 
between employment and labour productivity growth discussed in the /rst section. Until the mid 1990s 
the increasing productivity growth in Italy was sustained by a decline of labour utilization and an increase 
of capital intensity due to high wages. -e labour market reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s raised 
employment utilization, but this happened at the cost of productivity since the increase of GDP per hour 
was totally o0set.
As we did in the second chapter (see Box 2.3), to carry out the analysis on Italian productivity we use 
the same EU Klems database.
-e picture of Italian labour productivity growth over the past decade at industry level is appalling: 
with the highest level of industry disaggregation allowed by the EU Klems database, Figure 5.2 is analo-
gous to Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2 and shows the performance of Italy: only four sectors (post and telecom-
munications, electricity, gas and water supply, /nancial intermediation and minor manufacturing indus-
tries) out of twenty-/ve increased their productivity growth with respect to the period 1980-1995. -e 
productivity growth rate decreased signi/cantly in agriculture but also in many important manufacturing 
sectors (chemicals, electrical equipment, metal, transport equipment, textiles, food and beverage, etc.). 
In the service sector the productivity growth rate has never been sparkling, the only exception being post 
and telecommunications where in the second period, 1995-2007, Italy shows an average annual growth 
rate of labour productivity around 7%, slightly higher than Continental countries and 2% higher than 
Southern countries. -e industry level analysis points out that wholesale and retail trade did not perform 
well in the /rst period (1980-95), but they got even worse in the second period (1995-2007). Productiv-
ity in business services, hotels and restaurants, personal and public services is on the whole low, even if it 
is slightly better than in 1980-95. 
-e awful performance of Italy’s productivity growth rate is striking not only in comparison with 
the best performers but also with Southern countries. Figure 2 of Chapter 2 shows that for the latter 
the increase in productivity growth rate between 1995 and 2007 was widespread across many sectors 
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(machinery, automotive trade, transport equipment, electrical equipment, textiles and footwear). Indeed 
the increase in productivity growth of the /nancial services sector has been impressive: more than 5% on 
annual basis for the period 1995-07.
Figure 5.2 Labour productivity growth in Italy (annual average, %)
Table 5.1 Multi-factor productivity growth, 1995-2007
Italy Continental countries (*)
Nordic 
countries
Anglo-Saxon 
countries Spain (**)
Total -0,3 0,5 0,7 0,5 -0,7
ICT production 2,4 4,0 8,3 4,3 -0,6
Goods -0,5 1,6 0,8 0,5 -0,6
Manufacturing -0,4 2,1 1,3 1,0 -0,4
Other goods -0,5 0,9 0,1 -0,2 -0,6
Services -0,3 -0,2 -0,2 -0,3 -0,7
Market services -0,7 0,0 0,4 1,0 -0,8
Distribution -0,8 0,9 1,4 0,5 -1,1
Finance & business -0,1 -0,7 -0,3 1,9 0,9
Personal -1,6 -0,4 -1,4 -0,6 -2,3
Non-market services 0,1 -0,4 -0,8 -1,6 -0,6
(*) Continental countries family does not include Luxembourg as data on MFP are not available. 2007 data for 
Belgium are also not available.
(**) Southern countries family could not be shown as Greece and Portugal data on MFP are not available.
Source: Calculation based on EU Klems.
-e widespread interpretation of the dismal productivity in Italy as the result of structural weaknesses 
is supported by the analysis of multi factor (MF) productivity growth that is a broad measure of the ef-
/ciency of labour and capital utilisation, and also, as we have seen in the /rst two chapters of a number 
of other variables, including regulation. Looking at Table 5.1 we see that the under performance of the 
Italian multi factor productivity growth is comparable only to Spain. Only two sectors show positive MF 
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productivity growth. -is is particularly appalling for the manufacturing sector where no other group of 
countries but Spain has a negative MF productivity growth rate. 
5.2.1 $e Role of the Service Sector 
A general explanation for the dismal performance in the service sector in Italy is that most of them are 
characterized by a low intensity of competition. Many service industries are still mainly producing for 
regional or domestic markets and are only to a small degree involved in international competition. -is 
lack of competition is quanti/ed by Bank of Italy2 that points out that a large number of market services 
(retail, transport and communication, banking and /nance, insurance, construction, electricity, gas, wa-
ter, tourism, hotels and restaurants) have higher service sector mark-ups than the average of the other 
European countries. Although the empirical evidence3 has shown that there are new channels to open up 
service markets, an outward orientation of service industries may not be feasible for all services, which 
is notably true for most personal services. Moreover some services industries do not show characteristics 
that are favourable for high productivity growth. -is is the case with social services (health, education, 
etc.) where increasing eIciency is not a primary objective: data show that in Italy these services are often 
provided at high operating costs that vary signi/cantly across regions and administrations. 
Among services industries, the productivity gap in Italy is particularly evident in the distribution services 
(wholesale and retail). Looking at the US and best European performers (see Box 5.1), in wholesale productivity, 
growth has been mainly been driven by operational drivers such as automation, a shift to higher-value products, 
and improved organization of functions and tasks, as well as by industry dynamics including consolidation at the 
wholesale and retail levels. Large wholesalers can more easily automate their warehouses to increase productiv-
ity. In retail, the main driver of higher productivity is the emergence of a clear productivity leader and a shift to 
higher-value products. In this view the lagging productivity growth in Italy in the distribution services is partially 
explained by scale of operations – even though some increase in the average scale is recently taking place – related 
to the diIculties of doing wholesale deliveries to retail stores in protected historic districts. -e small scale hinders 
prominent productivity increase that are realized by big shopping malls. Moreover land and product market regula-
tion, labour barriers including tax wedges and wage regulations and infrastructure gap create barriers to entry and 
weaken private investment.
Box 5.1 – Sweden’s retail productivity revolution
Swedish retail had the highest productivity growth in Europe between 1995-05. -is achievement began with 
the easing of zoning laws in the 1990s. -is reform reduced the power of municipalities over new store open-
ings, which led to a more than doubling in the average size of new food retail outlets between 1990 and 2000. 
-is boost in the size of stores was part of a transformation in the structure of Sweden’s retailers that included 
an expansion in the number of shopping centres and a trend towards integrated chains which bene/ted from 
scale advantages in purchasing, supply chains and store management and marketing. -is, together with an 
in.ux of discounters and rise of new channels such as internet shopping, intensi/ed competition. -e trend 
of growth in private labels has increased margins to some extent as retailers captured a larger part of the value 
chain, eliminating relatively unproductive shops. Finally a greater use of IT technology has signi/cantly im-
proved eIciency of the supply chain and improved assortment and inventory management.
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010). 
Business services /rms in Italy have an average size lower than elsewhere in Europe. According to some 
interpretations,4 this is why the Italian business sector has a poorer performance than other countries 
(for e.g. small /rms are less able to o0-shore some services that can be a relevant source of productivity 
increase). A particular subgroup of business services, professional services, under perform in Italy mainly 
because of: a) entry barriers: restriction and reserved rights aim to ensure a certain standard for these ser-
2 Forni et al. (2009).
3   OECD (2005).
4  Giovannetti et al. (2010). 
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vices, but excessive regulation is likely to reduce the supply of service providers and to hinder competition 
from more innovative formats; b) price /xing and regulatory requirements: in some cases they reduce 
incentives to improve eIciency and gains from competition; c) regulation on business conduct: the ra-
tionale for these restrictions is consumer protection but they limit completion.
-e Italian tourism sector (hotels, restaurants, etc.) su0ers from a low quality infrastructure. and of some 
touristic services – especially in the Southern regions – that impedes Italy to move-up in its market position. 
-e underperformance of the tourism sector also depends on the lack of a focused and coherent tourism 
strategy where responsibilities for this sector have historically been split between di0erent government levels. 
Public service productivity has been widely studied by Bank of Italy.5 It examines services o0ered at 
the central (education and justice), regional (health) and local (local public transport, waste, water, gas and 
nurseries) levels. In general considerable delays, measured both in terms of quality and eIciency, emerge in 
the international comparison with wide regional disparities, irrespective of the level of government providing 
the service. -ese delays seem linked to the organizational models adopted, the allocation of resources, the 
wrong incentives to operators and the regulation system. -e study also points out the need to expand the 
information available to improve understanding of problems and the e0ectiveness of interventions.
Unfortunately the EU Klems database, because of its detailed disaggregation both at the industry and 
country level, is updated gradually (the latest year available is 2007) so we cannot appreciate the e0ect on 
productivity of reforms adopted during the present crisis.
Indeed the crisis appears to have acted as a catalyst for structural reforms. -e OECD Going for Growth 
2012 analysis points out that, compared to the pre-crisis period, the responsiveness to the recommendations 
addressed to OECD countries increased widely. Box 5.2 shows the Italian responsiveness in terms of reforms 
to the recommendations addressed by OECD. A lot has been done especially since 2011. It is likely that 
these reforms, notably the reduction of regulatory barriers to competition, strengthening incentives for in-
novation and labour market reforms, will address the delay of productivity performance in Italy, both in the 
whole economy and in the services sector. So we can expect to /nd improvements, in future EU Klems data 
with regards to the performance of Italian productivity. Nevertheless, a lot still remains undone.
An analysis of the existing best practices in Europe suggests further developments to address the pro-
ductivity challenge in Italy:6 
–  Pulling down barriers to market entry to make room for newcomers and foreign rivals;
–  Encouraging reallocation of resources (capital and labour) towards more productive uses, which may 
require geographical and sectoral mobility, less employment protection and stronger work incentives;
–  Fostering attainment levels and quality in education and stepping up life-long learning to help peo-
ple cope with faster technological change;
–  Pushing the speed of technological change through R&D – including by a better balance between 
legitimate intellectual property protection and the anti-competitive use of patents – and accelerating 
the di0usion of ICT and innovation; 
–  Cutting wasteful subsidies and other government expenditure to create space for targeted public 
support to broadband infrastructure investment, which would allow exploiting the potential of the 
e-economy more fully.
5.3 
the malfunctioning of labour market 
-e impact of the recent deep recession on the Italian labour market has been relatively mild in terms 
of increased unemployment which rose by 3.3 percentage points between the onset of the crisis (second 
quarter of 2007) and January 2012 to reach 9.2%, an increase smaller than the average rise for the OECD 
area. -e crisis indeed has heavily a0ected Italian youth (aged 15 to 24), whose unemployment rate was 
around 33% at the end of 2011.
5  Bripi et al.(2011). 
6  McKinsey Global Institute (2010).
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Box 5.2 – Recommendations addressed to Italy by OECD
Priorities supported by indicators
Reduce regulatory barriers to competition (2007, 2009, 2011)
Recommendations: Reduce barriers to competition in network industries and professional, retail trade and 
local services.
Actions taken: -e December 2011 decree introduced measures to liberalise retail trade e.g. lifting restric-
tions on shop opening hours and easing various entry barriers, including those for large retailers. Such meas-
ures could, however, be partly overruled by the regional authority’s territorial policy. -e decree also gave the 
competition authority the power to challenge regulations in the courts. -e government introduced signi/-
cant measures to liberalise the liberal professions and transport services in early 2012.
Improve access to and graduation from tertiary education (2007, 2009, 2011)
Recommendations: Link teacher’s careers to performance, introduce tuition fees gradually and income-con-
tingent repayment loans, decentralise the /nancing and management of universities.
Actions taken: A 2011 law separated university administrative management from teaching and research and 
reinforced evaluation mechanisms.
Improve the eIciency of the tax structure (2007, 2009, 2011)
Recommendations: Reduce the tax wedge on labour. Shift more taxation to consumption and property.
Actions taken: -e 2011 emergency budget raised VAT and introduced an allowance for new corporate eq-
uity in company taxation. Labour taxation was reduced for young people and women by making the payroll 
tax deductible against the regional income tax. A new, higher, local property tax will be introduced in 2012.
Other key priorities
Reduce public ownership (2009, 2011)
Recommendations: Reduce state ownership, especially in TV media, transport, energy and local services.
Actions taken: Plans to privatise water services were overturned by referendum in 2011. -e new government 
plans to pursue privatisation.
Reduce labour market dualism (2011)
Recommendations: Relax job protection on standard contracts.
Actions taken: No signi/cant action taken but the new government is considering a comprehensive labour 
market reform aimed at relaxing job protection on standard contracts. Such reform is expected to be intro-
duced along with a major welfare reform aimed at improving the safety net for the unemployed.
Decentralise wage bargaining (2007, 2009)
Recommendations: Promote greater wage di0erentiation by decentralising wage bargaining.
Actions taken: -e social partners signed (2009) an agreement to promote private sector wage di0erentia-
tion. -e 2011 emergency budget allowed local bargaining to undercut national wage agreements, provided 
a representative union in the /rm accepts to opt out of the collective agreement and signs the new agreement 
with the employer.
Strengthen incentives for innovation (2009)
Recommendations: Increase R&D tax incentives and improve business-academic research links.
Actions taken: -e 2011-13 Budget introduced a tax credit for /rms commissioning research activities to 
universities or public research centres.
Reform corporate governance (2007)
Recommendations: Reform bankruptcy legislation and enhance corporate governance and transparency of 
/nancial instruments.
Actions taken: In 2010, disincentives for creditors to lend and obstacles to the participation of shareholders 
in general meetings were reduced. -e December 2011 decree prohibited cross-membership of directors and 
senior oIcers on the boards of competing /nancial institutions.
Source: OECD (2012b) 
Moreover, the moderation in the last decade in overall unemployment appears to be entirely due to 
the creation of /xed-term and atypical contracts while the number of permanent jobs is still falling. -is 
implies that the Italian labour market is becoming more segmented, with more mature workers in stable, 
protected jobs and many young workers in more precarious jobs.
-e labour market dualism leading to unsustainable di0erences among insider and outsider workers 
and low employment rates are the two prominent shortcomings of the Italian labour market. -ere is also 
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a major problem of mismatching between wages and productivity trends that lead the unit labour cost 
in Italy to be notably higher than in other advanced countries. -e paragraph below will try to address 
these issues.
5.3.1 Employment rate
Following signi/cant labour market reforms in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s (see Box 5.3), labour market 
outcomes have improved substantially in Italy but employment rates in Italy continue to be substantially lower than 
in other OECD countries. In 2010 only Turkey and Hungary had a lower rate (Figure 5.3). Indeed employment 
rate for women in Italy shows an even higher gap than the overall. Additionally the employment rate of older work-
ers (55-64 years) is lower in Italy than in the other OECD countries.
Figure 5.3 – Employment to population ratio in Italy, 2012
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Figure 5.3 – Employment to population ratio in Italy, 2012
Source: OECD Employment Database.
Box 5.3 – Reforms aimed at increasing .exibility of the Italian labour market
-e Treu reform adopted in 1997 introduced the /rst legislative measures meant to increase the employment 
rate and overall labour market .exibility. -ey aimed at increasing .exibility via labour market reform “at the 
margin,” mainly by introducing temporary contracts and providing incentives for part time work. Another 
law in the same year abolished the principle of a public monopoly on employment services. E0orts to increase 
labour market .exibility were taken forward with the 2003 Biagi reform. -is reform further deregulated the 
use of atypical work arrangements, such as temporary agency work and part-time work, and introduced new 
forms of atypical work arrangements such as on-call jobs, job sharing and occasional work (lavoro a progetto).
Such a low rate of employment represents a major source of reduction in potential growth for Italy. -e 
low female participation rate is largely related to diIculties of women in covering both an outside-home 
job and their family’s care obligations that could be decreased through an adequate policy of public spend-
ing on family bene/ts. -ese expenditures mainly include: child-related cash transfers to families with 
children (child allowances that vary with the age of the child and sometimes are income related, public 
income support payments during periods of parental leave, etc.); public spending on services for families 
with children (direct /nancing and subsidies for childcare providers and early education facilities, pub-
lic childcare support through earmarked payments to parents, public spending on assistance including 
centre-based facilities and home help services for families in need); /nancial support for families provided 
through the tax system (tax exemptions, child tax allowances or tax credits, etc.). According to OECD 
analysis, Italy spends at least 1.4% of annual GDP on family bene/ts against the OECD average of 2.2%. 
France and UK spend more than 3.5% of GDP on these bene/ts; Scandinavian countries are all around 
3% (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4 – Public spending on family bene/ts in cash, services and tax measures,% of GDP, 2007.
Source: OECD Family Database 2011.
-e increase in the participation rate of older workers is mainly a matter of introducing the right incen-
tives in the pension system. -e December 2011 Italian pension reform should boost senior employers 
participation, but other policies, both on the demand and on the supply side, could have signi/cant e0ect. 
-e success of the Netherlands in this /eld is described in Box 5.4. 
Box 5.4 – -e Netherlands boost older workers’ participation
-e Netherlands has undertaken a reform that raised the participation rate of the 55 to 64 age group by 24% 
between 1990 and 2009. -e main provisions adopted concern:
Pension incentives: pension schemes were allowed to include minimum retirement age of 63 years but only 
with 40 years of contribution; statutory age of retirement /xed at 65; new provisions to make early retirement 
less attractive.
Non-pension /nancial incentives: revision of disability pathway toward early retirement; reduction of the 
duration of unemployment bene/ts; introduction of job-search requirements for older unemployed.
Employers’ behaviour/incentives: introduction of task-force to change employers’ perception of older 
workers and of anti-discrimination legislation; new guidelines for redundancies; promotion of civil society 
involvement.
Employability: making training available for older workers, decentralized and specialized employment 
services.
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010).
A /nal remark on the low employment rate in Italy concerns the poor investment in active labour market 
policies (ALMP), the public programmes that intervene in the labour market to help the unemployed /nd 
work. -ere are three main categories of ALMP:
–  Public employment services, such as job centres and labour exchanges that help the unemployed 
improve their job search e0ort;
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–  Training schemes, such as classes and apprenticeships that help improving unemployed vocational 
skills and hence increase their employability;
–  Employment subsidies, either in the public or private sector that directly create jobs for the unem-
ployed. -ese are typically short-term measures which are designed to allow the unemployed to build 
up work experience and prevent skill atrophy.
Figure 5.5 – Public expenditure on labour market policies (Active measure, % of GDP, 2009)
Source: OECD Employment Database.
According to OECD data (Figure 5.5), public expenditure for ALMP in Italy is 0.4% of GDP, below the 
OECD average (0.6% of GDP), and far below the levels of Germany and France (around 1% of GDP) 
and Denmark and Scandinavian countries (around 1.5% of GDP). 
-e German labour market reform described in Box 6.5 shows that these policies can play a crucial 
role in sustaining employment.
Box 5.5 – Germany’s labour market reforms
Between 2003 and 2005, under the so called Hartz Laws, Germany increased the e0ectiveness of its labour 
market services. For example, Germany reorganized its local employment agencies in order to be more ac-
countable for their results and more focused on targeting speci/c pro/les among the jobless. 
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Box 5.5 – Germany’s labour market reforms
It enforced the principle of “rights and responsibilities” among the unemployed. On one hand, Germany 
modi/ed the rules for entitlement to unemployment and social assistance, reducing the duration and gener-
osity of the bene/ts, and encouraging the proactive behaviour of unemployed. On the other hand, it adopted 
smart regulation of the labour market, facilitating new forms of employment for temporary workers. 
From 2005 to 2008, the number of unemployed in Germany decreased by one-third and, when the world 
economic and /nancial crisis hit, the reforms a0orded the economy a measure of insulation. -e impact of 
the crises on employment has been quite limited, with only a 0.5% rise in unemployment rate compared with 
3 points of average increase in the OECD countries. A major contributor to Germany’s relative resilience on 
employment was also its widespread use of the short-time worker scheme – Kurzarbeit – under which the 
Federal Employment Agency can subsidise part of the forgone income of employees if a company reduces 
working time for economic reasons. -e subsidy scheme prevented companies in temporary distress from 
laying o0 workers if the jobs seemed viable in the long run. It will be important however to adjust the scheme 
and allow for changes in longer-term demand once the repercussions of the crisis have vanished.
To quote Megan Felter (2012):
“In mid-2009, over 1.4 million workers and 63,000 employers participated in the program. $e “largest work 
sharing program [] in the world, “Kurzarbeit cost the German government an estimated €5 billion but saved more 
than 200,000 jobs by the latter half of 2009.Under Kurzarbeit, employees working reduced hours receive a “short-
time allowance” of 60% of their former full-time wages, or 67% if they have a child. Workers receive the short-
time allowance form their employers. In turn, the employers submit monthly accounts to the government and are 
reimbursed for the funds paid in excess of the workers’ net hourly compensation. Vacation and holiday pay, however, 
remain the employers’ responsibility. Employers must also make social insurance contributions, although provisions 
limited the contributions for lost hours to 80% of normal contribution payments. $e government does, however, 
reimburse the employer for half of these payments during the 'rst six months, and after six months, the government 
is responsible for the full amount of social insurance contributions”.
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010)
Finally the issue of regional disparities for employment rates is also important to consider because they 
are notably lower, especially for women, in the South of Italy. All the employment-boosting policies 
mentioned above would be useful in increasing employment rates in the Southern regions, but some de-
centralization in bargaining would probably be useful. A decentralized system, which integrates regional 
di0erences in productivity and cost of living into wage-setting could reduce regional participation rate 
disparities. 
5.3.2 Dualism in labour market 
Contrary to common wisdom, the Italian labour market is not particularly rigid. -is is con/rmed by 
the OECD Labour database which shows (Figure 5.6) that Italy has an overall employment protection 
slightly above the OECD average. 
Hence Italy’s labour market is more .exible than that of Germany or France. Among the three indexes 
Italy has a strictness of legislations which are below average both in terms of protection against individual 
dismissal and in the regulation of temporary forms of employment. However, the speci/c requirements 
for collective dismissals are the narrowest and their procedure cumbersome. Furthermore, the rules for 
reinstatement following unjusti/ed dismissal are stricter than the OECD average, procedures entail long 
lags in court decisions and the outcome of litigation is often uncertain. 
Despite that, the Italian labour market represents an average of two extreme markets. -at is mainly 
because: a) there are speci/c aspects of legislation that contribute to dualism and low creation of perma-
nent jobs; b) standard contracts are more expensive. -us, one side of the story shows that permanent 
highly protected workers with high gross costs both directly in terms of high /scal and contributive wedge 
than indirectly in terms of social rights and /ring costs are in majority in Italy. -e other side shows that 
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there are many temporary workers who face lower /ring costs, /scal wedge and social security charges. 
-is is illustrated in Table 5.2 below that shows the composition of Italian employment (excluding self-
employed), the contributive wedge and the level of social rights for each group. -e result suggests that 
among the reasons why Italian companies resort to non-standard contracts it is certainly prominent the 
attempt to decrease the gross component of wages that is too high for permanent contracts.
Figure 5.6 – Employment protection legislation (overall strictness, scale 0-6, 2008)
Source: OECD Employment Database.
Table 5.2 Italian Employee contract structure (2010)
Share over total employees Contributive wedge Social rights
Permanent workers 80.1 35-42% f
Temporary workers 6.7 35-42% f
Apprenticeship 1.7 10% r
Other short-term contracts 2.2 0-42% f-r
Occasional workers 6.1 27% r
Placement and others 3.2 0% r
Other short-term includes: CFL, “Contratto d’inserimento”, “Interinale”, Job-sharing and Job-o(.
Occasional workers includes: “co.co.co”, “occasionale” and “progetto”.
Others includes: stage, “tirocinio”, “pratica professionale” and others.
Social rights: f=full, r=reduced according to ISTAT de/nition. Source: ISFOL Plus 2012, ISTAT, INPS.
Contributive wedge includes all social security security charges.
Source: ISFOL Plus 2012, ISTAT, INPS.
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Employment protection is disproportionately distributed even for the /rst group of permanent workers. 
In fact the employed people covered by Article 18 of the Statute of workers, (workers sheltered by man-
datory reinstatement for unfair dismissals), are a minor percentage of employed people. Ichino (2011) 
computes that just 6 million private employees and 3.5 million public employees out of a total number 
of employed people of around 23 million in a workforce of over 25 million bene/t from this protection. 
-is framework gives /rms little incentive to invest in training and retaining employees as non perma-
nent workers can be hired at lower gross costs and /red extremely easily (especially during periods of high-
unemployment such as at present). It also discourages hiring of permanent workers as, during a downturn, 
/rms /nd it diIcult and onerous to dismiss those workers. -ere is also evidence indicating that a pervasive 
dual system, with a .exible temporary workforce and a highly protected permanent workforce, can actually 
increase unemployment (Blanchard and Landier 2002; Jaumotte 2010; Dao and Loungani 2010).
-e adverse e0ect on productivity and growth caused by overload dualism in the Italian labour market 
has been illustrated by IMF (2011). -e economic and regulatory bene/ts of temporary contracts reduce 
incentives for human capital investments and temporary employment creation tends to be in low-skill 
areas. Hence, reforms to rebalance such gross costs and regulatory bias along with a view to support job 
creation would give /rms more incentives to invest on newly hired workers and to take on more deserving 
workers on a permanent basis. 
-e reduction of the segmentation of the labour market should be accompanied by a comprehensive 
reform of the currently fragmented unemployment bene/t system. As con/rmed by the last column of 
Table 5.2, dualism in labour market polices is indeed mirrored in dualism in social rights included the 
unemployment protection system: Italy’s social safety net is generous for some worker groups, but virtu-
ally non-existent for others. As a consequence, rising shares of workers face high employment risk but 
little income insurance. 
-e ongoing labour market reform in Italy is trying to address some of the speci/c concerns outlined 
above. Box 5.6 brie.y describes the proposal made by Monti’s Government to Parliament.
Box 5.6 – Monti’s government labour market reform
-e ongoing reform addresses the detrimental “dualism” of the Italian labour market by rendering temporary con-
tracts more costly and reducing employment protection on permanent contracts. By expanding unemployment 
bene/t to workers (temporary and permanent) from all sectors, the reform would also render the Italian labour 
market more equitable and bring it in line with European standards. -e reform’s main innovations are:
1) Changes in the provisions of Article 18 of the Statute of Workers (on mandatory reinstatement for un-
fair dismissals): In Italy, as in many other European countries and very di0erently from the US system, 
disputes between workers and management over termination are part of the legal system. According to 
various analysis, over time some features of the Italian approach have lead to excessive rigidity and are 
relevant sources of precariousness. -e reform address a speci/c feature: until now, if a judge found that a 
worker had been unfairly dismissed, the employer was obliged to reinstate the worker to his/her previous 
post, and pay compensation. In the government proposal, only if the dismissal is found to be discrimina-
tory (i.e., on the basis of race, sex, religion, political or trade-union activities and participation in a strike) 
mandatory reinstatement would apply. Otherwise, the judge will decide between the reinstatement and 
the compensation. In unfair dismissals for economic reasons (/rm restructuring), the worker will be en-
titled to a compensation (maximum 24 monthly wages). Only in those cases where the judge /nds that 
restructuring has clearly not taken place will the employer be obliged to reinstate the dismissed worker.
2) Disincentives against temporary contracts: Firms will have to pay an additional 1.4% contribution on 
wages for temporary contracts. -ese revenues will fund extended unemployment bene/ts (see below). 
Free traineeships/internships will be allowed only during periods of schooling and university attendance. 
 3) Extended social safety net: Several sectoral unemployment bene/ts will be substituted by a universal bene/t. 
-is will cover all workers (temporary and permanent) from all sectors that can demonstrate to have worked 
1 year in the previous two years. It will provide 75% of the latest wage for the 12 months following dismissal 
(18 months for workers older than 55). -ere will also be a “mini-bene/t” for those with at least 13 weeks of 
contribution in the preceding 12 months. -e universal bene/t will come into force in 2017. 
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5.3.3 Wage bargaining setback
During the last forty years wage bargaining in Italy has not been able to ensure that wage growth re.ects 
productivity developments. -e mismatch between wages and productivity evolution is the main source of 
the increase in unit labour cost that is signi/cantly higher than in the largest euro area countries (Figure 5.7).
Figure 5.7 –Trend of Unit Labour Cost (1970 = 100). 
Source: OECD.
In Italy, wage bargaining is rigid.7 About 60% of Italian workers are formally covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements, a higher percentage than other European countries, being the e0ective coverage even 
higher. 
-e coordinated bargaining entails greater wage compression, with negative e0ects on relative em-
ployment, especially at the bottom of the wage distribution (Blau and Kahn, 1996). Centralized wage 
bargaining institutions tend to raise the relative wages of the young and less-educated and to lower em-
ployment for these groups (Kahn 2000). Wage compression also modi/es the industry distribution of 
employment, shifting employment away from industries with low wages (Davis and Henrekson, 2000), 
and can exacerbate regional employment disparities. Bertola et al. (2002) highlight how centralized wage-
bargaining together with a high degree of unionisation lowers the female employment rate, while preserv-
ing a high employment rate for prime-age men, as the unions tend to negotiate large wage premiums for 
those with a high opportunity cost of employment. -e European Commission (2010) estimates that 
wage mark-up reductions would have signi/cant positive impact on long-run growth. Eichengreen and 
7  Schindler (2009).
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Iversen (1999) contend that as growth becomes increasingly reliant on rapidly changing, science-based, 
skilled-labour-intensive technologies, countries with centralized wage bargaining will have to move fur-
ther in the direction of decentralization.
Currently, although the bargaining system in Italy has not resulted in excessive average wage growth 
compared to other European economies, it has provided insuIcient di0erentiation, leading to wage out-
comes that are too restrictive for some subsets of the economy. -e Italian two-level bargaining system 
leaves little scope for many /rms to engage in /rm-level negotiations, speci/cally for small enterprises. As 
a result, a predominance of nationally negotiated wages over those at the /rm level exacerbates regional 
di0erences in economic development. Nationally negotiated minimum wages are less binding in the 
North, but too high for the South. -is has two e0ects: /rst of all it increases unemployment or, more 
likely, irregular work, secondly it tends to perpetuate di0erences between wages and productivity. Indeed 
the lack of a broad social safety net, particularly in the Southern regions, prevents suIcient geographical 
mobility that could reduce regional disparities faster. 
An extended use of second-level bargaining is crucial to obtain a more .exible and di0erentiated wage 
structure. A step in this direction has been taken through the June 2011 agreement (see Box 5.7) between 
unions and employers’ representatives that con/rms the validity and e0ectiveness of decentralized bar-
gaining which may introduce derogations to industry-wide agreements.
Box 5.7 – Agreement for participation in industry-wide bargaining
On 28 June 2011, an agreement was signed by Italy’s major union confederations Cgil, Cisl and Uil and 
employers’ federation Con/ndustria. It introduces new rules on the certi/cation of representativeness for 
participation in industry-wide bargaining at national level, and on the validity of company deals. It also heals 
the rift created between the social partners in 2009 when Cgil refused to sign an agreement on the reform 
of the bargaining structure. -e new inter-sectorial agreement of 28 June 2011 represents the implementa-
tion of one of the main provisions of the January 2009 Framework Agreement, clause 17 of which envisaged 
the introduction of rules on representativeness. However, it also provides a set of rules that can be used to 
solve problems raised by possible divergences over the content of company-level bargaining, and particularly 
to guarantee the validity and e0ectiveness of decentralized bargaining which may introduce derogations to 
industry-wide agreements.
5.4 
human capital and educational system in italy 
In modern economies higher education plays a crucial role in creating and spreading new knowledge and 
fostering innovation. Higher education institutions contribute to human capital development, providing 
individuals with the right skills needed to underpin the type of knowledge-based economy that allows 
countries to compete globally. 
Higher education attainment also has a positive impact on employment outcomes: university gradu-
ates show higher rates of employment than individuals with lower levels of quali/cation. In addition, 
forecast for skill requirements in the advanced economies for the coming ten years show an increasing 
demand for highly skilled workers that will need to be satis/ed. 
-e literature on economic growth shows that higher growth in human capital contributes to higher 
output growth. A well-functioning tertiary education system has indeed a positive impact on productiv-
ity: European Commission (2011e) estimates show a relative strong correlation between levels of higher 
education attainment and overall economic output, in terms of GDP per capita. 
Because of globalization, Europe’s industry specialization is changing: employment is shifting from 
primary and basic manufacturing sectors to knowledge-intensive activities which require a high-skilled 
workforce. As a result, investment in tertiary education becomes essential as it contributes to increase a 
country’s ability to innovate. 
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Realising the potential contribution of the higher education system is therefore of crucial importance 
to economic growth especially for a country like Italy su0ering from a dismal productivity performance.
In the sub-section below we will provide a description of the Italian higher education system mainly 
based on a recent OECD analysis.8 A number of indicators of the country’s performance in education at-
tainment show a persistent gap between Italian universities and those of other advanced economies. -ese 
results indicate that disappointing productivity growth in Italy may be in part explained through the low 
learning outcomes of the higher education system. 
5.4.1 $e Italian higher education system can perform better 
According to OECD, when comparing the overall investments made in high-end skills and their use in 
di0erent countries, the Italian labour market is characterised by low tertiary attainment as well as low 
employment rates among those with a tertiary education (Figure 5.8). In 2009 the proportion of the 
working-age population with a tertiary degree in Italy was 15%, only half the OECD average and the 
employment rates of those with a tertiary education reached 79% against the OECD average of 84% 
(and 74% in Turkey, the lowest among OECD countries). -e share of second-cycle (research) degrees, 
although in line with the EU (27) average, remains signi/cantly lower in Italy than in other European 
countries. In 2009 only 1.6 new PhD degrees per 1000 people were awarded in Italy against 3 graduates 
in Sweden and Switzerland.9
Further, a proxy for the quality of higher education can be found in the international rankings of 
universities which show that the best Italian universities lag behind the world leaders. According to the 
Shanghai ranking in 2011 none of the Italian universities is in the world top 100 universities (only 4 in 
the Top 200). Italian universities do not appear to be internationally competitive: net emigration of Ital-
ian high skilled individuals is large and it is not o0set by immigration of high skilled people from other 
countries. In 2009 only 3.3% of all students in universities in Italy were foreigners, compared to almost 
21% in the United Kingdom, 11.5% in France and 10.5% in Germany. 
-ere are di0erent underlying factors that a0ect foreign students’ choice of Italy as a country of study 
or research. First of all, the language is a huge barrier as very few programmes are taught in English. 
Secondly Italy has a severe lack of students and high-level scienti/c facilities even if living costs are as 
high as in other European countries. -e low scienti/c prestige of Italian institutions, as shown by the 
international rankings of universities, the underdeveloped level of international scienti/c networks and 
cumbersome administrative and immigration procedures for admission are factors that exacerbate the 
non-attractiveness of the Italian higher education system. In addition, according to the OECD, around 
70% of the Italian brain drain is permanent (despite recent measures adopted to encourage the return of 
high skilled people – including tax credits and special channels of temporary recruitment – which appear 
to have little long-term impact).
Furthermore, /nancial resources invested in tertiary education are lower than in other countries: in 
2008, annual expenditure per student was 47% less than the OECD average; corresponding to 1% of 
GDP compared with an OECD average of 1.9%. Public expenditure on higher education as a share of 
total public expenditure was 1.7% versus 3.0% of OECD and 2.7% of EU27. Due to /scal consolida-
tion goals, increased spending in education is o0 the agenda, thus improving higher education learning 
outcomes needs eIciency-enhancing measures.
-e geographical fragmentation of the university system can explain the high number of courses and 
programmes which have been activated in the past two decades: the median class size in tertiary pro-
grammes is less than 50 students (75 when excluding numerous clauses programmes). Rationalisation of 
the supply of academic courses can contribute to a more eIcient use of limited resources. -e OECD 
suggests that investment in professional/vocational tertiary education institutions (“Istituti Tecnici Supe-
riori – ITS”) should continue. 
8  OECD (2011c). 
9  UNU-MERIT (2012).
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Figure 5.8 – Skill acquisition and use, 25-64 year-olds with a tertiary education (2009)
Source: OECD (2011c).
Italy shows low course completion rates, ranking 19 out of 27 OECD countries and again below the 
OECD average (see Figure 5.9). In addition, Italian students graduate later: most students graduate one 
year after the theoretical end of studies and the tail of the graduation remains long. -ese results have not 
been changed by the move to the two-tier system underlying the Bologna process since the graduation 
rates of students /nishing on time decreased. -ese results, combined with the a high dropout ratio, sig-
ni/cantly increase the cost of tertiary education, produce congestion of the universities (OECD 2011c) 
and lower the reputation of the diplomas for completing students.
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Box 5.8 – Moving toward more performance-based careers in Italian Universities
Italian universities are moving toward more performance-based careers and salary progression abandoning 
seniority-based systems. So far entry-level researchers have been earning signi/cantly less than in other coun-
tries. Law 240/2010 raises entry-level salary for tenure-track faculty by 50%. Under the old system wages in-
creased very quickly with seniority and independently of any criteria of academic and scienti/c performance, 
with the result that average and maximum wages for older sta0 are higher than in other countries. -ere is 
evidence that by the end of their career, Italian tenured professors may be earning as much as 95% of the sal-
ary of an American peer with higher productivity. Much of the growth in university budgets in recent years 
has gone to /nance the consequences of earlier waves of promotion of senior sta0 (from associati to ordinari). 
However, in reality, career advancement (and salary progression) should be linked to performance (in teach-
ing, research and patenting). Contracts could be for a /xed (and limited) number of years on initial appoint-
ments, followed by a tenure conditional on a strong record of published research, teaching and administrative 
service.
Source: OECD (2011c).
Figure 5.9 – Graduation rates at tertiary level (2009).
Source: OECD (2011c).
Labour market indicators also provide information on the performance of Italian tertiary education: 
wage premia of graduates in Italy are lower than in most other OECD countries (Figure 5.10). -is 
suggest some “under pricing” of higher education in Italy even though we are aware that wage premium 
statistics also re.ect some “inequality at the top” due to oversized multi-million compensation for 
CEOs, lawyers, consultants, etc., that is more widespread in some countries (USA, UK) than in other 
(Germany, Sweden). Entering the labour market is also more diIcult for Italian young graduates: in 
2009 unemployment rates of tertiary degree holders in the age group 25-29 was as high as 10%, com-
pared with 6% in the OECD area.
-e underperformance of tertiary education restricts the supply of skilled professionals. According to 
European Commission forecasts, in the coming ten years, there will be a lack of high-skilled workers es-
pecially in sectors important for innovation (ICT, environment R&D). -is shortfall combined with the 
relatively high level of unemployment rates of high skilled workers in Italy provides for a skill-mismatch-
ing that must be reduced. Skill mismatch can be determined by the under performance of universities in 
di0erent ways: the demand for highly-skilled workers is not completely met (Figure 5.11); according to 
the OECD results Unioncamere (2011) /nds that the majority of the Italian employers hit upon short-
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ages in the supply of higher quali/cations. But there are many tertiary graduates with a “wrong” speciali-
zation that have diIculties to /nd a job. 
Figure 5.10 – Gross wage premium per year of tertiary education, (2001)
Source: OECD (2011d).
Figure 5.11 – Supply of and demand for highly skilled employees, 2009 (employees in high-skill occupations as a 
% of those with at least a university degree)
-e index compares the number of jobs requiring a tertiary degree to the number of employees with tertiary education. A positive index 
means that some of the high-skills jobs are performed by employees with less than tertiary education. A negative index means that some 
tertiary graduates work in jobs requiring skills lower than those provided by tertiary education.
Source: OECD, Measuring Innovation Database 2011.
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Skill mismatch contributes to lower productivity in two ways: the education system does not ful/l cur-
rent needs of /rms and there are shortages of graduates in /elds that drive productivity growth. Hence, 
/rms are unable to adjust the skill composition of their labour force as much as they would like, thereby 
constraining eIciency-driven changes and innovation. -us, policies to improve the quality of higher 
education are paramount for increasing productivity.
5.4.2 Granting universities more autonomy
Italian universities show a mismatch between autonomy (freedom to decide how to use their resources) 
and accountability (being responsible for their results). A limited autonomy relative to universities in 
other OECD countries is re.ected in staIng and funding decisions (faculty salaries in public universities 
are determined centrally, and despite some reforms, recruitment procedures are seriously constrained). By 
contrast, Italian universities are relatively free to decide on course content and examinations with little ex-
ternal control; the result of which is a highly heterogeneous quality of degrees across institutions, despite 
the legal equivalence (valore legale) of all degrees (OECD, 2011d). 
In order to improve autonomy, an Italian law of 2008 allowed public universities to convert into 
private foundations, separating the management board from academic issues, and rede/ning the respon-
sibilities and powers of the university presidents. -is reform has not yielded the expected results. Indeed 
Italian universities already have the ability to raise funds from the private sector, but rarely do so, mainly 
because of lack of institutional capacity. -e Italian recruitment system despite several attempts of reform 
over the recent years has not succeeded in ensuring consistent selection of the best candidates. -e main 
limitation of the reformed recruitment procedure is that it does not impose suIcient accountability at 
local level to overcome a historical lack of impartiality in the selection procedure. 
Italy’s current assessment framework of university performance shows that the evaluation practices are 
heterogeneous across universities and are not considered tools for improving the actual performance of 
universities, being treated rather as formal procedures. -e US experience proves that evaluation practises 
can play a key role: in the US the quality rankings of many types of universities (national universities, 
small private colleges, state universities, etc.) are constantly monitored by private organizations such as, 
for example, US News & World Report. -is kind of “hierarchy” becomes very entrenched, as students, 
faculty, and private contributions all .ow to the highest rated institutions. Other criticisms concern the 
legal value of the degree for employment in the public sector, di0erent degrees delivered by di0erent uni-
versities are considered equivalent independently of the quality of the degree which may distort students’ 
choices, a0ect competition between universities and may be a deterrent to international mobility. 
Italian public university funding depends mainly on the central government and is distributed accord-
ing to historical spending with a balancing share. In 2008 the share of private expenditure in total ter-
tiary education expenditure (29%) was still lower in Italy than the OECD average (31%) and so was the 
change in this share between 2000 and 2008. -erefore, bearing in mind the pressure on public resources, 
there are a number of reasons for increasing private funding even though this is not straightforward and 
may entail some diIculties. 
OECD suggests that a good option could be that of increasing tuition fees: they provide informa-
tion on the cost of education, incentives for quality-cost comparison and incentive to improve university 
performances to attract students (the current level of tuition fees is around 20% lower than the OECD 
average, covering between 7% to 15% of the actual costs). According to Italian law, tuition fees for public 
universities should not exceed 20% of core funding: this constraint makes it diIcult for a university to 
o0set cuts in central government funding and it may even require them to cut fees instead, which further 
prevents them from increasing fees to /nance improved course quality.
5.5 
spreading innovation into the economy
-e OECD (2011c) considers Italian research to be of good quality although there is low cooperation 
between /rms and universities leading to poor di0usion of innovation. Cooperation between universities 
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and business is discouraged due to several factors: high costs, risk-aversion, a weak innovation culture and 
lack of institutional capacity to support inventions. -ese factors constitute a disincentive for a patenting 
activity; mobility between university and industry appears low; researchers are highly dispersed across 
institutions which reduces the ability of the tertiary education system to respond to industry needs. More 
so, the research priorities of universities are di0erent from those of the industrial R&D and industry-
university /nancial cooperation is underdeveloped. 
-e contribution to innovation of Italian universities appears modest in a variety of perspectives. -e 
quality and openness of scienti/c research, which can be measured by the number of international scien-
ti/c co-publications, is less developed in Italy than in other countries. In 2010, Italy had around 500 co-
publications per million population which was more than EU average (300) but there are large di0erences 
with other eleven EU countries which have more than 1000 co-publications. In terms of eIciency of the 
research system (measured by the number of highly cited publications) Italian research output is below 
the EU average, although the under performance in this indicator may be in.uenced by a bias towards 
English speaking countries.10
According to the OECD, Italian universities’ share of patenting activity is around the European aver-
age but key countries with a lower share for their universities have a very high level of patenting activity 
outside universities, whereas in Italy this is almost non-existent. 
-ese results weaken the performance of the Italian higher education system in spreading innovation 
into the economy. It is not surprising that Italy is considered a “moderate innovator” (UNU-MERIT 2012), 
that is a country showing an overall innovation performance below the international average (Figure 5.12). 
Figure 5.12: EU Member State innovation performance 2011
Source: Innovation Union scoreboard 2011. Average performance is measured using a composite indicator building on data for 24 indica-
tors going from a lowest possible performance of 0 to a maximum possible performance of 1.
10  UNU-MERIT 2012.
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-e Scoreboard above provides di0erent indicators capturing the main drivers of innovation performance 
external to the /rm, the innovation e0orts of a /rm and outputs level covering the e0ects of /rms’ in-
novation activities. Across the eight dimensions used to calculate innovation performance, Italy is below 
the EU average most of the time. It performs especially bad in “human resources” (which measures the 
availability of a high-skilled and educated workforce) and in “/rms investments”: private R&D expendi-
ture only reaches 0.67% of GDP against the EU average of 1.23% and public expenditure for R&D in 
Italy stands at 0.54% of GDP against 0.76% in EU(27). -e situation looks better only for the number 
of /rms that have introduced innovations in the market or within their organisation. 
-e interaction between universities and business is weak and it is usually driven by the need for 
funding universities or the individual projects of professors rather than for promoting a sustained collabo-
ration. -is lack of cooperation may depend on several factors. Firstly, the coexistence of di0erent intel-
lectual property rights regulations for each tertiary institution is a disincentive for researchers to patent 
inventions or spino0 ventures. Secondly, low mobility of tenured faculty between university and industry, 
no systematic interactions between university and industry due to the low entrepreneurial propensity of 
university boards, the underdevelopment of specialised and technological research, di0erent priorities 
between academic research – centred on the discovery stage of the innovation process – and industrial 
research which is more development-centres, the scarcity of equity markets and venture capital dedicated 
to support collaboration between universities and business are other factors that could be the reasons for 
a lack of cooperation between universities and business.
In recent years some initiatives to promote the interaction between public research and /rms have 
been developed such as the Italian Technology Transfers OIce and the creation of scienti/c and techno-
logical parks (such as the Italian Institute of technology). According to OECD (2011c), these initiatives 
have had some success but their e0ectiveness in creating the right synergies has been weak.
Financing research and innovation is su0ering from discontinuity, lack of clarity and predictability: 
funding schemes are often diIcult to access due to cumbersome procedures and bureaucracy, tax credits 
measures are simpler tools but easily misused through the reclassi/cation of expenditure as R&D. 
In line with the new strategy proposed by the European Commission under Europe 2020, Italian 
innovation policy should therefore concentrate on speci/c measures, aiming at reducing fragmentation 
of investment; modernizing the education system keeping excellence as a guiding principle; ensuring the 
free movement of researchers and innovators; simplifying the innovation programmes and developing the 
cooperation between science and business; granting better access to /nance; promoting partnerships and 
the pooling of expertise and resources.
5.6 
reforms to foster growth rapidly
-e ongoing policies for public sector consolidation in Italy will hopefully strengthen /nancial stability, 
improving incentives for private investment. However, positive e0ects will kick in only in the medium 
term, whereas in the short term consolidation will have a negative impact on growth. Given the diIcult 
/scal environment limiting policy options, Italy should therefore concentrate its e0orts on reforms that 
can quickly boost growth: rethinking industrial policy; promoting competition in broadband and energy 
sector; providing well functioning institutions and a favourable environment for doing business. Last but 
not least, liberalizing the service sector that is instrumental in enhancing the impact of innovation and 
innovation di0usion, hence amplifying productivity growth.
5.6.1 Rethinking industrial policy
Since the 1980s traditional industrial policy has fallen into disrepute among academics and policy advis-
ers. -e main argument being that it prevents competition and allows governments to pick winners in 
a discretionary fashion, thereby increasing the scope for capture of governments by vested interests. -e 
recent debate on climate change, the /nancial crisis and globalisation have invited a rethinking of indus-
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trial policy which, according to Aghion et al. (2011), should no longer be regarded as an opposition to 
competition policy but rather a complement to it.
-is renewed interest in industrial policy can also be found in the goal of a ‘smart growth’ set in the 
Europe 2020 Strategy entailing a new European industrial policy agenda, especially as the euro and the 
Internal Market alone have not led to higher growth. -e focus is now on sectoral aid targeting selected 
objectives – green technologies, skill-intensive and competitive sectors – that will help achieve high and 
sustainable levels of growth. 
An Italian strategy for growth should therefore draw inspiration from the principles mentioned above 
and be designed to target incentives on a few selected objectives based on eIciency criteria. -is is of 
course a second best approach needed for the Italian business environment that is heavily regulated and in 
which organized interests often succeed in impeding the di0usion of innovation. In an open and competi-
tive environment no industrial policy provided by the public sector would be necessary. 
 -ere is a need to support rather than prevent restructuring and resource mobility towards the most 
productive activities, encouraging innovation process, energy eIciency, ICT di0usion in the production 
process, in public administration, in consumption activities and in distribution. So Italy should get rid 
of extraordinary wage support schemes (cassa integrazione straordinaria and mobilità) and extraordinary 
administration proceedings (amministrazione straordinaria) as much as possible. Resources should be de-
voted to projects that respond to European standards and should be granted on the basis of uniform 
criteria, decided at national level and with transparent tender procedures. 
All protectionist schemes at local level that may hinder competition should be avoided. A critical 
point for the realization of any industrial policy in Italy is the eviction of politics (central and local) from 
the intermediation of any incentive system as well as of all public services concessions. In international 
comparison Italy performs very badly in the corruption index. -e Transparency International Ranking 
places it 69th out of 162, far below any other European country excepting Greece. In the /ght against cor-
ruption, transparency is the main tool. Any incentive aimed at achieving a well de/ned goal should be as 
automatic and predictable as possible. Public goods provisions should be subject widely to the obligation 
of tender system with full application of European rules. Requirements of high innovative standards for 
public goods/services providers would boost innovation.
In a period of recession and /scal consolidation such as the present, facilitating access to credit should 
be part of the industrial policy. In Italy the productive system is dominated by SMEs while non-banking 
means are relatively scarce since equity /nancing continues to play a modest role in the Italian context 
compared to other EU countries.
5.6.2 Promoting competition among service providers especially in broadband and energy sectors
A kick-start for the recovery of the Italian economy could come from the promotion of competition in 
some strategic sectors that are generally considered bottlenecks for growth.
Broadband: It is an essential infrastructure that has been proven to stimulate competition, productivity and 
growth and is considered the engine of the so called knowledge-information economy. In Italy, according to the 
Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2011 (European Commission 2011b), /xed broadband take-up by population is 
lower than the EU average. Only 59% of households have an internet connection. -e percentage of frequent 
internet users is close to the European average. While the percentage of regular users (48%) is one of the lowest 
in the EU, the percentage of those who have never used the internet (41%) is one of the highest.
At the end of 2011, Italy was moving towards achieving the Digital Agenda for Europe target aiming 
at securing a basic broadband connection (in the order of 2 Mbps) for all EU households by 2013, with 
a signi/cant reduction of narrow-band connections and some funds available for rural areas. However 
the digital divide still a0ects 5% of the population. Moreover, progress in the deployment of high-speed 
(30 Mbps) and very high-speed broadband (100 Mbps) has so far been less encouraging, both in terms 
of coverage and take-up. 
Proposals to foster broadband investments in Italy include: a)making the regulatory environment stable, 
clear and neutral among competitors; b) making it easier to use existing infrastructures (water, electricity, etc.) 
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for installing the broadband cable; c) incentivising investments by incumbent operators through the competi-
tive threat of alternative public and private investors (including local administrations and public utilities). 
Energy Sector: Improvements in terms of increasing competition took place in the energy sector with 
electricity more advanced than gas, but a lot remains to be done since the high energy price in Italy is 
a major disadvantage to boost growth. Recently Monti’s government has set preliminary conditions for 
splitting the ownership between energy producer ENI and Snam Rete Gas SpA (its gas transmission-grid), 
in order to promote the development of independent operators in the gas sector. -is should happen 
within the next 18 months. -e same package has introduced changes to the rules regulating the quar-
terly adjustments of utility tari0s, linking them to the gas spot price, with a view to lowering energy bills 
for households and companies. Some reduction in the price of gas in Italy has recently been observed. In 
the /eld of renewable energy, mainly solar and wind energy, Italy has done a lot of investment and will 
achieve EU targets (European Directive 2009/28/CE) ahead of the scheduled timetable. In Italy, energy 
production through nuclear power has been precluded by a referendum of the ’80s that has substantially 
prohibited the possibility of building nuclear power plant. 
5.6.3 Reducing administrative burdens on businesses
-e Italian business environment is relatively unfavourable across the board. In 2011 the World Bank analy-
sis, carried out annually through its Doing Business Reports, ranked Italy 87th out of 183 for the easiness 
of doing business, far below other industrialized countries. -e burden of administrative regulation and the 
complex and slow judicial system are all indicators in which Italy compares unfavourably with the EU aver-
age. Italian environmental regulation is particularly burdensome and unstable. -e sharing of competencies 
between di0erent levels of public administration and between di0erent bodies does not exclude duplica-
tions, is a source of delays, e.g. in authorisation procedures, and contributes to legal uncertainty.
In recent years, Italy has approved ambitious programmes for reducing administrative burden, sim-
plifying procedures and improving relations between public administrations and business, with a strong 
emphasis on e-Government. Recently Monti’s government too has adopted a decree to reduce red-tape 
(see Box 5.9). All these developments have been largely welcomed by stakeholders but their actual impact 
is yet unclear. In the past some of these policy interventions appeared uncoordinated and fragmented 
while some promising measures remain only partly implemented or are delayed by lack of resources or 
complex decision-making procedures or practices. 
Box 5.9 – -e “Sempli/ca Italia” Decree-Law of 27 January 2012
-e decree belongs to the broad framework of the programme for reducing the administrative burden that 
has been carried in Italy over the recent years. It draws from the inputs gathered through public consultation 
to complement the existing simpli/cation apparatus by providing for concrete, practical measures having im-
mediate e0ects, di0erentiating between general measures, measures for citizens and measures for businesses. 
-e decree addresses lengthy administrative procedures by introducing the possibility of substitutive pow-
ers at the request of private individuals to expedite administrative processes when delays are not respected. 
Meeting administrative deadlines becomes the direct responsibility of individual civil servants, who may be 
subject to sanctions. It also introduces the use of regulatory budgets for each public administration to prevent 
new regulation from tampering with the simpli/cation e0orts. -e measures for citizens aim to reduce red 
tape for people with disabilities, to computerize civil acts by making public administrations communicate 
directly by electronic means. Further savings should result from shortened processing and delivery periods. 
Several administrative procedures are simpli/ed, among which the issuance and renewal of driving licenses 
and technical compliance of cars. -e measures for business involve, notably, simpli/cation of procedures 
for participating in tenders through better use of electronic information in e-procurement, elimination of 
the security policy document in the privacy area, a unique environmental permit for SMEs, elimination of 
obsolete regulations, co-ordination and streamlining of inspections, as well as sector speci/c measures (agri-
culture, /shing, heating installations).
Source: www.governo.it
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Because of the economic challenges faced by Italy at this time there is no doubt that it is still necessary 
to reduce the administrative burden on business (including that due to the tax code). To this extent, the 
OECD report on Better Regulation (2012a) lists a number of challenges that Italy still has to tackle, in 
particular:
–  Complex devolution of 2001 has brought forward the need to pay greater attention to the implica-
tions of multi-level regulatory management. While the e0ects of decentralisation have clearly com-
plicated the task of regulatory management and oversight, this needs to be more clearly signposted 
in the current and future reforms.
–  Growing awareness of the need for e0ective regulatory reform should be matched by a similar aware-
ness or capacity to act in the complex network of public administrations that need to be mobilized 
at national and sub-national level.
–  -e mechanisms that could support incremental improvements in regulatory reforms and incentiv-
ize administrations to deliver better regulatory management remains poorly developed. In particular, 
open public consultation and communication mechanisms on regulatory activity are weak and non-
systematic, giving discretionary powers to the administration to use them. E0ective provisions to 
monitor and evaluate the programmes are lacking – with the notable exception of the administrative 
burden reduction strategy – preventing constructive feedback on their e0ectiveness.
Business activity also needs a modern public administration able to deliver eIcient and high quality 
services. Reforms should emphasize e-government initiatives like uni/ed service centres for the public, 
shared networks and data centres. Many e-government initiatives also allow enterprises to spend less on 
administrative procedures and devote more resources to business opportunities. E-procurement must in 
this regard be promoted to the maximum extent possible.
5.6.4 Fully implementing Single Market legislation, in particular the services directive
As the European Council pointed out on January 2012, “the Single Market constitutes a key driver 
for Europe’s economic growth. -is is an area where action at EU level can do much to boost jobs and 
growth. It is of crucial importance that we swiftly and fully implement at the national level what we have 
already agreed to deliver the full potential of the Single Market”.11 
A study carried out by the UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills (2011), which quanti/ed 
the consequence of the full implementation of the Single Market, estimates that the economic gains for 
the European Union and its Member States arising from the removal of all barriers to the Single Market 
are potentially very substantial. Although this is a theoretical simulation, with a number of caveats to be 
taken into account, the study provides an order of magnitude of these gains. By 2020 EU national income 
would increase by 14.1% and European production by 24.4% at constant prices. -is would, for Italy, 
translate into 13.6% of additional GDP and 14.7% additional production. 
It is crucial that Italy strengthen its e0orts to implement the Single Market legislation correctly and in 
a timely manner. Transposition delays of EU directives and other EU law infringement cases have always 
been a weakness of the Italian system, despite some recent progress. According to the European Com-
mission Internal Market Scoreboard, in 2005 the share of directives not timely transposed into Italian 
legislation was 3.1% of the total. -ere has been a progressive reduction to 2.1% in November 2011, but 
Italy remains in the group of member states which have failed to reach the 1% transposition de/cit target. 
Timely transposition of EU legislation represents the /rst step for a full implementation of the Single 
Market legislation. In fact, member states need to transpose EU directives correctly.  Italy under per-
forms, being the country with the highest number of open infringement proceedings for non-conformity. 
In March 2012 there were 132 open infringement proceedings against Italy, of which 93 concerned cases 
of violation of EU law and 39 cases of no-transposition of directives. -e breakdown of infringement 
proceeding by sectors shows that the majority of cases relates to the areas of environment, taxation, em-
11  European Council Conclusion 30 January 2012.
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ployment and social a0airs (35, 13 and 12 respectively).12 -is non conformity with EU law reveals the 
insuIcient awareness by Italian public administration and national parliament of the obligations and 
challenges that arise from the participation to the European Union and the full functioning of the Inter-
nal Market.
-e full and correct implementation of Single Market legislation is of key importance if Italy is to reap 
the economic and social bene/ts associated with the removal of obstacles to the free circulation, notably 
in services, if only there will be the political will to pursue them with determination and continuity.
-e structural reforms necessary to create a real Single Market for services is at the core of the Europe 
2020 strategy which recalls the need to create an open internal market for services consistent with the 
services directive. It estimates that its full implementation could increase EU trade in commercial services 
by 45% and foreign direct investment by 25%, bringing an increase of GDP between 0.5% and 1.5%. 
By boosting competition in the service sector, Italy would create new opportunities for domestic 
investment and increasing productivity, which would translate into higher domestic incomes, as well as 
indirectly strengthen industry through lower-cost and higher-quality services. 
In 2011, a large number of country-speci/c recommendations for structural policies concerning the 
service sector were addressed to Italy by the main international institutions (ECB, IMF, European Coun-
cil and OECD). -ey included calls to step up the full implementation of the services directive, to remove 
unjusti/ed barriers to entry and to further open professional services whose barriers to entry remain sub-
stantial but are being reduced (Figure 5.13).
Figure 5.13 – Barriers to entry in professional services (index scale of 0-6 from least to most restrictive).
Source: OECD (2012b).
-e services directive covers a wide range of economic activities representing around 45% of the EU 
economy, including large sectors such as retail, construction, business services, tourism and most regu-
lated professions. In Italy it was implemented with some delay by means of legislative decree No. 59 of 
2010 (for a brief description of the decree see Box 5.10). In adherence with the directive, the government 
has completed a review of existing regulations on service activities at the central, regional, and local level 
to ensure consistency of existing regulation on service activities at all government levels with the EU leg-
12  Italian Department for European Policies ,  March 27 2012.
96 5. Growth and Productivity in the Italian Economy
islation. -e European Commission is now in the process of assessing the extent to which all the required 
changes in speci/c legislation have been implemented. 
Box 5.10 – Implementing the services directive, the Legislative Decree 59/2010
Following the review of the existing regulations the decree has simpli/ed procedures for starting a service 
activity: authorization schemes which result to be discriminatory and too restrictive have been substituted by 
less restrictive schemes, such as tacit silence or the Certi/ed Statement of Business Start Up (SCIA – Segnal-
azione Certi'cata di Inizio Attività), which has replaced the existing Declaration of Business Start Up since 
2010 (DIA – Dichiarazione di Inizio Attività). It allows a new company to start operating from the /rst day 
(whereas the DIA required a thirty day standstill). With the SCIA, public administrations should control 
compliance with relevant requirements in the following 60 days (or, after this period, only in exceptional 
circumstances such as for public safety reasons). 
-e number of cases in which authorization was required to start a business has been reduced; access to or 
the exercise of a service activity is no longer subject to an economic test on market demand, a number of 
requirements to start a business activity has been abolished. 
However the portal “impresainungiorno.gov.it” designated as the national point of single contact as required 
by the services directive has not come across as being very user friendly for entrepreneurs from abroad, for 
linguistic and technical reasons. 
Because the services directive involves competences shared notably between the State and the regions, the 
implementation required a deep co-ordination activity. -e Department for European Policies is in charge of 
such coordination. Most regions have already adopted transposition measures in the areas which fall within 
their competence. -ese notably include tourism and commerce. Where implementing regional laws or regu-
lations have not yet been adopted, Legislative Decree 59/2010 applies until relevant regional acts are issued. 
Source: European Commission (2011a).
Even though policies are in the process of being revised, Italy urgently needs a revolution in services 
regulation. According to the European Commission, to exploit the full potential of the service directive, 
it is essential to “shift from a compliance perspective to a competitiveness driven focus”.13 the scope of 
the services directive, there are other sectors with important growth potential. In April 2012, the OECD 
(2012b) recommended Italy to reduce regulatory barriers to competition in network industries and pro-
fessional, retail trade and local services. To this end the government has recently introduced a number of 
measures aiming at opening the services sector to competition although it is too early to give an evaluation 
on their e0ectiveness. 
In December 2011 the “Salva Italia” decree introduced measures to liberalise retail trade e.g. by lifting 
restrictions on shop opening hours and easing various entry barriers, including for large retailers. Such 
measures could, however, be partly overruled by regional authorities’ territorial policy. Removing unnec-
essary restrictions on retail opening hours can stimulate new investment and boost consumer spending. 
-e decree also gave the competition authority the power to challenge administrative measures in the 
courts. 
With the “Cresci Italia” decree of early 2012, the government implements measures aiming at pro-
moting competition and the removal of unjusti/ed restrictions on economic activities in conformity with 
economic freedom and competition principles laid down in the Italian constitution and the EU law. 
As a general principle and consistently with the service directive, article 1 of the decree provides for the 
elimination of all those rules which subject the start up of a business activity to quantitative restrictions, 
authorizations or licenses by the competent authorities which are not justi/ed by a reason of general pub-
lic interest. -e decree establishes the removal of national provisions that impose bans or restrictions on 
economic activities and limits due to territorial planning where these are not necessary and proportionate 
for securing public general interest objectives. -e government (Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri) will 
13  European Commission (2011d).
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be in charge of a systemic monitoring of the restrictions to economic activities and the promotion of com-
petition. Moreover, the decree’s sectoral range of action is wide, as it encompasses a variety of economic 
activities which are described in Box 5.11. 
-ese measures represent a signi/cant step towards increasing competition in the service sector in 
Italy, but the legislative tools used (decrees) do not provide for a systemic framework for the regulation of 
services. In the medium term it would be appropriate, as recommended by both the European Council 
(in July 2011) and the Commission (2011a), for Italian authorities to approve an Annual Law on Com-
petition. Taking into account the main recommendations from the National Competition Authority, it 
would represent a useful tool for opening protected sectors further. -e European Commission suggested 
that the Competition Authority be empowered to e0ectively contest administrative and regional acts in 
contrast with market competition, and that it be more actively involved in regulatory impact assessment. 
-e Annual Law on Competition could provide binding provisions and guidelines for regional and local 
administration, in those sectors where unjusti/ed restrictive measures may arise.
Box 5.11 – Cresci Italia Decree, sectoral provisions
Among other provisions, the decree introduces measures that can reduce the quantitative barriers to the 
number of pharmacy licenses, previously limited to one in every 4,000 inhabitants. A number of prescrip-
tion drugs will also be made available in para-pharmacies and pharmacies and will be able to establish their 
working hours, apply discounts on any item independently. New pharmacy openings are being encouraged 
in shopping malls, train stations and airports.
With regards to the legal sector, slots for new notaries will be opened each year until 2014. Young entrepre-
neurs will be allowed to open their own LLC with a minimum budget of €1 and without the assistance of a 
notary. Professional tari0s will be progressively abolished, and professionals will have to provide customers 
with an estimate for their /nal compensation.
Fuel stations will be allowed to sell food, newspapers and tobacco. -e fuel station operators that do not own 
the plant will have the chance to take over it and they will then be entitled to choose their gas providers. Class 
actions will be simpli/ed and made more accessible.
A new independent regulatory authority for the transport sector will be established with the task of granting 
fair and non-discriminatory conditions for the access to rail, port and airport infrastructures and highway 
networks. -ese measures include de/ning criteria for the establishment of tari0s by the competent provid-
ers; /xing minimum quality standards for transport services under the obligation of public services of general 
economic interest and de/ning the minimum content of recipients’ rights, including reimbursement.
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Appendix  
Exit strategies in the labor market
"e current recession had an exceptionally high impact on labor markets. In the US, the gap between the 
peak level of employment just before the crisis and the through, 2 years after the initial shock, was larger 
than 6%. Further, the recovery has been the slowest ever in the post-war period in the US. Figure A1 
indeed represents the aftermaths of each of the recessions, and show in particular the percentage losses in 
employment over 50 months after the triggering of the recession, for all the NBER recessions since 1948. 
Most recessions but the current one ended after 24 months; many of the employment losses at the throu-
gh were below 3%. In contrast, in the current recession, 50 months after the beginning of the recession, 
the employment level in the US is still 3% below the pre-recession period. 
Figure A1 – Evolution of US employment during 12 episodes of recessions. 
Source: Billy McBride, http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2012/09/schedule-for-week-of-sept-30th.html
Why is it that the current recession is so speci(c? It is interesting to note that the 2001 recession was also 
quite slow to end, and, as the 2007 recession, had a speci(c cause: originating from a decline in asset 
prices and a contraction in the (nancial markets. 
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Indeed, (nancial crisis typically last very long and have extremely slow recoveries. "is recession was no 
exception to the rule. Figure A2 further documents this, in comparing the US employment evolution to 
the employment paths of several non-US economies that were hit by a (nancial crisis over the last decades: 
Japan, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Spain, as well as the Great Recession in 1929 in the US. "e current 
recession in the US is now an exception relative to these other crisis: while these crises led to very large 
employment losses (up to -20% in the worst cases at the through), the current US employment losses were 
limited to -6% and recover faster than for the other economies, where the recovery took a decade or more. 
Figure A2 – Evolution of US employment relative to other economies a+ected by (nancial crises
Source: Billy McBride, http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2012/09/employment-losses-comparing-(nancial.html 
"e two charts, taken together, are suggestive of the importance of counter-cyclical (scal and monetary 
policies to mitigate the initial impact of the (nancial shocks ; and of the importance of the resilience of 
labor markets, and in particular labor market ,exibility and the mobility of labor, to absorb the shock.
In Europe, what is also peculiar to the current crisis is the increased divergence across Euro area 
countries in both labor costs and current account surpluses/de(cits over the past decade. "is lasted until 
2009. Indeed, Figure A3 reports the evolution of nominal unit labor costs and the divergence pattern 
between 2000 and 2009. After 2009, signi(cant decline in unit labor costs were observed in Ireland, and 
to some extent, in Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Germany’s labor costs started to catch up from below towards other European countries, thanks to 
wage increases in 2009 and 2011. France and Italy, on the other hand, have not started their convergence 
yet: the unit labor costs only increased less fast after 2009. "e recent 2% increase in the minimum wage 
in France in July will not contribute to wage moderation, while the (scal shock in the French 2013 bud-
get is likely to reduce (rm’s investment and adversely a+ect productivity gains. "e prospect for France is 
increasing divergence in unit labor costs. 
Note surprisingly, as reported in Figure A4, France remains on its decennial trend of growing current 
account de(cit, while other countries display instead a pattern of convergence: the large current account 
de(cits of Southern European countries have been reduced signi(cantly. "ey are on the way to disappear. 
"e current account surplus in Germany has not really decreased, but at least its increase has been stopped 
since 2007. France is the exception and the current account de(cit is still growing. 
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